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SYNOPSIS 
The present century has witnessed the immense gTowth and power of compames 
registered under the Companies Act. Investment in companies has increased by leaps and 
bounds and the number of petsons holding shares in companies has increased 
tremendously. Many of these investors are minority shareholders who are vulnerable to 
oppression, discrimination and prejudicial conduct by the majority shareholders. 
Company Law therefore has a duty to ensure that the minority is adequately protected. 
The courts generally have been very reluctant to interfere in the 
management of companies owing to the fact that it is a separate ]~gal entity with its own 
board of directors. This judicial reluctance of the courts to interfere with the management 
of companies began with the notorious case of Foss v Harbottle ( 1843) 2 Hare 461. This 
reluctance of the courts led to abuses of power by those having a controlling stake, either 
directly or indirectly, in the company. Ultimately it was the minority shareholders in the 
company who were disadvantaged. 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to focus on the general development 
of the company law with respect to the protection of minority shareholders. The study 
will cover both the common law and the legislative endeavours made to provide adequate 
protection to minority shareholders. ln this respect comparison will be made with other 
jurisdictions, especially with the United Kingdom and the Australian legislative 
prov1s1ons. The study is divided into the following chapters. Chapter 1 is the 
Introduction chapter dealing with the object and the scope of the study. Chapter 2 will 
focus on the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 , its exceptions and 
limitations. Chapter 3 \viii trace the historical development of minority statutory 
protection. Chapter 4 will focus on the persons who may seek relief under section 181 
Companies Act 1965. Chapter 5 wilfbe based on the specific elements of section 181 and 
how the courts have interpreted the elements. Chapter 6 will focus on the remedies 
available to a member or debenture holder under section 181. Chapter 7 is the Conclusion 
chapter summarising the main limitations of the common . law fraud on the minority 
exception, the strengths and weaknesses of section 181 and suggested reforms to section 
181 to make it more effective. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the major problems in the Company Law is the control of the power weilded by 
the majority shareholders. The majority use their power to control and direct the 
company' s affairs. They can decide who sits on the board of directors and what 
resolutions are passed. If the board does not toe the line of the majority, the majority can 
dismiss the board and replace it with new members. 
In the management of a company' s affairs the majority is greatly assisted 
by the notorious rule in Foss v Harbottle1 which prevents a company' s members from 
suing to correct a wrong done to the company or in respect of an irregularity of the 
company's officers which can be regularised by the passing of a resolution at a general 
meeting. The rule in Foss v Harbottle was a major obstacle to minority protection. 
Although the courts developed a number of exceptions to the rule, the exceptions were 
inadequate to provide effective protection to the minority. 
Company Law witnessed a rapid development in the second-half of the 
nineteenth century and in early part of the twentieth century. It was clear during this 
development that the courts cannot be relied upon to develop effective principles of 
minority protection. Judges were reluctant to interfere with the internal administration of 
companies. It was therefore necessary to Parliament to step in and enact legislation to 
control the exercise of the majority' s power to provide weapons for the minority by 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 
which the minority could battle oppression, discrimination, unfair and prejudicial 
conduct. 
In Malaysia the new legislative spirit is enshrined in section 181 of the 
Companies Act 1965. Section 181 is one of the most important developments of modern 
Company Law. Its role in relation to the management of companies cannot be over 
emphasised. In this minor dissertation the writer makes a modest attempt to study its 
scope, strength and weaknesses. 
In the light of the above, the present study will focus on the limitations of 
the common law, the development of the minority statutory provisions in the other 
jurisdictions and will specifically focus on section 181 Companies Act 1965 of Malaysia. 
I. Objectives 
The objective of this study is to examine briefly the historical development of minority 
shareholders protection in companies, the main limitations of the common law rule in 
Foss v Harbottle and the limitations of the early minority shareholders statutory 
protection provisions. However, the main objective of the study is to focus and examine 
the significance and the impact of section 181 Companies Act 1965 on protection of 
shareholders and debenture holders in Malaysia. In this respect, comparisons will be 
made with the equivalent provisions in other Commonwealth Countries with specific 
reference to the United Kingdom section 459 Companies Act 1985 and the Australian 
section 260 Corporations Act 1989 and how the courts have applied and interpreted the 
various provisions in order to protect the rights of those entitled to protection under their 
respective legislations. 
II . Scope and Outline of the Study 
This study will be confined mostly to the statutory provisions and how the judiciary had 
interpreted the various elements in the statutes, persons entitled to seek relief under the 
provisions and to what extent the courts are able to provide a suitable remedy to them. 
The study will mainly focus section 181 Companies Act 1965 and how the Malaysian 
courts have responded in applying and interpreting the section and the difficulties faced 
by them. This study will not extent to other provisions in the Companies Act 1965 
which may be available to minority shareholders or debenture holders for protection of 
their rights, although certain sections may be briefly mentioned in the course of this 
study. 
This dissertation is divided into the following chapters : 
i) Chapter 2 will focus on the common law rule of Foss v Harbottle, its exceptions 
and the limitations of the rule. 
ii) Chapter 3 will focus on the historical development of the statutory minority 
provisions especially section 210 Companies Act 1948, United Kingdom and its 
adaptation in other Commonwealth Countries, its limitations and restriction in 
providing an effective remedy. The chapter will also introduce the new 
legislative proV1stons m the Commonwealth countries showing how the 
legislatures have widened the scope of minority shareholders protection 
tremendously. 
iii) Chapter 4 will focus on persons who can obtain a relief under section 181 
Companies Act 1965 to protect their rights. Comparisons will be made with 
similar provisions in other Commonwealth countries. 
iv) Chapter 5 will focus on the elements of section 181 Companies Act 1965 and how 
they have been interpreted by the courts. Comparisons will be made with similar 
provisions in other Commonwealth countries. 
v) Chapter 6 will focus specifically on the wide remedies available under section 181 
Companies Act 1965 and the discretion given to the courts in providing whatever 
remedy they may deem fit in bringing to an end the matters complained of 
vi) Chapter 7 will be the conclusion chapter and in this chapter the writer will 
summarise and focus on the main exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 
namely the fraud on the minority exception and highlight its limitations. 
Thereafter, a brief summary of the advantages and weaknesses of section 181 as 
an effective remedy will be looked at. Finally, the writer will provide some 
general recommendations and suggestions to further improve the effectiveness of 
section 181 Companies Act 1965. 
III. Research Methodology 
The research methodology for the purposes of this study was library research based at the 
University of Malaya Law Library. The materials in this study were obtained from 
relevant text books, local and international law reports, statutes, reviews, articles and law 
journals. 
The writing of this dissertation involved an in depth study and reading of 
cases and the resources mentioned above for the purposes of comparative studies between 
the Malaysian minority provision and the other Commonwealth provisions, especially 
England and Australia. 
The extensive reading of case law was necessary to provide a clear 
understanding as to how the local courts applied and interpreted section 181 Companies 
Act 1965. However, constant reference had to be made of foreign cases because of the 
limited amount of reported cases under section 181 Companies Act 1965. 
IV. Problems and Limitations 
The main problem and limitation faced by the writer is the extent and the depth to which 
each chapter in the dissertation had to be covered. Given the broad and general nature of 
the topic, the writer had to endeavour not to elaborate too much on each chapter of the 
study but rather provide a general study of the development of minority protection and to 
6 
focus on the significance of section 181 Companies Act 1965 as a powerful tool to a 
shareholder or a debenture holder in the Malaysian context. 
Although there was an abundance of written materials covering the topic 
of minority protection in the library but then most of these materials were by foreign 
writers based on foreign minority protection provisions. There were only a few articles 
on section 181 Companies Act 1965 written by local writers and the contents were rather 
inchoate in relation to the scope of this study. 
However, with the valuable assistance and guidance of the supervisor, 
Professor P.Balan, the writer managed to overcome the limitations and cover each 
chapter of the study satisfactorily and effectively for the purposes of this study. 
CHAPTER2 
THE RULE IN FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
I. Introduction 
Much of the development of the present company law regarding majority rule is 
attributable to the law of partnership which had its humble beginning in England in 
the mid-nineteenth century. 1 Investors and businessmen had to raise capital and the 
only possible means was to pull their resources and skills together and slowly these 
led to expansion of businesses. However the success of these partnerships depended 
on the close co-operation of the partners. In the course of the development of the law 
of partnership, the Chancellor generally would not intervene in the affairs or matters 
pertaining to the internal regulation of the partnership except with a view of 
dissolution. It is interesting to note that during this period, no mention of the principle 
of majority rule was ever made, nonetheless the majority was considered as having a 
right to jurisdiction over internal disputes.2 In fact, later, when companies were 
incorporated, the principle of non-intervention in their internal affairs became a norm, 
therefore basically leaving their management to those appointed or elected as 
directors by the members or shareholders of the companies concerned. Lord Eldon is 
reported to have said in Carlen v Drury:3 "This Court is not required on every 
2 
3 
Boyle AJ, 'The Minority Shareholder in the Nineteenth Century: A study in 
Anglo-American Legal History' (1965) 28 :MLR 317 
Ibid at p 318 
(1812) 1 Yes & B 154 
1 
Occasion to take the Management of Every Playhouse and Brewhouse in the 
Kingdom". This principle of majority rule which developed from the law of 
partnership, later became entrenched in modem company law under the concept 
known as "The Rule in Foss v Harbottle". 4 
In Edwards -y Halliwell,5 Jenkins L.J. gave his "classic definition"6 of 
the Foss v Harbottle rule as follows: 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle comes to no more than this. First, the 
proper plaintiff in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a 
company is prima facie the company itself. Secondly, where the 
afleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the 
company by a simple majority of the members, no individual 
member of the company is allowed to maintain an action in respect 
of that matter for the simple reason that, if a mere majority of the 
members of the company is in favour of what has been done, then 
cadet quaestio. 
In MacDougall v Gardiner7 Mellish L.J. referred to the second 
limb of the rule and said: 
4 
5 
6 
7 
In my opinion, if the thing complained is a thing which, in 
substance, the majority of the company are entitled to do, or 
something has been done irregularly which the majority of the 
company are entitled to do regularly, or if something has been 
done illegally which the majority of the company are entitled to do 
legally, there can be no use in having litigation about it, the 
ultimate end of which is only that a meeting has to be called, and 
then ultimately the majority gets it wishes. 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 
[1950] 2 AllER 1064 
So described by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v Newman 
Industries (1982] Ch 224 
(1875) 1 Ch.D.13 
In Burland v Earle, 8 Lord Davey summarised the rule as follows: 
It is elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock 
companies that the court will not interfere with the internal 
management of companies acting within their powers, and in fact 
has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is clear law that in order to 
redress a wrong done to the company or to recover moneys or 
damages alleged to be due to the company, the action should prima 
facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal. principles 
are laid down in the well known cases of Fcss v Harbottle [(1843) 
2 Hare 461] and Mo::ley v Alston [(1847) 1 Ph. 790] and in 
numerous later cases which it is unnecessary to cite. 
The importance of the rule in Foss v Harbottle rests on the fact that it 
eliminates multiplicity of legal actions being brought by individual disgruntled 
shareholders. This would save the company from wasting its valuable time and 
money in defending frivolous and vexatious actions brought by some troublesome 
minority. In a public company this is important because shareholders would have 
invested their money in the company and the directors are accountable as to how the 
monies are spent. The existence of the rule in Foss v Harbottle therefore helps the 
directors to spend more time in managing the company's business. This in tum will 
bring better returns to all the shareholders of the company. The Company' s reputation 
will also be protected. There will be more public confidence in the company. 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle recognises one of the most important 
principles of company law, that the company is a separate legal entity as enshrined in 
[1902] AC 83 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd. 9 Therefore, if any wrong is done to the company, it is 
the company which should bring an action. 
The rule can cause severe hardship to the minority. They are not only 
prevented from seeking redress to ao alleged wrong to the company but are prevented 
from complaining about internal irregularities. The minorities position i~ further 
made difficult by the rule in Percival v Wright 10 whereby the courts have held that 
directors owe duties only to the company and not to individual shareholders. 11 In this 
case the directors of a company purchased some shares from a member without 
revealing that negotiations were in progress for the sale of all shares in the company 
at a higher price. In fact no sale ever took place. The member concerned sought to 
have his sale to the directors set aside for non-disclosure. It was held that the sale 
should not be set aside since the directors owed no fiduciary duties to individual 
members. 
However, where it can be shown that the directors had undertaken to 
act as the shareholders agents in the transaction, then, the directors will owe them the 
ordinary fiduciary duties arising from that agency relationship. 12 In situations 
9 
10 
II 
12 
[1897] AC 22.See also Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd (1961] A.C 12, Macaura 
v Northern Assurance Co.Ltd [1925] AC 619 
[1902] 2 Ch 421. 
See also Dawson International Pic v Coats Patons Pic (1989) 5 BCC 405. 
Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444; Briess v Woolley [1954] AC 333 
involving takeover bids, directors generally owe a duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interest of the company. However, the courts have held that in advismg members 
of the company, whose shares are to be sold in a takeover bid, the directors do owe a 
duty to the shareholders to be honest and not to mislead them. 13 
The articles of most companies usually vest the power of management 
with the directors. An example of such an article is Article 73 of Table A. Article 73 
reads as follows: 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors 
who may pay all expenses incurred in promoting and registering 
the company, and may exercise all such powers of the company as 
are not, by the Act or by these regulations, required to be exercised 
by the company in general meeting, subject, nevertheless, to any of 
these regulations, to the provisions of the Act, and to such 
regulations, being not inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or 
provisions as may be prescribed by the company in general 
meeting; but no regulation made by the company in general 
meeting shall invalidate any prior act of directors which would 
have been valid if that regulation had not been made. 
Articles such as Article 73 bestow tremendous power on the board and 
takeaway managerial powers from the general meeting. 14 The power to sue or not to 
sue in the company's name would be decided by the board of directors. At one time 
it was believed that as a result of Marshall Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & 
13 
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Gething v Kilner (1972] 1 All ER 1166;Heron International Ltd v Lord 
Grade and Associated Communications Corporation Pic [1983] BCLC 244; 
Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch.34; 
Quin & Axtens v Salmon [ 1909] AC 442. But for contrary views see Goldberg 
( 1970) 33 MLR 177; Blackman ( 1975) 92 S.A.L.J 286 and Sullivan ( 1977) 93 
LQR S69. 
Co. Ltd, 15 the general meeting can commence an action without the approval of the 
board, despite an article similar to Article 13. However in a recent case. Breckland 
Group Holdings Ltd v London & Suffolk Properties Ltd, 16 Harman J indicated that he 
considered Marshall's Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd was 
"overwhelmed by the weight of au~horities" against it. An article similar to Article 73 
prevents shareholder intervention in matters relating to management and can put 
immense power in the hands of the board and it is obvious therefore the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle when added to the force of Article 73 can work as a severe setback for the 
minority. Again, where the wrongdoers control the majority votes at a general 
meeting, irregularity in the operation of the company may be made binding on the 
majority by the passing of a simple majority vote. Such is the severity of the rule that 
the minority in a company will be completely be in the hands of the majority if there 
were no exceptions to the rule. However four exceptions have been evolved by the 
courts to protect the minority in the company but as Professor Farrar, has remarked 
this is an area of the law "where obscurity and inconsistency are the order of the day" 
and the latest judicial pronouncements, instead of providing clarification have in fact 
"further confused an already blurred picture".17 
15 
16 
17 
(1909] 1 Ch 267. 
[1989] BCLC 100. 
J.H Farrar, N.E Furey & B.M.Hannigan. Farrar's Company Law, 3rd ed. 
London, Butterworths, 1991 p 445. 
A. The Exceptions in general 
i) Ultra vires acts: in cases where the acts complained of are wholly ultra vires 
the company or association, the rule has no application because there is no 
question of the transaction being confirmed by any majority; 
ii) Personal rights: where the personal and individual rights of the shareholders 
have been invaded, the rule has no application at all. 
iii) Special majorities: an individual member is not prevented from suing if the 
matter is one which could be validly be done or sanctioned, not by simple 
majority of the members but only by some special majority; 
iv) Fraud on the minority: where what has been done amounts to what is 
generally called in the cases as "a fraud on the minority" and the wrongdoers 
themselves are in control of the company, the rule is relaxed in favour of the 
majority shareholders' action on behalf of themselves and a11 others; 
Before studying the impact of s 181 of the Companies Act 1965, it is 
necessary to see the extent to which the four exceptions protect the minority at 
common law. The exceptions appear to be compartmentalised and unless the 
minority finds himself within the confines of one compartment, he may not succeed. 
A closer look at the exceptions will show that there are some major limitations: 
i) The ultra vires exception in a true sense is not an exception to the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle because if a company does not have the power to carry out certain 
transactions, then the transactions cannot be ratified by the majority. At 
common law, the company cannot enforce nor can its members ratify an ultra 
vires 18 transaction and any shareholder may apply for an injunction to restrain 
the company from proceeding with the transaction. At common law where a 
company or its officers enter into an ultra vires act or transaction the minority 
are not prevented in suing either the company or the board. Section 20 of the 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965 has changed the common law position to a 
large extent. Section 20(1) deals with acts of the company in excess of the 
powers conferred by the objects clause in its Memorandum. It provides in 
effect that neither a company nor a third party may rely on the ultra vires 
doctrine to avoid any act, transaction or conveyance. However by virtue of 
section 20(2)(b), any member of the company may rely on the company's lack 
of capacity or power in a suit against the company's officers. This in effect 
makes the common law exception irrelevant and a member can sue relying on 
section 20(2). The member's action under section 20(2) must be in the 
derivative fonn .. 19 It is subject to the tedious procedure and the rules of the 
derivative action. 
ii) It may be a personal right of a member is infringed. Personal rights may be 
18 
19 
conferred by the Companies Act, the constitutional documents or in a separate 
contract. The member when enforcing such a right is enforcing a right 
personal to him. Classic personal rights are voting rights and rights to 
Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co v Riche (1875) L.R. 7 H.L 653; Re Jon 
Beauforte (London) Ltd [1953] Ch. 131. 
Smith v Croft (No.2) [1988] Ch 114. 
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21 
22 
23 
dividends as provided in the company' s articles?0 Personal rights are not in 
the true sense an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. In Residues 
Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd'-1, King CJ of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia stated: 
A member's voting rights and the rights of participation which they 
provide in the decision making of the company are a fundamental 
attribute of membership ana· are rights which the member should be 
able to protect by legal action against improper diminution. The rule in 
Foss v Harbottle has no application where individual membership 
rights as opposed to corporate rights are involved 
Sometimes it is not clear whether an infringement is a personal right or a 
corporate right or both. Where doubts of this nature arise this exception is not 
an effective remedy for the members. The orthodox view is that a member 
cannot enforce rights enshrined in the articles, unless they are "membership 
rights" that is affecting him personally. In 1957, Lord Wedderburn in his 
seminal article22 on Foss v Harbottle pointed to Quin & Axtens Ltd v 
Salmon23 where the House of Lords appeared to uphold the principle that a 
member could enforce rights in the articles even though it was not a 
membership right. Despite Lord Wedderburn's strong arguments the orthodox 
According to Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 (Ch.D.70), members have the 
right to enforce provisions in Articles entitling them to have their votes 
counted at a general meeting. Similarly they have the right to enforce 
payment of a declared dividend: Wood v Odessa Waterwork Co. (1889) 42 
Ch.D.636. 
(1988) 14 ACLR 375 
Wedderburn KW, "Shareholders' right and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle" 
(1957) CU 194 and (1958) CU 993. 
[1909] AC 442. 
view is generally accepted as prevailing and continues to be espoused in the 
leading texts on Company Law. 24 This controversl5 is not in the minorities 
interest and the difficulty that sometimes arises in distinguishing membership 
rights and outsider rights can cause hardship to the minority. This problem is 
to an extent overcome by .section 181 though the section creates its own 
difficulties. This will be discussed at a later stage. 
iii) The rule does not apply where the matter in question requires not a simple 
24 
25 
26 
majority but some special majority or some special procedure. The only 
option for the majority in such cases is either to follow strictly the articles or 
to alter the articles. Ratification by an ordinary resolution will be ineffective. 
Thus in Edwards v Halliwell, 26 the minority successfully restrained an attempt 
by the majority to increase member's contribution without obtaining the two 
thirds majority as required under the rule. Again in Quin & Axtens Ltd v 
Salmon, the artides required specific transactions to have the consent of both 
Managing Directors. A transaction which did not satisfy the above 
requirement was held to be non-ratifiable by the majority. As a measure of 
minority protection, this exception will be unable to render protection to the 
L.C.B Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 5th ed. London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1922, p 286-287 ~ J.H Farrar, N.E Furey & B.M Hannigan, Farrar's 
Company Law, 3rd ed. London, Butterworths, 1991, p 126- 127. 
See Goldberg (1970) 33 MLR 177~ (1972) 35 MLR 362~ (1985) 48 MLR 158 
Blackman (1975) 92 S.AL.J 286; Sullivan (1977) 93 LQR 569; Drury,RR, 
[1986] CU 219~ Gregory, Roger (1981) 44 MLR 526 
[1950] 2 AllER 1064. 
minority where the majority are able to achieve the majority required for the 
particular resolution. Agam 1f the majority could control at least 75% of the 
votes they can alter the articles. 
iv) In respect of minority prote~tion the most important exception of the Foss v 
Harbottle rule is where there is fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers are 
in control. This exception which is in fact the true exception to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle has caused the most amount of litigation and also caused 
many other problems. Under this exception when a wrong amounting to a 
fraud on the minority is done to the company, a shareholder may bring an 
action on behalf of the company. Such an action is known as a derivative 
action. However to bring a derivative action, the shareholder must satisfy the 
following requirements: 
a) the acts complained of amount to a fraud on the minority and the 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of fraud on the minority 
before he is allowed to proceed. 
b) the shareholder must establish that the \vrongdoers control the 
company and refuse to remedy a wrong done to the company. This is 
generally the case where the general meeting or the board of directors 
have control over the \·otes actually cast by the \vrongdoers . 
The main problems associated with the above requirements are the 
meaning and interpretation given to the two words ' fraud' and 'control ', the issue of 
locus standi or standing to bring a derivative action and the issue of indemnity for the 
costs of a derivative action. The law on these issues are very uncertain and 
ambiguous and can cause hardship to the minority. 
B. Concept of fraud 
As to the concept of fraud, it is categorised as either common law fraud or equitable 
fraud. Common law fraud involves actual deceit or dishonesty. Equitable fraud is an 
application of a broader principle developed by the courts of equity which prevented 
the holders of various types of powers from exercising their powers improperly. 
'Fraud' in the context of ·fraud on the minority shareholders of a company' means an 
abuse of power whereby the majority secures an unfair gain at the expense of the 
minority. In fact in certain circumstances the company itself can be the injured party 
instead of the minority. Fraud has heen given a wide meaning and the following 
examples prove to that effect 
i) Where the majority usurp the corporate property or opportunities to 
themselves or to some other person. In Cook v Deeks, 27 the directors of a 
company negotiated a contract on behalf of the company and then diverted it 
to another company they had formed for this purpose. The directors who were 
27 [1916] 1 AC 554. 
also the majority shareholders wrongfully ratified their expropriation of the 
company' s property. 
ii) Where the majority expropriate the minority' s shareholdings. In Brown v 
British Abrasive Wheel Co,28 a company required further capital. The majority 
shareholders held 98% of the issued capital but would only provide further 
capital if they could buy up the remaining issued shares. The minority 
shareholders refused. A special resolution to alter the articles was passed 
permitting the majority shareholders to expropriate the shares of the minority. 
It was held that the alteration was a fraud on the minority. 
iii) Where the majority use their controlling power to prevent an action being 
brought against themselves. In Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Great London 
Counci/,29 the Council fonned a company which owned a block of flats . The 
company decided to sell long leases to the flats . The purchasers of each flat 
were given one share which carried no vote until all the flats were sold. In the 
meantime, the Council retained the sole voting rights. Before all the flats were 
sold, political control of the Council changed. The Council refused to sell the 
flats. The company then brought an action against the Council to prevent it 
from pursuing the changed policy. The Council by using its voting rights at a 
meeting of the company instructed the directo-:s to discontinue the action. A 
28 
29 
[1919] 1 Ch 290. 
[1982] 1 AllER 437. 
minority shareholder attempted to carry on the action in the name of the 
company and the court held that there was fraud on the minority. Megarry V-
C said: 
I feel little doubt that the Council had used its voting power not 
in order to promote the best interests of the company but in 
order to bring advantage to itself and disadvantage to the 
minority. 
iv) Where a majority member has obtained a benefit at the expense of the 
company. In Daniels v Daniels,30 the plaintiffs were minority shareholders in 
the third defendant company. The first and second defendants were majority 
shareholders and directors, upon whose instructions the company sold certain 
land to the second defendant below its market value. The plaintiffs brought an 
action against the defendants for this alleged breach. The defendants applied 
to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no cause of action because 
no fraud was alleged against the defendants concerned. Templeman J 
. 
nevertheless allowed the minority shareholder to maintain the action on the 
basis that 'a minority shareholder who has no other remedy may sue where 
directors use their powers intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or 
negligently m a manner which benefits themselves at the expense of the 
company.' 
30 [1978] 2 AllER 89 
In Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd 
and Ors,31 Gopal Sri Ram JCA considered the cases and held that: 
Although the real meaning of the phrase is unclear in the sense that 
one is unable as yet to determine its boundaries with any precision, 
an examination of the authorities leaves us to conclude that the 
following propositions may be taken as settled and beyond 
question: 
(1) the expression 'fraud on the minority' is a term of art and has 
absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with actual fraud or deception 
at common law; 
(2) lack of probity comes within the ambit of the expression. But it 
is not necessary to prove dishonesty before a minority shareholder 
may claim relief under the doctrine; and 
(3) it is sufficient for the plaintiff in an action grounded upon the 
doctrine to show that those wielding majority control abused the 
powers vested in them in the sense that they used or omitted to use 
their powers for an oblique or collateral motive or purpose and not 
for the true purpose for which the power was entrusted to them 
either by the memorandum and articles of association, by statute or 
the general law. 
Generally, it is difficult to define precisely the concept of fraud and 
this is an obstacle for the minority shareholder. The courts would have to rely on the 
facts before them to establish whether there was fraud. The courts must be careful 
because by giving too wide an interpretation to the word 'fraud', they may be 
encroaching on a shareholder's right to vote in whatsoever manner he wishes. This is 
because the right to vote is a proprietary righe2 
31 
32 
[1995] 3 MLJ 417 
North-West Transportation Co Ltd and Beatty v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 
589; Peter's American Delicacy Co Ltdv Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457; Mills v 
Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150. 
C. Wrongdoer control 
Then there is the issue of proving 'wrongdoer control', before the minority 
shareholder ca.! bring a successful derivative action. Again, there is no clear authority 
on what 'wrongdoer control' means and the law is in a state of authoritative chaos. 33 
One major hurdle faced by minority shareholders, arising from the 
concept of 'control' and which clearly shows the reluctance of the courts to intervene 
in a company's affairs is the case of Smith v Croft (No.2). 34 In this case, the plaintiff 
shareholders brought an action against the directors of the company on the grounds 
that they had acted ultra vires or had breached their fiduciary duties by paying 
themselves excessive salaries, had made improper payments to management 
companies they were associated with and also had entered into transactions involving 
the provision of financial assistance by the company in connection with the 
acquisitions of its shares in contravention of section 42 of the UK Companies Act 
1981 (now sections 151- 152 of the Companies Act 1985). In Smith v Croft (No.2), 
Knox J was of the view that if the majority of the shareholders who were independent 
of the wrongdoers decided not to pursue with the legal suit, then the plaintiff minority 
shareholder, even though he may have locus standi to sue, must not be allowed to 
proceed with the suit. However, the difficulty the courts would face is trying to 
establish who the 'appropriate independent organ' is. Knox J stated in the above case 
that the 'appropriate independent organ' would vary according to the constitution of 
33 
34 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers: Controls, Remedies and Decision 
Making, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p 592. 
[1988] Ch 114. 
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the company concerned and the identity of the defendants. This would mean that in 
certain situations a preliminary hearing has to be carried out to establish who the 
'independent organ' is. At times this might lead to lengthy and complicated trial. At 
most, the Smith v Croft (No.2) procedure will only be applicable in cases where the 
issue of an independent organ can be easily assessed and it can be shown that the 
minority shareholder has the backing of the majority of the independent shareholders, 
that is all those not in the alleged wrongdoers' camp.35 Then there is the issue of what 
test to apply to determine shareholder independence. Most probably a test similar to 
that postulated for alteration of articles in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd, 36 
that is whether there was a substantial risk of the votes having being cast in order to 
support the defendant wrongdoers as opposed to obtaining a benefit for the 
company.37 
Other than determining shareholder independence, there is the 
question of burden of proof that is required of minority shareholders to establish the 
lack of independence of the particular 'independent organ' concerned. Unless the 
minority shareholders can satisfy the burden of proof by producing sufficient 
evidence on the balance of probabilities to show that the votes of the 'independent 
35 
36 
37 
Prentice DD, 'Shareholder Actions: The rule in Foss v Harbottle' (1988) 104 
LQR 341 at p 345. 
[1900] 1 Ch 656. 
Stamp M, 'Minority Shareholders: another nail in the coffin' (1988) 9 Co 
Law 134 at p 135 
organ' were cast to support the wrongdoers, they would not be able to succeed in 
their derivative action. 38 
It is obvious that by leaving the decision to the independent organ, 
there is the danger that even if fraud is proven and wrongdoers are in control , no 
action can be taken if the majority of the independent shareholders refuse to do so. 
This could result if the majority shareholders of the company manage to persuade or 
convince the independent shareholders that it is not in the best interest of the 
company for them to pursue their action. This makes the law absurd because it seems 
to recognise that whenever fraud on the minority is alleged, it is better at the initial 
stage of the action itself, for the independent shareholders to decide whether a fraud 
has been committed. 39 
Further, as was rightly pointed out by D.D.Prentice,40 the reasoning of 
Knox J would most probably also apply to ultra vires or illegal transactions. 
Therefore even though these transactions cannot be ratified by the shareholders, the 
shareholders may resolve not to pursue a right of action arising out of them. This, 
D.D.Prentice points out, is equivalent to ratification, that is indirectly allowing or 
permitting shareholders to vote that no minority shareholder's action should be 
38 
39 
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Ibid at p 135 
Ibid 
Prentice, Supra n 35 at p 344 
brought. A learned writer, L.S.Seally says,41 
Has company law really been brought to this level of absurdity? 
What advantage is there to anyone in pretending that the real 
issues do not matter, and requiring the judge to speculate, en the 
sketchiest of evidence, about where "control" lies, which 
shareholders can be supposed "independent," and how such 
shareholders might be likely to vote at a hypothetical meeting 
which might itself have to reach decisions on no better evidence? 
If the Court of Appeal in Prudenti~l thought that their ruling would 
shorten and simplify litigation and reduce costs, the sorry history 
of Smith v Croft suggests otherwise. 
The courts would also have to contend with the question of whether 
control means 'de facto' or 'de jure' controL Here again the opinion of judges and the 
courts vary. Vinelott J in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No2/2 was prepared to accept that control existed where there was no real 
possibility that the issue would be put to the shareholders in a way which would 
enable them to exercise a proper judgment on the issue. In his opinion, the exception 
would apply whenever the defendants were shown to be able by means of their 
manipulation of their position in the company to ensure that an action was not 
brought by the company. Vinelott J pointed out to a number of cases wherein the 
above situation had arisen.43 However, in the Court of Appeal, the Lord Justices did 
not accept this view. The Court of Appeal took a conservative view of control. The 
Court of Appeal criticised Vinelott J's definition of de facto control and said that 
41 
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Sealy LS, 'More Bleak News for the Minority Shareholder' (1987) CU 46 at p 
400 
[1981] 1 Ch 257 
Pavlides v Jensen [1956] 1 Ch 565~ Atwool v Merryweather, 37 U Ch 35, 
Kerry v Maori Dream Gold Mines Ltd (1898) 14 TLR 402 
because of that definition , he had to hear the thirty day action before deciding 
whether the exception applied. Tremendous cost was involved and in fact at the end 
of the thirty days the substantive matter had in actual fact been heard. The Court of 
Appeal however said that control embraces a broad spectrum extending from an 
overall absolute majority of votes at one end to a majority of votes at the other end 
made up of those likely to be cast by the delinquent plus those voting with him as a 
result of influence and apathy.44 
Further, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that when the issue of 
control or no control is raised as a preliminary point to decide whether it is a case 
which should proceed to full trial of the alleged misconduct by the majority, the court 
will not be in a position to investigate the misinformation of shareholders by the 
wrongdoers. The court should therefore adjourn the case so that a general meeting of 
shareholders may be held to investigate the allegations of misinformation of 
shareholders. The main problem here is that the general meeting may not be in a 
position to investigate and verifY disputed facts . Basically, what the Court of 
Appeal's decision seems to establish is that control means having a firm majority of 
votes.45 
Then, there is the issue of where fraud is pleaded but control is equally 
held between the plaintiff and the defendant. In Ting Chong Maa v Chor Sek 
44 
45 
(1982] Ch 204 at p 219 per Cumming- Bruce, Templeman and Brightman 
LJJ. 
Chris Shepherd, Company Law Textbook, 7ili ed. London, HL T Publications, 
1995, at p.249 
Choon, 46 the plaintiff and the defendant had owned the issued share capital of the 
company in equal shares. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had obtained 
secret profits by diverting the company's customers to another firm. The plaintiff 
sued on behalf of the company, the director for accounts and inquiries and payments 
of sums of money. The defendant had applied for the statement of claim to be struck 
_on the ground that plaintiff had no locus standi. The court held that there had been no 
clear majority so that the plaintiff could not be a minority shareholder or the 
defendant the majority shareholder. However, the court said that the action should be 
allowed to proceed because the defendant being the managing director and all things 
being equal, he would prima facie have had de facto control of the company. 
Similarly, later in England, in the case of Barrett v Duckett & Ors, 47 
Sir Mervyn Davies held that a fifty per cent shareholder who was complaining about 
the behaviour of the other fifty per cent shareholder cum director, was a minority 
shareholder for the purposes of a derivative action. 
The above two cases show the inconsistency of the courts as far as the 
requirement of wrongdoer control with regard to the fraud exception to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle. But then they seem to support the view of Jesse! M.R. in Russell v 
46 
47 
[1989] 1 MLJ 477 
[1993] BCC 778 
Wakefield Waterworks Co, 48 where he suggested that the rule in Foss v Harbottle is a 
"general one and does not apply to a case where the interests of justice require the 
rule to be dispensed with". The view of Jessel M.R. can be appreciated too in 
situations where a minority fails to plead fraud, as in the case of Daniels v Daniels. 
The court recognised the fact that sometimes fraud is hard to plead and difficult to 
prove but nonetheless allowed the minority shareholder's action on the grounds of 
wrongdoer control. In a nutshell, 'it is better to run the risk of interfering with the 
internal management of a company than to run the risk of denying justice to a party 
by refusing to hear his case'.49 
D. Locus standi 
Another debatable issue with the derivative action, is the question of whether the 
minority shareholder has a standing or locus standi to bring an action alleging fraud 
on the minority. The law is not clear on this and the courts are divided in their 
opinion. In Regina v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of 
Self Employed and Small Business Ltcf0 the Court of Appeal stated that the issue of 
locus standi should be decided in isolation before the full trial of the matter. 
However, on appeal, the House of Lords overruled the decision of the Court of 
Appeal and said that it was \vrong to treat the question of locus standi as a threshold 
issue. However, later, a differently constituted Court of Appeal in the case of 
48 
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Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2), was of the view that to 
allow the minority to pursue a derivative action on the grounds of fraud on the 
minority would be wrong and unjust because it will involve a lengthy trial. It is 
therefore best that the question of standing be decided as a preliminary issue. This 
will save the company being involved in unnecessary legal action and save time and 
expense. The other view is that in allowing the miaority to prove that they have locus 
standi to bring an action, the law might deprive them of remedying a wrong done to 
the company. This is because the preliminary trial itself may be time consuming and 
very expensive for the minority shareholders concerned. 
Although subsequent English cases like Smith v Croft and Estmanco 
(Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council have followed the principle as stated in 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd, the courts in Australia have 
refused to accept the view postulated by the English Court of Appeal as laying down 
an universal principle. In Hurley and Anor v BGH f..'ominees Pty Ltd and Ors. 51 King 
CJ said: 
51 
do not think that the procedure suggested in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 All 
ER 354 could be applied in all cases. In many cases a hearing to 
determine whether there was a prima facie case would be alm0st 
as long as a full trial and a good deal less satisfactory. In such 
cases the only reasonable course may be to determine the issue of 
standing, if raised as a preliminary issue, on the assumption that 
the allegations in the statement of claim are correct. Even on the 
basis it may be desirable in certain cases to distinguish sharply 
between the issue whether the allegations in the statement of 
claim, if true, disclose legal liability to the company and the issue 
whether the plaintiff has standing to enforce any liability which 
(1983) 2 ACLR 497 
might be disclosed. It seems to me that the procedure for the 
determination of the issue of locus standi ought to be determined 
in each individual case according to what appears to be just and 
convenient in the circumstances of that case. 
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The above approach has been consistently fo11owed in other Austrahan 
cases. In Eromanga Hydrocarbons NL v Australis Mining NL & Ors52 and Bia/a Pty 
Ltd v Mal/ina Holdings Ltd,53 the courts held that the plaintiff need only show a 
prima facie case and there was no necessity of determining the question of locus 
standi. 
Malaysian cases decided after Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd appear to show a leaning towards a preliminary hearing as stated by the 
Court of Appeal in the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd case. 
Huang Ee Hoe & Ors v Tiong Thai King & Ors54 is one such case. The preliminary 
hearing point was also dealt with by Jemuri Serjan CJ (Borneo) in A/or Janggus Soon 
Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors55 . His Lordship said:56 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Lord Templeman's observations [in the Prudential Assurance case] 
clearly enjoin the courts in such cases as the present that this 
crucial issue must first be determined at a preliminary hearing so 
that if the plaintiffs fail then cadit quaestio. What happened before 
Vine1ott J's court happened also in the instant case though, 
admittedly, there was a hearing on a point of law on a different 
issue altogether and there was no argument and no direction by the 
(1988) 14 ACLR 486 
(1988) 6 ACLC 1138 
[ 1991] 2 MLJ 51 
(1995] 1 MLJ 241 
ibid at p 255 
learned judge to have this crucial issue argued and witnesses 
examined before him in order to determine that issue. 
His Lordship further said:57 
... we are satisfied in our own minds that the learned judge had 
erred in the same way as Vinelott J in [the Prudential Assurance 
case] in not dealing with the question whether the plaintiffs' case 
comes within the exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle's case. 
Hi.s Lordship's decision on the locus standi, therefore, is not 
definitive and conclusive as there were no adequate and 
comprehensive arguments on that issue to enable him to do so. 
At least one Malaysian judge has expressed support for Vinelott J. In 
Tan Guan Eng & Anor v Ng Kweng Hee & Ors,58 Edgar Joseph Jr J said obiter: 59 
For myself, I would respectfully agree with the view of Vinelott J 
for, to quote Mr Walter Woon in his admirable work in Company 
Law at p 240, ' There seems nothing wrong in principle with 
Vinelott J's reasoning in this respect. After all, if the wrongdoers 
manage to obtain the approval of the majority by fraud or duress, it 
should surely be necessary to allow a minority member to bring an 
action against them even if the company will not.' 
In this context it is pertinent to refer to an old Malaysian case, Peck v 
Russel 60decided more than 50 years before the Court of Appeal decision in 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) . In that case the Court 
57 
!bid at p 258 
58 [1992] 1 MLJ 487 
59 
Ibid at p 500 
60 (1923) 4 FMSLR 32 
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of Appeal of the Malay States ordered that there should be a trial of all the facts 
before the question oflocus standi was decided. Woodward CJC held:6 1 
r do not think a difficult point like this should be decided at this 
stage. I think it would be much safer to decide it after all the facts 
have been investigated. The court will then be in a better position 
to judge whether the rule in Foss v Harbottle should be applied, or 
whether the case is one of the exceptions. 
E. Costs 
Another limitation for the minority shareholder, is the cost of bringing a derivative 
action. In Wallersteiner v Moir, 62 the English Court of Appeal held that it was open 
to the court in a minority shareholders action to order that the company should 
indemnify against the costs incurred in the action even if the action was unsuccessful. 
The Court of Appeal's reasoning was based on the fact that trustees63 or agents64 who 
pursue a legal action on behalf of their trusts or principals respectively are generally 
indemnified for the costs involved in bringing any action to protect the trust or the 
interest of the principals. Buckley L.J. in the Court of Appeal stated:65 
6 1 
62 
63 
64 
65 
. . . where a shareholder has in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds sued as plaintiff in a minority shareholder' s action, the 
benefit of which, if successful, will accrue to the company and 
only indirectly to the plaintiff as a member of the company and 
which it would have been reasonable for an independent board of 
directors to bring in the company's name, it would, I think, clearly 
Ibid at p 45 
[1975] 2 WLR 389 
In re Beddoe (1893) l Ch 547 
Pettman v Keble (1850) 9 C. B 547 
Supra n 58 at p 407H 
be a proper exercise of judicial discretion to order the company to 
pay the plaintiffs costs. 
33 
But, in Smith v Croft, Walto_n J considered that this would impose an 
unfair burden on a company. The judge was of the view that it was necessary for the 
plaintiff to show that he lacked the resources to finance the actions. If he was in 
reality a 'nominal plaintiff representing a group of shareholders then the resources of 
these shareholders should be taken into account. He also said that normally only a 
percentage of these costs should be paid as this would provide the plaintiff with the 
incentive to pursue the matter diligently to recover the balance. 
Although both the above cases seem to suggest that some sort of 
compensation or indemnity should be provided for minority shareholders, there are 
still many other problems that a court would encounter in trying to establish a 
procedure whereby a proper system of compensation or indemnity could be set up to 
help minority shareholders. In the writer's opinion this would lead to preliminary 
trials similar to the issues of establishing locus standi or independent shareholder 
control. The very fact of holding a preliminary trial and establishing whether a 
minority shareholder is entitle to costs may discourage the minority shareholders 
from pursuing a derivative action. They may not be in a position or have the means to 
pay for the cost of the preliminary trial and may not stand to gain much at the end of 
the day. However, much would depend on the facts of each case. 
34 
Lord Denning M.R.66 in the Court of Appeal did propose a procedure 
whereby the minority shareholder can apply ex parte to the master for directions with 
the support of a counsel's opinion as to whether there is a reasonable case or not. He 
said that this preliminary application should be simple and inexpensive and must not 
lead to a mini trial. But then this is only a general statement, because there is no 
assurance that every application will be simple and inexpensive. 
Then there is the issue of how the costs is to be imputed. Nothing 
concrete was put forward by the Court of Appeal, although Lord Denning M.R. and 
Buckley LJ suggested that costs should be allowed at least on a common fund basis. 
Buckley LJ went further and said that where necessary the costs should be given on 
an indemnity basis. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that the lack of clear authority 
on the question of indemnity for costs may be a real hindrance for a minority 
shareholder to bring an action under the rule in Foss v Harbottle"-
F. Ratifiable and non-ratifiable wrongs 
An unresolved problem in relation to the derivative action is the question of ratifiable 
and non -ratifiable wrongs . Ratification would basically exonerate or relieve 
\VTongdoers, generally the directors, from being made liable for breach of their duties 
66 
Supra n 58 at p 397D-E 
35 
towards the company. 67 Illegal or ultra vires acts, however, are non-ratifiable. The 
question of ratification has given rise to many difficult debatable issues. The general 
principle is ratification of any act done by wrongdoers by the general meeting would 
prevent the general body of shareholders later from bringing a derivative action.68 
However, whether the general meeting can ratify such a wrong or not is questionable. 
Given that companies are generally managed by the board of directors, would it not 
be proper for the board of directors to ratify any act done? 
The questions to be addressed here is, what are the limits on the 
majority's power to ratify breach of directors duties, when would this ratification be 
considered a fraud on the minority and which of the shareholders of the company are 
entitled to vote in a meeting for ratification of the breach of the directors duties. The 
writer will endeavour to answer these questions through some of the following case 
examples. A classic case example is the case of North-West Tramportation Co. Ltd 
v Beatty, 69• wherein one of the company's directors sold a ship he owned to the 
company at a profit. Here there was a clear conflict of interest between the director's 
personal interest and his duties to the company. A minority shareholder took an 
action to set aside the transaction. However, a shareholders' meeting was convened 
and the majority shareholders voted and ratified the contract. The Privy Council 
67 
68 
69 
This is especially true in small private companies. In this type of companies 
the directors are generally the majority shareholders. 
MacDougall v Gardiner (No.2) (1875) 1 Ch.D 13; Burland V Earle [1902]. 
AC94. 
(1887) 12 App Cas 589. 
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stated that a resolution of the shareholders, passed by a simple majority, was 
sufticient to render the contract between the director and the company non-voidable. 
The above case raises the _question as to whether the director, who 
held a sufficient number of s~ares to control the general meeting, was entitled to 
vote. The Privy Council was of the opinion that every shareholder has a perfect right 
to vote upon any question even though he may have a personal interest in the subject 
matter of the resolution. 70 
The North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty case clearly shows the 
potential of interested parties (like the director) to easily use the general meeting to 
control any act of ratification. This control may of course arise, either by way of 
actual votes or the use of the proxy system or by way of manipulation or use of 
71 pressure on shareholders. 
70 
71 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
vi ) 
This is consistent with longstanding authority that a shareholder's right to 
vote is a proprietary right: Pender v Lushington (1877) 5 Ch D 70. 
However, there are now provisions in the Companies Act 1965 to protect the 
manipulation of corporate control and decision making. Some of the 
provisions are as follows: 
S 69E- Substantial shareholder to notifY company of his interests. 
S 69F - Substantial shareholder to notifY company of change in his interests. 
S 69G - Person who ceases to be substantial shareholder to notifY company. 
S 69L - Company to keep register of substantial shareholders. 
S 690 - Power of company to require disclosure of beneficial in its voting 
shares. 
For the purposes of the above sections, s 6A defines what is meant by 
"Interests in shares,. 
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Although the law imposes strict fiduciary duties on the directors, 72 the 
mere fact of allowing directors to vote in a general meeting would at times allow 
them to be absolved from any wrongdoing to the company. If such be the case, the 
very purpose of the formulation of the fiduciary duties on directors to act in the best 
interest of the company is a waste oftaxpayers' money. 
Generally, if the directors have acted in their own interests rather than 
the interests of the company, then any ratification by the majority shareholders can be 
challenged by the minority shareholders: Ngurli Ltd v McCann. 73 In Bamford v 
Bamford, 74 the court held that the general meeting can ratify an improper exercise of 
powers by directors provided the directors honestly believed that their actions are in 
the best interest of the company. The problem in this case was that the court failed to 
consider the fact that the majority may be committing a fraud on the minority by 
ratifying the directors improper exercise of power. 
72 
73 
74 
Duty to act honestly duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose, duty to 
retain discretion duty to avoid conflict of interest duty to act with care and 
diligence. 
(1953) 90 CLR 425 
( 1970] Ch 212. In this case, the directors of Bam fords Ltd allotted shares to 
Burgers for the purpose of preventing a takeover of the company. 
Shareholders in favour of the takeover applied to court for a declaration that 
the allotment to Burgers was invalid. A general meeting of Bamford's Ltd 
was called to pass a resolution ratifying and approving the allotment of shares. 
The Court of Appeal held that the directors had made full disclosure of all the 
circumstances relating to the share issue to the general meeting and therefore 
their actions were capable of being ratified by it and the directors excused 
from liability. 
In Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd, 75 the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal, in considering the effect of a resolution of the general meeting of 
shareholders, dealing with an improper exercise of powers by directors, was of the 
opinion that ratification of such a transac~ion was possible provided full and frank 
disclosure of all material facts. including the fact that there is a breach of duty, had 
been made to. the shareholders. 
The above position IS further fortified in the case of Residues 
Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd, 76 wherein King CJ by way 
of obiter dictum stated that shareholders have a personal right against the dilution of 
voting power by the issue of shares to achieve an improper purpose and reiterating 
that the voting power of the majority may not be exercised in a way which 1s 
oppressive of or in fraud of minority shareholders. 
There are also conflicting authorities as to whether the majority in 
general meeting can ratify a director's breach of duty in not exercising proper skill 
and care (negligence of the director). In Pavlides v Jensen, 77 the court held that since 
negligence does not fall under any of the exceptions in the rule in Foss v Harbottle 
' 
therefore no action can be brought against the directors by the majority shareholders. 
75 
76 
77 
[1975] 2 NSWLR 666. The facts of this case were similar to Bamford v 
Bamford, except that the directors in Winthrop Investments Ltd sought 
approval from the general meeting before actually issuing the shares. 
(1988) 14 ACLR 569. 
[ 1956] Ch 565 
But then later in the case of Daniels v Daniels, 78 the court held that even though there 
is no fraud, the directors cannot be allowed to benefit from their negligence. The 
court distinguished the case of Pavlides v Jensen on the basis that in Pavlides v 
Jensen, the directors did not make any pro_fit from their negligence. Templeman J in 
Daniels v Daniels stated: 
The authorities which deal with simple fraud on the one hand and 
gross negligence on the other do not cover the situation which 
arises where, without fraud, the directors and majority shareholders 
are guilty of a breach of duty which they owe to the company, and 
that breach of that duty not only harms the company but benefits 
the directors. In that case it seems to me that different 
considerations apply. If minority shareholders can sue ·if there is 
fraud, I see no reason why they cannot sue where the action of the 
majority and the directors, though without fraud, confers some 
benefit on those directors and majority shareholders themselves. It 
would seem to me quite monstrous- particularly as fraud is so hard 
to plead and difficult to prove- if the confines of the exception to 
Foss v Harbottle, were drawn so narrowly that directors could 
make a profit out of their negligence. 
The above case illustrations no doubt show that the courts do impose 
certain limitations on the shareholders power to ratify and prevent abuse of power. 
This is important, otherwise, the power of ratification combined with the rule in Foss 
v Harbottle will result in the creation of a legal regime that would perpetuate 
injustice toward minority shareholders. 79 
78 
79 
[1978J 2 W.L.R 73 at p 79-80 
Friedman S, 'Ratification of Directors' Breaches' (1992) 10 C and SLJ 252 at 
p255. 
G. Director's breach of fiduciary duties 
As to which is the right organ of the company to ratify any act done, the problem can 
be seen with reference to directors breach of fiduciary duty in misappropriating 
corporate opportunities. The fiduciary duty imposed here is rather strict. In Regal 
Hastings Ltd v Gulliver, 80 the CQurt held that the directors could protect themselves if 
they had obtained the approval of the company's share!:10lders in a general meeting. 
But then, there seem to be conflicting authorities on this issue. For instance, in Pesos 
Silver Mines v Cropper, 81 the court was of the opinion that where the board of 
directors decide not to pursue a business venture, then it was open to an individual 
director to take the business venture for himself. It is argued that by refusing or 
rejecting the corporate opportunity in good faith, the board had removed it from the 
scope of the defendant's fiduciary duties. 
A similar situation arose in the case of Queensland Mines Ltd v 
Hudson, 82 wherein the board of directors of Queensland Mines Ltd (a joint venture 
between two companies) decided not to take a valuable iron ore exploration license 
from the Tasmanian Government owing to financial constraints. The license was then 
taken over by Hudson who controlled one of the companies holding shares in 
Queensland Mines Ltd. Later Hudson was sued by Queensland Mines Ltd on account 
for the profits he made from the license. The Privy Council held that once the board 
80 
81 
82 
[1967] 2 AC 134 
(1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1 
(1978) 18 ALR 1 
was fully informed and had rejected the license, it was open to Hudson to do 
whatever he wanted. 
It is argued that although the decision in Pesos Silver Mines can be 
justified on the grounds that tl)e director who took the corporate opportunity, took it 
on the basis of information acquired by him on his private capacity, the same cannot 
be said in the case of Queensland Mines Ltd because Hudson was acting ostensibly 
on behalf of Queensland Mines Ltd at the time he acquired the license concerned. 
Nevertheless, both the case seem to suggest that in certain circumstances, the board 
of directors may override the requirement of ratification by the general meeting of 
shareholders, thus leaving an undue concentration of powers in the hands of directors, 
and thus allowing the directors effectively to act as judges in their own cause.83 This 
would mean that minority shareholders would not even have a chance to vote and 
decide on this matters at a properly convened meeting of shareholders. 
The only solution to the above difficulty is to treat the shareholders as 
the appropriate organ for ratification. But then, there will be the problem of what is 
the appropriate majority of shareholders required to ratify any act in any particular 
given situation. 
However, this may not be a practicable solution. Certain decisions 
may have to be made by the board of directors for commercial reasons. Therefore, it 
83 Friedman S, Supra n 76 at p 266 
may be necessary for the proper functioning of the company to define which matters 
should be ratified by the general meeting or by the board of directors and who are the 
parties who are entitled to vote in either situation. This is important because in 
situations where there is a breach of duty.by directors, the general meeting cannot 
ratify such breach of directorS: duties, where it can be shown that the majority in 
ratifying ," had failed to act in the best interest of the company. 84 In situations where 
the directors are also the majority shareholders and are able to control the majority 
votes at the general meeting of shareholders, any exercise of power of the directors to 
ratify a breach of their duty would be a fraud on the minority and therefore would be 
invalid.85 
H. Should there be a ftfth exception? 
It has been suggested in some cases that a minority action may be permitted where 
justice requires that the court should intervene to assist an otherwise helpless 
minority. This is sometimes known as the 'fifth exception' to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle. Since the other exceptions in many ways limit an action to be brought by a 
minority shareholder, therefore this exception would be relevant and useful for a 
minority shareholder. This exception allows the court to use its discretion and based 
on equitable principles, the court may decide whether a minority shareholder is 
entitled to bring a personal or a derivative action. In Heyting v Dupont, 86 Russel,L.J., 
84 
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Winthrop Investments Ltdv Winns Ltd£1975] 2 N.S.W.L.R 666. 
Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554. 
[1964] 2 AllER 273. 
said (obiter):87 
I am prepared to assume for the purposes of this case (though I 
must not be understood as accepting it as a proposition of law) that 
there may be occasions in which justice requires departure from 
the rule when all that is asserted is damage to the company arising 
from misfeasance in withholding ~n asset of the company, without 
fraud or ultra vires. To my mind, however, it is quite plain that 
justice does not requir~ it in the present case". 
In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) and 
Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council, the Court of Appeal in 
England was not in favour of the concept of justice because it was an impractical test. 
However, Sir Robert Megarry VC, in Eastmanco v Greater London Council did 
recognize the fact that although the concept of justice is not the test, it is an important 
reason for making exceptions from the rule. 
Although in England, this exception has never been glVen due 
recognition, the same cannot be said of other commonwealth countries. In Nigeria, 
the Supreme Court in Edokpolo and Co Ltd v Sem-Edo Wire Ind Ltd and Ors88 held 
that a minority shareholder can rely on the fifth exception to bring an action against 
the majority shareholders. In Australia in Hawkesbury Development Co Ltd v 
Landmark Finance Pty Ltd. 89 the court recognised the fact that it is useful not to limit 
the exceptions in the rule in Foss v Harbottle and keep the door open lest in some 
extreme unusual circumstance injustice may result from applying the rule. Although 
87 Ibid at p 279 
88 [1984] NSCC 553 
89 [1969] 2 NSWLR 782 
later, in two other Australian case , the courts doubted the existence of the fifth 
exception but the recent decision in Biala Pty Ltd & Anor v Mal/ ina Holdings & 
Ors90 clearly shows the significance and the usefulness of the fifth exception in 
Australia. 
In Biala Pty Ltd & Anor v Mal/ina Holdings Ltd & Ors, there was a 
clear fraud on the minority shareholders. However before the date of the trial the 
defendants were no more in control of the company. This made it difficult for the 
plaintiffs to satisfy the wrongdoer control element for proving fraud on the 
minorities. However, the court by looking at all the facts and the circumstances of the 
case came to the conclusion that for justice to be done, the plaintiffs should be 
allowed to proceed with the claim. Jpp J said: 
90 
The circumstances of modem commercial life are very different to 
those which existed when Foss v Harbottle was decided. The body 
of shareholders of a public company is ordinarily far greater in 
number, and the controlling minds of individual shareholders are 
far more difficult to identify than was the case with the relatively 
small corporations that existed 150 years ago. These developments 
and the complexities and sophistication of modem shareholding 
make it often very difficult to bring derivative claims within the 
established exceptions. To the extent that policy may be relevant in 
determining whether a fifth and general exception to the rule 
should be recognized, I consider it to be desirable to allow a 
minority shareholder to bring a derivative claim where the justice 
of the case clearly demands that such a claim be brought, 
irrespective of whether the claim falls within the confines of the 
established exceptions. 
In Malaysia although the courts have not clearly endorsed the rule but 
(1993) 11 ACSR 285 
Gopal Sri Ram JCA in the Court of Appeal in Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong 
Industrial Park (Me/aka) Sdn Blul' and in the Federal Court in Owen Sim Liang Khui 
v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhc/2 expressed his preference to the fifth exception. The 
importance of the recognition of the rule in Malaysia can be seen in Ting Chong Maa 
v Chor Sek Choon, where a situation of equal shareholding arose and the issue as to 
whether the plaintiff was a minority shareholder was questioned. Peh Swee Chin J (as 
he then was) rightly recognised the fact that being a majority or minority shareholder 
is not a conclusive test and it is therefore important to take into consideration de facto 
controL It is common in modem day companies that mere shareholding is not enough 
for one to maintain control of a company but rather on how much influence, power 
and money one has to manipulate decision making. 
II. Conclusion 
The Foss v Harbottle Rule is a major obstacle for the minority and their only hope 
lies in its exceptions. But the exceptions are subject to intricate rules and procedures. 
It is surprising that such an important area of company law should be subject to 
many obscure and inconsistent rules. It is regretted that the latest judicial 
pronouncements, like the Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd 
(No.2) and Smith v Croft (No.2) have increased the obscurity and have created further 
obstacles for the minority. 
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It is obvious that some other means have to be devised by company 
law to protect the interest of minorities. A minority member may complain of 
improper dealings, harassment, oppression, discrimination, prejudice and other forms 
of unfair conduct. The legislature has responded by creating statutory remedies. The 
principal remedy is s 181 of the Companies Act 1965, which has its genesis in s 186 
of Uniform Companies Act 1961 of Australia. The Australian section can be traced 
to s 21 0 of the Companies Act 1948 of United Kingdom. Section 21 0 broke new 
grounds in 1948 by providing to an oppressed shareholder an alternate remedy to 
winding up and also a hope of overcoming (in appropriate circumstances) the rigours 
of the Foss v Harbottle Rule. To these matters, this dissertation will now turn. 
CHAPTERJ 
HISTORY OF MINORITY PROTECTION 
UNDER COMPANIES LEGISLATION 
I. Introduction 
The many obstacles and restrictions facing a minority shareholder relying on the 
exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, supposedly came to an end when section 
210 of the Companies Act 1948, United Kingdom was passed by the United Kingdom 
Parliament. Section 210 was the result of the recomrnen<;iations of the Cohen 
Committee. 1 The Cohen Committee was concerned with the wide scale abuses of 
power especially in private companies whereby shareholders were locked into the 
company because of the refusal of the directors to register transfer of their shares. 
Shareholders in private companies are generally not able to dispose of their shares in 
the market easily. Further, the committee was aware of the fact that directors paid 
excessive remuneration t<' themselves, thus preventing shareholders from getting 
reasonable dividends for their investments. 
The introduction of section 210 was also timely because of the 
harshness of the just and equitable ground of winding up remedy that was available to 
a minority shareholder. 2 For instance in Re Yenidge Tobacco Co. 3 it was held that 
2 
3 
Report on Company Law Reform 1945 (Cmnd.6659). 
Now s 122 (l) (g) Insolvency Act, 1986, U.K~ s 218(i) Companies Act 1965, 
Malaysia. 
[1916] 2 Ch 426 
47 
48 
where two principal directors and shareholders were in complete deadlock, it would 
be just ?.~d e~!!!t~b!e tc wind up the company even though the company was a viable 
and profitable company. 
In situations like this, it is obvious that the remedy was ineffective, in 
the sense that the company had to be wound up to bring to an end a dispute between 
shareholders. 
Section 210 ofthe Companies Act 1948 reads as follows: 
"(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of 
the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some 
part of the members, (including himself) or, in a case falling 
within s.169 (3) 4 of this Act, the Board of Trade, may make an 
application to the court by petition for an order under this section. 
"(2) If on any such petition the court is of the opinion - (a) that 
the company's affairs are being conducted as aforesaid: and (b) 
that to wind-up the company could unfairly prejudiced that part of 
the members, but otherwise the facts would justify the making of a 
winding-up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that 
the company should be wound-up~ the court may, with a view 
to bringing to an end the matter complained of, make such order as 
it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's 
affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members 
of the company by other members of the company or by the 
company and, in the case of a purchase by the company, for the 
reduction accordingly ofthe company's capital, or otherwise." 
The most significant point about section 210, is that, it enabled the 
court to provide whatever remedy it thought fit. However, the effectiveness of the 
4 S 169(3) gives the Board of Trade power to petition for a winding up or for an 
order under s 210 if it appears from the report of an inspector that the 
company's business is being conducted with an intent to defraud creditors or if 
there has been misconduct and misfeasance in the formation or management 
of the company. 
5 
6 
7 
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section was rather minimal because between 1948 and 1980, only two petitions were 
brought under the section successfully. 5 The following factors contributed to its 
ineffectiveness: 
a) petitioner had to prove oppression qua member. 
It was held in Elder v Elder & Watson,6 that the petitioner must 
show oppression of him or her in his capacity as a member and not in any 
other capacity, such as a director or an officer of the company. In this case, the 
petitioner brought an action against the company for removing him as a 
director and secretary of the company. He failed on the ground that he was not 
able to prove that the oppression against him was in his capacity as a 
shareholder. 
The same position was taken in Re Lundie Brothers Ltd, 7 where 
a minority shareholder was removed from his office as a working director and 
the court refused an application under section 210. In Re Jermyn Street 
Turkish Baths Ltd,8 a personal representative who was refused registration was 
held not to be a member and therefore could not petition under section 210. 
Although the court in Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v Meyel was of 
Scottish Corporative Wholesale Society Ltd V Meyer [1959] AC 324 andRe 
HR Harmer Ltd [ 1959] 1 W.L.R. 62. 
[1952] S.C 429. 
[1965] 1 W.L.R 1051. 
[1971] 1 WLR 1042; [1971] 3 AllER 184. 
[1959] AC 324. 
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the opinion that the courts should have regard to business realities and not 
legal tl':"t:'~_f1!t:'~!it!es but the weight of authorities construing section 210 seem 
to support the requirement that the petitioner can only bring an action in his 
. b 10 capacity as a mem er. 
b) Petitioner must prove that the oppression would justify winding up. 
This requirement was one of the major causes for the failure of section 210 
because the petitioner had to prove that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in an oppressive manner to himself11 and at the same time prove 
that it was just and equitable to wind up the company. Furthermore, he had to 
prove that there will be surplus of assets left after the winding up and that he 
had a tangible interest in those assets. 12 
One striking effect of the above onus of proof required of a 
petitioner, is that, it limits many of the grounds on which a winding up on the 
just and equitable ground could be made.13 This is because under section 210 
' 
to justify winding up, the court must be satisfied that there was oppression 
Re HR Harmer Ltd; Re Bellador Silk Ltd [1965] 1 AllER 667. 
Re Lundie Bros Ltd [1965) 2 AllER 693. 
Re Bellador Silk Ltd [1965] 1 All ER 667; Re Rica Gold Washing Co Ltd 
(1979) 1 1 Ch.D.36; 
Breakdown of mutual trust and confidence : Ebrahimi v West bourne Galleries 
Ltd [1973] AC 360; deadlock: Re Yenidge Tobacco Co Ltd [1912] 2 Ch 426; 
failure of substratum : Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd [1972] VR 445. 
14 
15 
16 
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which was serious, persistent and likely to continue14 and that there was no 
misconduct on the part of the petitioning shareholder. 15 
Since most private companies are established on the basis of 
quasi-partnership principles, where members are also directors the strict 
requirement of oppression and the narrow definitions given to the word 
'oppression' would prevent members in such companies from obtaining an 
appropriate remedy, other than winding up on the just and equitable 
principle. 16 
It is obvious that the just and equitable jurisdiction and section 
210 will only be applicable simultaneously in situations where oppression can 
be proven to exist in those situations. Further, the requirement to prove that 
there will be surplus assets after winding up suggested that section 210 was 
very much allied to the rules governing liquidation. This would require the 
courts to make inquiries and cross examinations as in a winding up petition of 
a company. This process may be time consuming and costly for all parties 
concerned. 
Re Newbridge Steam Laundry (1917) ll.R. 67. 
Lord Cross said in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 All E.R. 
492 at p 507: 
A petitioner who relies on the just and equitable clause must come to court 
with clean hands, and if the breakdown in confidence between him and the 
other parties to the dispute appears to have been due to his misconduct he 
cannot insist on the company being wound up if they wish to continue. 
Ebrahimi v Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd. 
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The above emphasis on the solvency of a company seemed to 
defeat the importance of section 210 as an alternative remedy. In was 
suggested by N.A.Bastin that the correct interpretation of section 21 0 involved 
reading the two requirements together and thus, "the facts would justify the 
making of a winding -up orde(" refers to "the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members." He 
suggested that a petitioner has to show not that the facts of the whole case 
would justify the making of a winding up order but that the way in which the 
business is being conducted is of a type that would warrant such an order. 17 He 
referred to Pennington's Company Law18 and stated that the reference to the 
just and equitable jurisdiction must simply be a criterion by which to assess 
the conduct of the oppressors. 
c) Petitioner cannot rely on mere negligence and mismanagement. 
17 
18 
19 
The strictness and narrowness of the interpretation of the word 
'oppression' by the courts, had made it more difficult for section 210 to be 
used in many circumstances where the position of the minority shareholders 
were undermined in the company. In Re Five Minute Car Wash Ltd, 19 the 
majority shareholder had grossly mismanaged the company. Buckley J held 
Bastin NA, 'Minority Protection in Company' (1968) JBL, at p 323. 
RR Pennington, Company Law, 6th ed. LondonEdinburgh, Butterworths, 1990 
at p 552 
[1966] 1 W.L.R 745. 
20 
21 
22 
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that although the majority shareholder was "unwise, inefficient and careless in 
the performance of his duties" but there was nothing to suggest that he had 
acted unscrupulously, unfairly, or with any lack of probity towards the 
petitioner or any other member of the company, or t!.1at he has overborne or 
disregarded the wishes of the board of the directors or that his conduct could 
be characterized as harsh or burdensome or wrongful towards any member of 
the company. 20 
Referring to the above case, Professor Wedderburn expressed 
his opinion in an article21 that to prove oppression, an independent element of 
unlawfulness must be present. He referred to Scottish Cooperative Wholesale 
Society v Meyer case where there was a breach of fiduciary duty by nominee 
directors and also to the case of Re HR Harmer Ltd, where there was a breach 
of the articles by the autocratic father. 22 
It was apparent from the above cases that unless there was 
some sort of legal impropriety, the courts were not willing to interfere in the 
management decision of the companies, no matter how bad the effect of the 
decision may have on the shareholders. 
Ibid at p 751. 
Wedderburn KW, 'Oppression of Minority Shareholders' (1966) 29 MLR 320. 
Ibid at p 324. 
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d) Petitioner must prove that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice 
In most instances, especially if the company is a going concern, it would be 
inequitable, if the court were to make an order to wind up the company if 
there is some other alternative remedy to bring to an end a matter complained 
of. In such a situation, the court should at all cost preserve the existence of the 
company because a petitioner's interest would be better protected. The 
petitioner will be able to realise a better return by selling his shares in the 
company rather than rely on the break up value of the shares in a winding up. 
In Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer for instance an order 
was made for the petitioner' s shares to be bought by the oppressors as though 
no oppressive conduct had taken place. 
e) Petitioner must prove oppressive conduct complained of is of a continuous 
23 
nature. 
The use of the words "affairs of the company" connotes that section 210 only 
applied to conduct which was continuous in nature. This in itself was a 
drawback of section 210 because it prevented isolated acts from being caught 
under the section. 23 
In Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd, at first instance Plowman J 
referring to the conduct of the directors in setting aside a resolution of the 
In a similar provision in Australia (s 186 Uniform Companies Act 1961) in the 
case of ReBroadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [ 1964-1965] NSWR 1648, it 
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shareholders in general meeting to sell a lease which the company possessed, 
stated that this does not amount to oppression because section 210 required a 
course of conduct up to date of oppression. It was also a requirement under 
section 210 that the process of oppression must be continuing when the 
application for relief was presented. This was because of the use of the words 
"are being conducted". in section 210. 24 
Although D.D.Prentice25 was of the opinion that the failure of 
the company to set aside any isolated act, for example improper allotment of 
shares would itself be of a continuing nature of conduct but the decided cases 
under section 210, however, seemed to state that the failure on the part of the 
company to rectify the isolated act or conduct is not sufficient. 
II. Jenkins Committee Recommendations 
Because of the many shortcomings of section 210, the Jenkins Committee on 
Company Law Reform26 recommended the reform of section 210. This brought about 
the enactment of a new section, that is section 75 of the Companies Act 1980 (UK) 
which is now found in sections 459 - 461 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK). Some of 
24 
25 
26 
was held that courts are prevented from anticipating oppression and threatened 
oppression could not fall under the section. 
Re Five Minutes Car Wash Service Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 745; 
Re Jermyn Sh·eet Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 3 AllER 184. 
Prentice DO, 'Protection of minority shareholders: s 210 of the Companies 
Act 1948', (1972) Current Legal Problems 124 at p 135. 
Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd.1749) (1962). 
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the main recommendations of the Jenkins Committee were: 
(i) for the extension of section 210 to include legal personal representatives and 
others to whom shares are transmitted by process of law. 27 
(ii) the repeal of the requirement contained in section 210(2)(b), namely that the 
petitioner must show facts which would justify the winding up of the company 
on the grounds that it is just and equitable. 
(iii) that section 210 should extend to cover isolated acts as well as a course of 
conduct. However, the committee failed to pwvide any criteria as to what acts 
these should be or by what criteria they are to be judged.28 
Most of the recommendations of the Jenkins Committee were adopted 
and now a remedy may be obtained without showing grounds for winding up of a 
company. The petition may be based upon a single act or omission as well as a course 
of conduct. An isolated past act or omission29 or a proposed future act or omission30 
can also be remedied by the court. However, the most far reaching change brought 
about by the Jenkins Committee under the new section 459 is the replacement of the 
concept 'oppression' with 'unfairly prejudicial'. Unfair prejudice has been given a 
wider interpretation by the courts compared to oppression. Under the new provision 
both unfairness and prejudice must be established. However, there is no necessity that 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Ibid at para 209 and 212 (f). 
Rajak H, 'The Oppression of Minority Shareholders' (1972) 35 MLR 156. 
Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 342. 
Re Kenyon Swansea Ltd (1987) 3 BCC 259. 
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the act complained of is improper or illegal and an exercise of a legal right may have 
an unfairly prejudicial effect. In the lat~r ch~f'tP.rc: , ~ more dP.tailed discussion will be 
made with respect to the above concepts. 
III. Statutory Protection in England 
The present section 459(1) Companies Act (U.K.) 1985 as amended by s 145 of 
Companies Act (U.K.) 1989 (Schedule 19, para 11) reads as follows: 
A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an 
order under this Part on the ground that the company's affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of its members generally Of of some 
part of its members (including at least himself) or that any actual 
or proposed act or omission of the company (incJuding an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. 
Even though section 459 of the Companies Act 1985, United Kingdom 
had removed most of the problems encountered under section 210 of the Companies 
Act 1948 but unfortunately there was still one main teething problem under the 1985 
Companies Act provision. Before the amendment in 1989, section 459 required the ~ 
petitioner to demonstrate prejudice 'to the interests of some part of the members 
(including at least himself)'. The use of the above words resulted in conflicting 
decisions by the courts. 
In Re A Company (No 0070 of 1987) exp. Glossop/ 1 a petitioner 
alleged that the director had not declared a reasonable dividend and therefore the 
petitioner was deprived from participating in the company's profits. Harman J held 
31 [1988] BCLC 570; 
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that a petition under section 459 required the prejudicial conduct to be directed 
::tgainst 'some part of members' and since the failure to declare dividends affected all 
the members, the petitioner's action failed. 
However, in Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd,32 where the facts of the case 
were similar toRe A Company (No 0070 of 1987), exp.Glossop, the court held that a 
minority shareholder could rely on s 459 even though the rights of the minority 
shareholder and the majority shareholders were the same with regards to the 
declaration of dividends. The reasoning of the court was based on the fact that the 
minority shareholder would not be able to procure a passing of a resolution for 
payment of a reasonable dividend compared to the majority shareholders, who had the 
power to grant or withhold such a dividend. This would therefore unfairly prejudice 
the position of the minority shareholder if the majority shareholders decide not to pay 
any dividend at all or to pay a dividend which was substantially less than the company 
33 
could reasonably be expected to pay. 
However, the passing of section 145 of the Companies Act 1989 and 
the inclusion of the words "members generally" in section 459 of the Companies Act 
1985, has helped to resolve much of the uncertainties and confusion surrounding the 
application of section 459 in situations like ReA Company (No 0070 of 1987), exp. 
Glossop andRe Sam Weller & Sons Ltd. It is obvious now that section 459 is 
32 
33 
[1990] BCLC 801; (1989) 5 BCC 810. 
See RR Pennington, Company Law, 6th ed London, Dublin and Edinburgh, 
Butterworths, 1990 at p 673. 
applicable even where all the members interests are affected equally. 
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IV. Statutory Protection in Australia 
To understand the development of the minority protection provision in Australia, it is 
necessary to have a brief idea as to the development of the law in Australia. 
Foremost, all Australian colonies acquired their own constitutions based on the 
Westminster system and received representative and responsible government 
between 1855 and 1890. The colonial parliaments had power under their 
constitutions to make laws with respect to the formation and regulation of companies. 
Each colonial parliament based its companies legislation on that in force in England 
at the time that they received government of their own affairs. The Companies Acts 
were administered by the respective Registrar of Companies and later, after federation 
by the State Corporate Mfairs Offices or Commissions. Although the legislation had 
a common source, each colony (State after federation) developed its law differently 
with the consequence that there was no uniformity in the law. 34 
To overcome the above problem, several attempts were made by the 
States and the Commonwealth to ensure that the law was uniform nationally. This 
led to the Uniform Companies Act 1961 which was adopted by all the States and 
Territories and which incidentally form.ed the model for Malaysia's Companies Act 
1965. 
34 Ruth E. Ruane, Corporation Law : Law (Corporation) 224 Guide, 3rd ed. 
Perth, Curtin Univeristy of Technology, Western Australia. 
35 
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Thereafter, there were various attempts by the legislature to have 
'ilu.ifcrm :;ystem of law in Australia, which finally resulted in the Corporation Act 
1989 (Cth). This Act was adopted by the other States35 and Territories. Section 210 
Companies Act 1948 (UK) in a modified form was adopted in the various States in 
Australia. This provisions were later referred to as section 186 Uniform Companies 
Act 1961, which provided as follows : 
186. Remedy in cases of Oppressions-
(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs 
of the company are being conducted in manner oppressive to one 
more of the members (including himself) may, or, following on a 
report by an inspector under this Act, the Minister may apply to the 
Court for an order under this section. 
(2) If the court is of the opinion that the company's affairs are 
being so conducted the Court may, with a view to bringing to an 
end the matters complained of 
(a) except where paragraph (b) of this subsection 
applies, make an order that the company be wound up; or 
(b) where the Court is of opinion that to wind up the 
company would unfairly prejudice the member or the members 
referred to in subsection ( 1) of this section, but otherwise the facts 
would justifY the making of a winding up order on the grounds, that 
it is just and equitable that the company be wound up, or that, for 
any other reason it is just and equitable to make an order (other 
than a winding up order) under this section, make such order as it 
thinks fit whether for regulating the conduct of the company's 
affairs in future or for the purchase of the shares of any members 
by other members or by the company and, in the case of a purchase 
by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's 
capital or otherwise. 
3) Where an order that the company be wound up is made 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section the 
provisions of this Act relating to winding up of company shall, 
S 94 Companies Act 1958 (Victoria); s 379 A Companies Act 1955 
(Queensland). 
with such adaptations as are necessary, apply as if the order had 
been made upon a petition duly presented to the Court by the 
company. 
4) Where an order under this section makes any alteration in 
or addition to any company's memorandum or articles, then, 
notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Act, but 
subject to the provisions of the order, the company concerned shall 
not have power without the leave of the Court to make any further 
alteration in or addition to the memorandum or articles inconsistent 
with the provisions o"f the order; but subject to the foregoing 
provisions of this subsections the alterations or additions made by 
the order shall be of the same effect as if duly made by resolution of 
the company. 
5) An office copy of any order made under this section shall be 
lodged by the applicant with the Registrar within fourteen days after 
the making of the order. 
(6) If default is made in complying with subsection (5) of this 
section the company and every officer of the company who is in 
default shall be guilty of an offence against this Act. 
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Section 186 was wider than the English provision in the sense that it 
need not require proof of facts which would justify the making of a winding up order. 
It simply required that for some reason it is just and equitable to make an order under 
the section. Section 186 was not much different from its English counterpart and 
faced the same drawbacks faced by the English courts. The problems were 
highlighted in the Australian case of Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd. 36 Briefly the Supreme 
Court of Victoria in construing section 186 stated the following : 
(a) those alleging that the affairs of the company have been conducted in 
a manner oppressive to them must establish, as one element, conduct 
36 [1972] VR 445. 
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which is unfair, or burdensome, harsh and wrongful or lacks probity, 
or is persistently illegal and dictated by self interest. 37 
(b) the oppression must be of members on their capacity as shareholders. 38 
(c) there must be ·something adverse or detrimental to the members' 
financial interests as shareholders. 39 
(d) the affairs of the company must be being conducted in a manner 
oppressive to members when the petition is presented. 40 
(e) the oppression must result from some overbearing act or attitude on the 
41 part of the oppressor. 
Later section 186 was replaced by s 320 of the Companies Code 1982. 
When the Jenkins Committee recommendations were adopted in the Untied 
Kingdom in 1980, Australia followed suit. This resulted in s 320 being amended 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] A.C 324; Elder v 
Elder and Watson Ltd [1952] S.C. 49; Re Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 W.L.R 62; Re 
Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R 1042; and MDalley & 
Co.Ltdv Sims (1968) 43 A.L.J.R 19. 
Re Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 W.L.R 62 at p 75 andRe Bright Pine Mills Pty Ltd 
[1969) V.R 1002 at p 1012. 
ReBroadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1964-65] N.S.W.R. 1648 at p 1662. 
Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R 1042 at p 1059. 
Re Jermyn Turkish Baths Ltd andRe Bright Pine Mills Pty Ltd at p 1102. 
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substantially in 1983 with the introduction of the Companies and Securities 
Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1983, whereby s 320 not only applied 
to the affairs of the company but also to acts and omissions. This was reflected under 
s 320 (1) (a) (ii) which stated that " an act or omission, or a proposed act or 
omission, by or on behalf of the company, or a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of 
a class of members, was or would be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly 
discriminatory against, a member or members or was or would be contrary to the 
interests of the members as a whole". It is obvious that, other than oppressive 
conduct, the amended section also included unfairly prejudicial and unfairly 
discriminatory conduct. 
Further, a new sub-section (4A)(b) [now sub-section (5) of section 260 
of the Corporations Act 1989] was incorporated and this recognised that a member 
can sue if he is oppressed, unfairly prejudiced or unfairly discriminated in any other 
capacity other than that of a member. The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Companies and Securities Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 1983 noted 
the plight of members in small partnership companies where their interest are affected 
as directors and shareholders. The Bill recognised that in these type of companies 
members usually derive their benefit by being paid as directors and employees. 42 
Even though the new sub-section (4A)(b) is desirable and the courts are able to 
42 Corkery JF, 'Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers - What can a 
shareholder do about it? An analysis of s 320 of the Companies Code' (1983-
1 985) 9 Adelaide Law Review 437. 
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control any abuse of the provision by applicants, nonetheless the potential is there for 
section 320 to be used for non corporate or for non-financial ends.43 
The full text of the present section 260 Corporations Act 1989, 
Australia reads as follows: 
43 
Remedy in cases of oppression or injustice 
260. (1) An application to the Court for an order under this 
section in relation to a company may be made : 
(a) by a member who believes: 
(i) 
(ii) 
that affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly 
discriminatory against, a member or 
members, or in a manner that is contrary to 
the interests of the members as a whole ·or 
' that an act or omission, or a proposed act or 
omission, by or on behalf of the company, or 
a resolution, of a class of members, was or 
would be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a member 
or members or was or would be contrary to 
the interests of the members as a whole; or 
(a) by the Commission, in a case where it has 
investigated, under Division 1 of Part 3 of the 
Commission Act 
(i) matters being, or connected with, affairs of 
the company; or 
(ii) matters including such matters. 
(2) If the Court is of the opinion: 
(a) that affairs of a company are being conducted in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairlv discriminatory against a member or 
members ·( in this section called the "oppressed 
member or members") or in manner that is contrary 
to the interests of the members as a whole; or 
Ibid at p 451. 
(b) that an act or omission, or a proposed act or 
omission, by or on behalf of a company, or a 
resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of 
members of a company, was or would be oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
against, a member or members (in this section also 
called the "oppressed member or members") or was 
or would be contr<;lry to the interest of the members 
as a whole; 
the court may, subject to subsection (4), make such order or orders 
as it thinks ·fit, including, but not limited to, one or more of the 
following: 
(c) an order that the company be wound up; 
(d) an order for regulating the conduct of affairs of the 
company in the future; 
(e) an order for the purchase of the shares of any 
member by other members; 
(f) an order for the purchase of the shares of any 
member by the company and for the reduction 
accordingly of the company' s capital; 
(g) an order directing the company to institute, 
prosecute, defend or discontinue specified 
proceedings, or authorising a member or members of 
the company to institute, prosecute, defend or 
discontinue specified proceedings in the name and 
on behalf of the company; 
(h) an order appointing a receiver or a receiver and 
manager of property of the company; 
(i) an order restraining a person from engaging in 
specified conduct or from doing a specified act or 
thing; 
(j) an order requiring a person to do a specified act or 
thing. 
(3) A person shall not contravene an order made under 
subsection (2) that is applicable to the person. 
( 4 )The Court shall not make an order under subsection (2) 
for the winding up of a company if it is of the opinion that the 
winding up of the company would unfairly prejudice the oppressed 
member or members. 
(5) In this section and in paragraphs 461 (1) (f), (g) and (h): 
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(a) a reference to a member, in relation to a company, 
includes, in the case of a company limited by shares, 
or a company limited both by shares and by 
guarantee, a reference to a person to whom a share 
in the company has been transmitted by will or by 
operation of law; 
(b) a reference to affairs of a company being conducted 
in a marner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member is a 
reference to affairs of a company being conducted in 
a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a person who is a 
member, whether in his capacity as a member or in 
any other capacity; and 
(c) a reference to an act or omission by or behalf of a 
company or a resolution of a class of members of a 
company being oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a member is a 
reference to an act or omission by or on behalf of a 
company or a resolution of a class of members of a 
company being oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a person who is a 
member, whether in the person,s capacity as a 
member or in any other capacity. 
(6) Where an order that a company be wound up is made 
under this section, the provisions of this Act relating to the winding 
up of companies apply, with such adaptations as are necessary, as if 
the order had been made upon an application duly filed in the Court 
by the company. 
(7) Where an order under this section makes an alteration in 
or addition to the constitution of a company, then, despite anything 
else in this Act but subject to the order: 
(a) the company does not have power, without the leave 
of the Court, to make any further alteration in or 
addition to the memorandum and articles 
inconsistent with the provisions of the order; and 
(b) subject to this subsection, the alteration has effect as 
if it has been duly made by resolution of the 
company. 
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(8) An office copy of any order made under this section 
pursuant to an application by a member of the company shall be 
lodged by the applicant with the Commis~i0!! '.~.r!thi!! 14 days after 
the making of the order. 
(9) If default is made in complying with subsection (8), the 
applicant is guilty of an offence. 
V) Statutory Protection in Other jurisdictions 
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Without going into much detail, other jurisdictions which adopted section 210 of the 
UK Companies Act 1948 faced similar problems as those faced by the English and 
Australian courts. 
A. New Zealand 
In New Zealand the minority provision was reflected in section 209 of the New 
Zealand Companies Act 1955. The section reads as follows: 
209. Remedy in cases of oppression. Alteration of 
memorandum or articles- (1) Any member of a company who 
complains that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a 
manner oppressive to some part of the members (including himself) 
or, in a case falling within subsection three of section one hundred 
and seventy-three of this Act, the Attorney-General, may make an 
application to the Court for an order under this section. 
(2) If on any such application the Court is of opinion that 
the company' s affairs are being conducted as aforesaid, and-
(a) That to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice 
that part of the members, but otherwise the facts would 
justify the making up of a winding-up order on the 
ground tha! !t '.~'~5 jus! ~!!d equitable that the company 
should be wound up; or 
(b) That, in any other case, it is just and equitable to make 
an order under this section, the Court may, with a view to bringing 
to an end the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit 
whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in 
future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members of the company or by the company, for 
the reduction accordingly of the company's capital, or otherwise. 
(5) In relation to an application under this section, section 
three hundred and forty-one of this Act shall apply as it applies in 
relation to a winding-up petition. 
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The main difference of the section compared to its English equivalent 
was that under the New Zealand section there was no necessity for the facts to justify 
a winding up order on the 'just and equitable ground' . This basically freed the section 
from technicalities of the winding up jurisdiction. 
In fact, throughout its existence and until the Companies Amendments 
Act 1980, only one case44 was brought to the court. In this case, the applicant was not 
44 
Re Empire Building Ltd [1972] NZLR 683. 
45 
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successful because the New Zealand court followed the restrictive attitude of the 
English courts in interpreting the word 'oppression'. Just as in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, section 209 of the New Zealand Act did not really serve its purpose in 
protecting minority shareholders. 
Only in 1980 pursuant to the Final Report of the Macarthur Committee 
in March 1973 was section 209 amended. The Committee relied to a certain extent 
on the 1962 Report of the Jenkins Committee in England and to the provisions of the 
Australian Uniform Companies legislation. 45 Section 209 of the principal Act was 
amended by repealing subsections ( 1) and (2) and substituting the following 
subsections (I) and (2) and by further inserting a new subsection (6): The new 
amended provisions read as follows: 
Section 209 Companies Act 1955 (as amended by Companies 
Amendment Act 1980) 
( 1) Any member of the company who complains that the 
affairs of the company have been or are being or are 
likely to be conducted in a manner that is, or any act or 
acts of the company have been or are or likely to be, 
oppressive, unfairly discriminatory, or unfairly 
prejudicial, to him (whether in his capacity as a 
member or in any other capacity) or, in a case 
falling within 
Russel M, ' The Companies Amendment Act 1980' (1981) NZU 71. 
section 173(3)46 of this Act, the Attorney-General, may 
make an application to the Court for an order under this 
section. 
(2) If on any such application the Court is of the opinion 
that it is just and equitable to do so, the Court may make such 
order as it thinks fit, whether for -
a) Regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in 
future; or 
b) Restricting or forbidding the carrying our of any 
proposed act; or 
c) The purchase of. the shares of any members of the 
company by other members of the company or by the 
company and, in the case of a purchase by the company, 
for the reduction accordingly of the company's capital; 
or 
d) Directing the company to institute, prosecute, defend, or 
discontinue Court proceedings, or authorisiJJg a member 
or members of the company to institute, prosecute, 
defend or discontinue Court proceedings in the name 
and on behalf of the company -
or otherwise. 
6) In this section the term 'member' includes the legal personal 
representative of a deceased member, and every person to 
whom shares of a member have been transferred by operation of 
law. 
In a nutshell the main effect of the amendments to section 209 are as 
follows:-
(a) the requirement that the member should be affected in his capacity as member 
46 
was removed. 
S 173(3) is similar to s 169(3) of the English Companies Act 1948. See supra 
n4. 
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(b) the amended section allows a single member to petition where the acts 
complained of affect only himself 
(c) it is no longer necessary that there should be a continuing course of conduct, 
as opposed to isolated acts. 
(d) a remedy is available not only for oppressive conducts but also for conduct 
which is unfairly discriminating or unfairly prejudicial. 
(e) the section now provides that a 'member' includes the legal personal 
representative of a deceased member, and any person to whom shares of a 
member have been transferred by operation oflaw. 
Later with the introduction of the Companies Act 1993 in New 
Zealand, the minority protection provision was amended further and was reflected in 
sections 174-176 of the new Act. The sections read as follows: 
174. Prejudiced shareholders - (1) A shareholder or former 
shareholder of a company, or any other entitled person, who 
considers that the affairs of a company have been , or are being, or 
are likely to be , conducted in a man11er that is, or any act or acts of 
the company have been, or are, or are likely to be, oppressive, 
unfairly discriminatory, or unfairly prejudicial to him or her in that 
capacity or in any other capacity, may apply to the Court for an 
order under this section. 
(2) If, on an application under this section, the Court considers that 
it is just and equitable to do so, it may make such order as it thinks 
fit including, without limiting the generally of this subsection, an 
order-
(a) Requiring the company or any other person to acquire 
the shareholder's shares : or 
(b) Requiring the company or any other person to pay 
compensation to a person; or 
(c) Regulating the future conduct of the company's affairs; 
or 
(b) Altering or adding to the company's constitution; or 
(c) Appointing a receiver of the company; or 
(d) Directing the rectification of the records of the 
r.nmn::~nv· nr 
- - .J- -· .I , -
(e) Putting the company into liquidation; or 
(f) Setting aside action taken by the company or the board 
in breach of this Act or the constitution of the company. 
(3) No order may be made against the company or any other 
person under subsection (2) of this section unless the 
company or that person is a party to the proceedings in 
which the application is made. 
175. Certain conduct deemed prejudicial - (1) failure to comply 
with any of the following sections of this Act is conduct which is 
unfairly prejudicial for the purpose of section 174 of this Act: 
(a) Section 45 (which relates to pre-emptive rights to the 
issue of shares): 
(b) Section 47 (which relates to the consideration for which 
shares are issued): 
(c) Section 3 (which relates to dividends) 
(d) Section 60 (which relates to offers by a company acquire 
its own shares): 
(e) Section 61 ( which relates to special offers to acquire 
shares): 
(f) Section 63 (which relates to stock exchange 
acquisitions subject to prior notice to shareholders): 
(g) Section 65 (which relates to stock exchange 
acquisitions not subject to prior notice to shareholders); 
(h) Section 76 ( which relates to the provision of fmancial 
assistance by a company to acquire its own shares): 
(i) Section 78 ( which relates to special fmancial 
assistance); 
(j) Section 80 (which relates to financial assistance not 
exceeding 5 percent of shareholders' funds): 
(k) Section 117 ( which relates to the alteration of 
shareholder rights) 
(l) Section 129 (which relates to major transactions). 
(2) The signing by the directors of a company of a 
certificate required by this Act without reasonable 
grounds existing for an opinion set out in its conduct 
that is unfairly prejudicial for the purposes of section 
174 of this Act. 
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176. Alteration to constitution- (1) Notwithstanding anything in 
this Act, but subject to the order, where the Court makes an 
order under ~ectic~ 17~ cf t."':is f .. ~t <1ltering or adding to the 
constitution of a company, the constitution must not, to the 
extent that it has been altered or added to by the court, again be 
altered or added to without the leave of the Court. 
(2) Any alteration of addition to the constitution of a company 
made by an order under section 174 of this Act has the same 
effect as if it had b~en made by the shareholders of the company 
pursuant to section 32 of this Act and the provisions of this Act 
shall apply to he constitution as altered or added to. 
(3) Within 10 working days of the making of an order under section 
174 of this Act altering or adding to the constitution of a 
company, the board ofthe company must ensure that a copy of 
the order and the constitution as altered or added to is delivered 
to the Registrar for registration. 
( 4) If the board of a company fails to comply with subsection (3) 
of this section, every director of the company commits an 
offence and is liable, on conviction, to the penalty set our in 
section 374 (2) ofthis Act. 
B. Canada 
In Canada, the minority oppressiOn prov1s1on as a ground for relief 
originated from the English Companies Act 1948 (U.K.). The oppression 
remedy was made available in Canada with the passing of the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act, 1974-75-76 (Can), C.33 (the "CBCA") 
(proclaimed in force on December 15, 1975). The Federal Parliament 
relied to a certain extent on the 1962 report of the Jenkins Committee on 
section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 (UK). The provisions of the 
CBCA, S.C. 1974-75-76, C.33, as amended (now R.S.C 1985, C. C-444, 
S.241) is as follows : 
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234 (1) Application to court re oppression. A complainant may 
apply to a court for an order under this section. 
(2) nrn?t>?ds. If, upon a:r. application under subsection (1 ), the court 
is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
effects a result, 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a 
manner, or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or 
officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters 
complained of 
(3) Powers of court. In connection with an application under this 
section the court may make any interim or final order it thinks fit 
including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing. 
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of; 
(b) an order appointing a receiver or receiver-manager, 
(c) an order to regulate a corporation's affairs by amending the 
articles or bylaws or creating or amending a unanimous 
shareholder agreement; 
(d) an order directing an issue or exchange of securities; 
(e) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or 
any of the directors then in office; 
(f) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or 
any other person, to purchase securities of a security holder; 
(g) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or 
any other person, to pay to a security holder any part of the 
moneys paid by him for securities; 
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to 
which a corporation is a party and compensating the corporation 
or any other party to the transaction or contract; 
(i) an order requiring a corporation, within a time specified by the 
court, to produce to the court or an interested person financial 
statements on the form required by section 149 or an accounting 
in such other form as the court may determine 
(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person; 
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records 
of a corporation under section 236. 
(1) an order liquidating and dissolving the corporation; 
(m) order directing an investigation under Part XVIII to be made; 
(n) an order requiring the trial of any issue. 
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The Canadian provision seems to be identical to the present English 
counterpart, that is, it covers isolated acts as well as a course of conduct and provides 
that a court can grant relief for unfairly prejudicial conduct but it is apparent that 
section 241 CBCA is wider in a number of ways. It still retains the word 
' oppression ' and further section 241 provides that if the interests of any security 
holder, creditor, director or officer are unfairly disregarded, a court can grant a 
remedy. No such provision is available under section 459 of the English provision. 
This will be discussed further in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
However, for now it is worth noting that section 238 specifically 
allows directors and officers to bring an action under section 241 . Therefore there 
will be no problem on the issue of a member suing qua member as opposed to some 
other capacity. There is no such clear provision in section 459 of the English 
provision. 
VI) Statutory Protection in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, "the Companies Ordinances 1940, of the Straits Settlements which was 
extended to the Malayan Union and later to the then Federation of Malaya did not 
contain any provision resembling the United Ki::-tgdom section 210. This is not 
surprising because the Ordinance was based on the Companies Act 1929 of England. 
Malaysian courts have consistently applied the rule in Foss v Harbottle and have 
47 
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denied relief to a minority shareholder who was unable to bring himself within any 
one of the exceptions to the rule".47 
The statutory proVIsion for minority protection was introduced 
into Malaysia with the passing of the Companies Act 1965 and it is obvious that on a 
general comparison of all the· other sections in the other countries, section 181 1s 
much more comprehensive in its wordings. The statutory provision is as follows: 
181. Remedy in cases of an oppression 
(1) Any member or holder of a debenture of a company or, in 
the case of a declared company under Part IX, the 
Minister, may apply to the Court for an order under this 
section on the ground -
(a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted 
or the powers of the directors are being exercised in 
a manner oppressive to one or more of the 
members or holders of debentures including himself 
or in disregard of his or their interests as members, 
shareholders or holders of debentures of the 
company; or 
(b) that some act of the company has been done or is 
threatened or that some resolution of the members 
' holders of debentures or any class has been passed or 
is proposed which unfairly discriminates against or 
is otherwise prejudicial to one or more of the 
members or holders of debentures (including 
himself). 
(2) If on such application the Court is of the opinion that either 
of those grounds is established the Court may, with the 
view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters 
complained or, make such order as it thinks for and without 
prejudiced to the generally of the foregoing the order may-
(a) direct or prohibit any act or cancel or vary any 
transaction or resolution; 
Gopal Sri Ram, JCA in Owen Sim Liang Kiwi v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd and 
Anor [1996] 2 AMR 2477,2495. See also Peck v Russel (1924) 4 FMSLR 94. 
(b) regulate the conduct of the affairs of the company 
in future; 
(c) provide for the purchase of the shares or debentures 
of the company by other members or holders of 
debentures of the company or by the company 
itself; 
(d) in the case of a purchase of shares by the company 
provide for a reduction accordingly of the 
company's capital ; or 
(e) provide that the company be wound up. 
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Section 181 to a certain extent reflects the English provision. In the 
case of Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Bhd, 48 Shankar JCA said: 
What is important from the Malaysian view point is that whereas prior 
to section 75 of the 1980 Act the English court were concerned under 
section 210 with the breaches of legal rights, the scope is now 
enlarged to provide relief for conduct unfairly to the interests of 
members as members. Under our law 'interest of members' is covered 
by section 18l(a) and conduct which is unfairly prejudicial' is 
covered by section 181 (b). In other words section 75 and section 459 
of the English Act cover the same ground as our section 181 ( 1 ). 
Section 181 will be examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
VII. Conclusion 
Even though section 210 was widely adopted by other countries in the 
Commonwealth, it is obvious that owing to its narrow and restrictive nature in 
providing an effective remedy, it faced the same fate as in England. However, it 
cannot be denied that section 21 0 did provide the impetus and stepping stone for the 
many legislative reforms in this complex area of minority protection. The new 
legislations and the vast amount of reported cases in recent years in the 
48 [1996] 1 AMR 300. 
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Commonwealth countries clearly show the significance and the seriousness of the 
legislatures and the courts in providing, assisting and remedying minu1iiy grit::vanct.:s. 
It is to be noted that the legislatures have departed from relying solely 
on the concept of 'oppression' and have introduced wider concepts into their minority 
provisions. Depending on the statute referred to, remedies are now available for acts 
which are 'unfairly prejudicial', 'unfairly discriminatory' and also in circumstances 
where 'the companies affairs are being conducted or directors' powers are being 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudi~ial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of one or more shareholders'. Further, the remedy is not only 
available to acts which have been effected but also to those acts which are 
'threatened' to be effected. Some of the statutes in fact, allow creditors, debenture 
holders, directors and others to rely on the minority provisions to obtain a remedy. 
Most significantly, the statutes spell out wide remedies and provide the courts with a 
very wide discretion in providing an appropriate remedy to an aggrieved shareholder 
or whoever having a right under the particular statute concerned. 
CHAPTER4 
APPLICANTS FOR RELIEF UNDER 
SECTION 181 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1965 
I. Applicants under section 181 
Under section 181, any member or holder of a debenture of a company or the 
Minister who has received a report by an inspector appointed pursuant to Part IX of 
the Act, may apply to the court under this section for relief 
A. Members 
A member is a person who is registered as such in the register of members: section 
16(6) Companies Act 1965. In the case of companies whose shares are traded 
scripless, depositors who appear in the record of depositors have all the rights of 
membership: Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991 (Act 453), section 
35. 
(i) unregistered members 
Therefore strictly construed unregistered purchasers would lack standing as was in 
the case of Niord Pty Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL, 1 where the court held that an 
unregistered transferee of shares Jacked locus standi because he had not been 
registered as a member at the time when the proceedings were commenced. It 
suffices that he or she is a member at the time of application: Re Spargos Mining 
NL. 2 
2 
(1990) 8 ACLC 684 
(1991) 3 ACSR 1 at p 6 
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(ii) member suing in some other capacity 
Under section 181, applicants must be a member or debenture-holder of the 
particular company and the conduct of which they complain must affect them in 
their capacity as a member or debenture holder. However, in Re Chi Liung & Sons 
Ltd, 3 it was held that if a person is oppressed in his capacity as a member. he may 
get relief in respect of acts that affect him in some other capacity as weiJ .4 In Re 
Chi Liung & Sons Ltd, the artic1es empowered only the governing director to 
appoint a managing director. Madam Chi Liung, the governing director appointed 
the petitioner, a member, as managing director and empowered him to exercise all 
powers as governing director on her behalf However, when she passed away, there 
was a power struggle and at an extraordinary general meeting, the petitioner was 
removed as managing director by the respondents in this case. In an action under 
section 181, the petitioner argued that his appointment as managing director was 
never terminated and the resolution passed at the extraordinary general meeting 
was void. Gi11 J referring toRe HR Harmer Ltd,5 held that once it was shown that 
the acts complained of were oppressive to the petitioners as members of the 
company it was irrelevant that the petitioners were also directors, for oppressed 
members who were also directors were not, by virtue of holding such office 
' 
disqualified from obtaining relief 
3 
4 
5 
(1968) I MU 97 
Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks. The Companies Act of Malaysia, An 
Annotation, Malaysia, Butterworths Asia 1997, P 284 
(I 958) 3 AJI ER 689 
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In Australia, the legislation now applies whether the member is 
affected in his or her "capacity as a member or in any other capacity": section 
260(5)(b) and (c). The Australian provision does not mention debenture holders 
compared to the Malaysian section 181 but it is obvious that section 260(5)(b) and 
(c) would appear to enable a member to bring an application when the member is 
affected in a non-corporate capacity, such as a creditor, although the court would 
take into consideration the main motive of the creditor in bringing the action, for if 
the action is merely brought to put pressure on the company to repay a loan, then 
the application will be dismissed as an abuse of process:6 Re Bellador Silk Ltd 7 
In the United Kingdom, the courts have said that an applicant can 
only bring an action if the conduct complained of affects the applicant in his 
capacity as a member. In Lundie Bros Ltd, 8 a director cum shareholder of the 
company was removed as a director and excluded from the management of the 
company. He brought an action under the equivalent of section 181 but the court 
held that he had no locus standi because his position as a director was only 
affected. This position of the courts in the United Kingdom was further confirmed 
in the case of Re HR Harmer Ltd 
6 
7 
8 
Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks, The Companies Act of Malaysia, An 
Annotation, Malaysia, Butterworths Asia,l997, p292 
[1965] 1 AllER 667 
(1965) 1 WLR 1051 
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The above position of the courts in Re HR Harmer Ltd and 
Lundie Bros Ltd remained unchanged, even with the introduction of section 75 
Companies Act 1980 (UK) (now Companies Act 1985, section 459(1), as amended 
by Companies Act 1989.) It was held in ReA Company,9 the first decision of the 
court under section 75 CompaR.ies Act 1980 (UK), that the member must prove that 
he has been or will be unfairly prejudiced in his capacity as a member of the 
company. However, recent cases10 under the above new English provisions seem to 
have discarded the requirement that members must be affected qua members. It has 
been held that if a member is admitted to membership on the understa..11ding that he 
will share in management his interests are prejudiced if he is ousted from 
management. 11 
(iii) majority shareholders 
The Malaysian, Australian and English provisions seem to clearly allow any 
member or members to rely on section 181, section 260 and section 459 
respectively to bring an action. Therefore in certain circumstances the majority 
members or shareholders can take an action under the above provisions. In Owen 
Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd & Anor, 12 Gopal Sri Ram, JCA stated: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
[1983] Ch 178 
ReA Company (No. 002567 of 1982) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 927; Virdi v Abbey 
Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342 
L.C.B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 5th ed London, Sweet 
& Maxwell,1992 at p 664. 
[1996] 2 AMR 2477,2505 
13 
14 
15 
It must not be forgotten that s 210 of United Kingdom 
Companies Act 1948 was placed under the [heading] 
"Minorities", clearly indicating that those who could seek relief 
must be in the minority. There is no such classification in the 
[Malaysian] Act. Consequently, relief under s 181 may be had 
by a majority of shareholders in circumstances where they are 
unable for any reason to exert their will at a general meeting of 
their company 
In Kumagai-Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors 13 
' . . 
Anuar J (as he then was) held that it is not essential that oppressors should have a 
controlling interest in the company. 14 The learned judge stated that section J 81 is 
directed against conduct by those in control of the company and that it is not 
always necessary that those in control must hold the majority interest. The learned 
judge further stated that the local provision falls under a different statutory 
heading:15 
In Ramashankar Prosad & Ors v Sindri Iron Foundry (P) Ltd & 
Ors [AIR 1966 Cal 512] when dealing with the Indian provision 
which is equivalent of s 210 of the UK Act, it was held that the 
Indian section was not limited to minority shareholders. The 
reasoning is interesting. The UK s 2 I 0 falls under the statutory 
. heading written into the Companies Act 1948 entitled 
'Minorities'. Such a heading is absent in the Indian provision 
and equally in our own provision. I would therefore agree with 
the view expressed by Mitter J in Ramashankar Prosad and hold 
that relief under s 181 is available to majority shareholders who 
are not in control of the management of the company and who, 
for any given reason, are unable to control the board, eg because 
they have agreed to a management power sharing formula in a 
separate agreement among the shareholders. 
[1994] 2 MU 789 
Ibid at p 807 
Ibid at p 802 
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(iv) legal personal representatives and rights of members arising by 
operation of law 
The right to apply for a remedy extends to a legal personal representative of a 
member and to a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by 
wi!l or operation of law: Re A Company. 16 Section 459(2) of the English Act 
provides that a person who is not a member of a company but to whom shares in 
the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law may rei y on 
the section. In Australia section 260 (l)(a)(i) and section 260(5)(a) clearly provide 
that a member, including a person who became a member by means of transmission 
of shares can apply for a remedy under the section. 
However, section 181, unlike the Australia or English provisions, 
does not clearly state the above proposition of law. In Owen Sim Liang Khui v 
Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd, Gopal Sri Ram JCA said: 17 
A reading of s 181 reveals that in the latter part of paragraph (a) 
of subsection (l) to that section the legislature has used the 
expression "members, shareholders... of the company". 
However, it does not require much intellectual exercise to realise 
that the sub-section, read as a whole, when using the term 
"member" and "shareholder" refers to the same category of 
persons within the company. The result, therefore, is that, as a 
general rule, only one who comes within the terms of s 16(6) of 
the Act may present a petition under s 181. Put another way, in 
general, a petitioner who applies under the section must be able 
to demonstrate that his name appears on a company's register of 
members at the date of presentation of the petition: if he is 
unable to do so, then he has no standing to invoke the 
jurisdiction conferred upon the court by the section. 
[1983] 2 AllER 36 
supra n 12 at p 2506 
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However, the Court of Appeal did recognise that the above 
simplistic approach to section 18 I would be inequitable in certain circumstances. 
The Court of Appeal stated that what was expre~sed under section 181 is only a 
general rule and not a universal rule and there may be cases where an application of 
the general rule would be unfair and unjust. 18 
Therefore in certain circumstances a respondent who is guilty of 
unconscionable or inequitable conduct will be estopped from relying upon the 
requirement of membership in order to defeat a petitioner's standing as this would 
amount to his using statute as an engine of fraud.19 For example, in a situation 
where a person has agreed to become a member and has always been treated as 
such by the company or the board as a member, it would be wrong later in an 
application under section 181 for the company or the board to assert that the 
petitioning member lacked locus standi on the basis that the name of the member 
has been omitted from the register of members. 20 
In Owen Sim Liang KI2Ui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd, the appellant was 
a registered shareholder of a company. The company wrote to the appellant 
alleging that he owed the company a sum of money. The appellant denied the 
allegation and the company's board sold the appellant's shares to satisfY the alleged 
18 
19 
20 
Ibid at p 2507 
Ibid at p 2509 
Ibid at p 2507 
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debt owed by the appellant to the company. The appellant presented a petition 
under section 181 alleging oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
discriminatory conduct ofthe company against him. The company took out a notice 
of motion to strike out the petition and the trial judge struck out the action based on 
three grounds. One of the grounds being that section 181 ( 1 )(b) of the Act could 
only be invoked by a member of a company and not by a shareholder in the strict 
sense. On appeal by the appellant, the Court of Appeal based on the reasoning that 
the application of the general rule would be unfair or unjust to the appellant and 
relying on authorities21 on the doctrine of estoppel allowed the appellants appeal. 
The Court of Appeal stated that it does not lie in the mouth of the alleged 
wrongdoers to say that the appellant has no grounds to stand on after having cut the 
very ground from under his feet. 22 
B. Debenture -holders 
One of the major differences between the Malaysian section 181 and the 
counterparts in Australia and the United Kingdom, is that the Malaysian provision 
provides a debenture holder a right to bring proceedings under section 18 I. 
Whether inclusion of debenture holders under the section IS 
desirable or not is questionable because the legislature had indirectly allowed or 
2 1 
22 
Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yal Hold;ngs Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 
MLJ 202; West v Pollack & l·reemantle ( 1937) TPD (SA) 64; Boustead 
Trad;ng (1985) Sdn Bhdv Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 3 
AMR 49: 2871 ; [1995] 3 MLJ 33 I 
supra n 15 at p 2507 &2508 
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permitted creditors to interfere in the management of companies when it is a 
generally a.cccpicJ principie in company law that management of companies should 
be in the hands of the board of directors. 23 
In fact creditors dealing in arms length with the company will have 
obtained security by way of a fixed or floating charge over the assets of the 
company and would have obtained personal guarantees from the directors. Even if 
a creditor is not provided with security or sufficient security, the credi~or may rely 
on the courts and commence legal proceedings to recover monies owing or rely on 
the winding up provisions to wind up the company to recover any debts owing to 
him by the company. 
Compared to shareholders, more often than not, creditors who 
provide loan capital to companies are very well advised by their accountants, 
financial advisors or lawyers and large institutional creditors would have generally 
protected their interests by taking insurance cover. Therefore by allowing debenture 
holders a right to bring an action may lead to unnecessary interference in the 
management of the company. 
(i) Debentures 
There is also the problem of defining who is a debenture holder. To date, there is 
23 
John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v John Shaw [I 935] 2 K.B. 113 
24 
25 
no precise legal meaning of the word "debenture". Section 4 of the Act defines a 
"debenture" as follows : 
"includes debenture stock, bonds, notes and any other securities 
of a corporation whether constituting a charge on the assets of 
the corporation or not" 
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It is obvious that the above definition is not exhaustive and may 
cover many other documents not specifically mentioned. Chitty J said in Levy v 
Abercorris Slate and Slab Co: 24 
In my opinion a debenture means a document which either 
creates a debt or acknowledges it, and any document which 
fulfils either of these conditions is a 'debenture' . I cannot find 
any precise legal definition of the term, it is not either in law or 
commerce a strictly technical term, or what is called a term of 
art. 
In British India Steam Navigation Co v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, 25 Lindley J said: 
.. . what the correct meaning of ' debenture' is I do not know. I 
do not find anywhere any precise definition of it. We know that 
there are various kinds of instruments commonly called 
debentures. You may have mortgage debentures, which are 
charges of some kind on property. You may have debentures 
which are bonds . . . You may have a debenture which is nothing 
more than an acknowledgement of indebtedness. And you may 
have a thing like this, which is something more; it is a statement 
by two directors that the company will pay a certain some of 
money on a given day, and will also pay interests half-yearly at 
certain times and at a certain place, upon production of certain 
coupons by the holder of the instrument. 
(1887) 37 Ch D 260 
(1881) 7 QBD 165 
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In Bensa Sdn Bhdv Malayan Banking Bhcf6 James Foong J in 
referring to Chitty' s definition of a debenture above, stated that a more liberal 
outlook should be given to the term 'debenture ' owing to the wide range of fonns 
anti instruments that are being introduced to meet the ever changing needs of 
modem day commerce. James Foong J stated that the tenn 'debenture' should 
include besides "debt", any obligation, covenant, undertaking or guarantee to pay 
or any acknowledgement thereof 
Given such a wide definition of 'debenture', any person can rely on 
section 181 and bring an action against a company. In fact, the court at the 
commencement of the hearing of the application would have to decide whether the 
applicant is a debenture holder or not. 
There is a high likelihood that many might claim to be a debenture 
holder and abuse section 181 by unnecessarily bringing an action which may be 
frivolous and vexatious. Although a company may be able to set aside such an 
action but it will still cost the company its valuable management time and resources 
in appointing, instructing and liasing with its lawyers and attending court 
proceedings. Such litigation might even damage the reputation of the company, if it 
is brought to the attention of the public by the media. Therefore, those managing a 
26 [1993] 1 MLJ 119 
(ii) Shadow directors 
Section 4 Companies Act 1965 defines a 'director' as follows: 
includes any person occupying the position of a director of a 
corporation by whatever name called and includes a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of 
a corporation are accustomed to act and an alternate or substitute 
director 
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It is known fact that in many circumstances, company directors rely 
and act in accordance with the directions or instructions of debenture holders who 
have advanced loans to the companies. Without the assistance and cooperation of 
these debenture holders it is difficult for the companies to embark on many 
promising projects or business adventures. Many companies do survive on these 
financial assistance, otherwise they would be out of business. In such a situation 
' 
the Board of Directors may be compelled to allow these debenture holders either 
orally, contractually or through the Articles of Association to participate directly or 
indirectly in the manageme·::tt and running of the company. There may be 
circumstances where these debenture holders would be able to influence decisions 
made by the Board of Directors of the company, even though the Board of 
Directors had been elected by the general meeting of shareholders to manage the 
company. Owing to the wide definition of 'directors' in section 4 of the 
Companies Act, the debenture holders may fall under the category of those 
persons commonly called the 'shadow directors' and therefore are able to run the 
company indirectly. 
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The mere existence of the above situation would allow the debenture 
holders to easily commence an action under sectipn 181 to protect and safeguard 
their loan capital. Even though the debenture holders may be aware of the 
sigrrificance and requirement of proving the elements of section 181 in the court of 
law, however, such requirement may not hinder them from pursuing against or 
pressuring the Board of Directors of the company to settle their debts. Most 
companies are very concerned about their public image and reputation in the 
business world and would at all cost avoid any legal suits being brought against 
them, especially by creditors. Therefore, in the process of trying to protect their 
credibility, there would be a strong tendency on the part of the Board of Directors 
to end up compromising their management decisions to please their creditors. It is 
on these grounds that the writer strongly suggests that debenture holders should not 
be included in the provisions of section 181. 
There are in fact other sufficient safeguards for the debenture 
holders. Public companies cannot issue debentures to raise money from the public 
unless such invitations to the public comply with the strict provisions of the 
Companies Act with regards to prospectuses.27 Generally, a debenture would 
include a covenant to pay, accompanied by some charge or security. The most 
common charge or security obtained by a debenture holder against the company 
would be a fixed or floating charge over the assets, property and undertaking of the 
27 See ss 37 - 47B, Division 1, Part iv, Companies Act 1965 
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common charge or security obtained by a debenture holder against the 
company would be a fixed or floating charge over the assets, property and 
undertaking of the 
company. However, it is to be noted that a debenture can be given without there 
being any charge over the company's property. This type of debenture is commonly 
known as an unsecured note or nake~ debenture. In fact, section 38(3) Companies 
Act 1965 requires that the acknowledgement of debt issued pursuant to section 38 
be described as an "unsecured note" or "unsecured deposit note" unless security of 
the kind specified in section 38(4) or (5) does in fact exist, in which case the word 
"debenture" may be used .. 
Further, public companies cannot issue debentures to raise money from the public 
unless a trustee corporation is appointed for the holders of the debentures. Section 
74(1) Companies Act 1965 provides: 
Subject to this section every corporation which offers debentures 
to the public for ~11bscription or purchase in Malaysia after the 
commencement of this Act shall make provision in those 
debentures or in a trust deed relating to those debentures for the 
appointment of a trustee corporation as trustee for the holders of 
the debentures. 
Further section 78(2)- (5) and s 79 give trustees wide powers to 
protect the interest of debenture holders by making application to the courts 
whenever the trustees are of the opinion that the interest of the debenture holders 
will be prejudiced by the acts of the company and the court has wide discretionary 
powers to provide the appropriate remedies. 
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Although the prohibitions and restrictions with regard to public 
offerings of debentures do not apply to private companies, nevertheless, the private 
debentures usually adopt similar restrictions as required by the Companies Act. 
Further, a charge created by a private debenture must be registered under section 
1 08(1) Companies Act 1965 so as to protect the debenture holder in recovering his 
loan capital. 
Given that there are adequate protection for debenture holders, it is 
suggested that the legislature should not have included debenture hoiders in section 
181. It is arguable that, it is for these reasons that the legislatures in the equivalent 
English and Australian provisions did not include debenture holders. 
The legislature gives a special position to debenture holders. Their 
position is more secure than those creditors (especially suppliers of goods or those 
who may have provided other valuable services) who do not have any documents 
which may be categorised as a debenture. They would expect that the company 
would pay them too. The section itself seems to be unfairly prejudicial and unfairly 
discriminatory in this context. 
In this respect and given the elusive nature of the definition of what 
a debenture means, Parliament would need to amend the present section 181. It has 
to either define precisely who the category of persons falling under the context of 
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The provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C 1974-
75-76, C.33, (now R.S.C 1985, C.C-44,), which are relevant for the present 
discussion are set out below: 
S234(1) 
(2) 
A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section. 
If, upon an application under subsection (1 ), the court is satisfied 
that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates: 
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates 
effects a result; 
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been carried on or conducted in a 
manner; or 
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its 
affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner; 
that is oppressive or unfairly pr~judicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any secunty holder, creditor, director or 
officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters 
complained of. 
In the Canadian Act, the term 'creditor' is not defined. However, the 
broad definition of 'complainant' in the Act purportedly allows creditors to have 
standing to bring an action under the above provisions. Referring to the Canadian 
cases, much depends on a case to case basis. The following cases show the position 
of the Canadian courts: Re Daon Development Corp. 28( debenture holder seeking 
leave to bring a derivative action not qualified as complainant); R v The Sands 
Motor Hotel Ltci9 (federal Crown as creditor qualified as complainant pursuant to 
28 (1984), 54 B.C.L.R 235 (S.C) 
29 [1 985] 1 W. W.R 59 (Sask. Q.B) 
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the oppression provisions); Bank of Montreal v Dome Petroleum Ltd. 30 (creditor 
qualified as complainant); Tsuru v Montpetie 1 (creditor qualified as complainant); 
Canadian Opera Co. v 670800 Ont. lnc32 (creditor qualified as complainant); First 
Edmonton Place v 315888 Alta. Ltcf3 (creditor had status as a complainant but 
llffiible to bring oppression remedy because not a creditor at time of oppression); 
Lloyds Bank Canada v Canada Life Assurance Co34 (assignee of creditor entitled to 
bring claim for oppression remedy in respect of assignor's loan to debtor 
corporation) and Prime Computer of Canada Ltd v Jeffrey & Robinson & Jeffrey 
Ltcf5 (the vendor of computer equipment to which the defendant corporation owed 
payment for purchases was permitted to bring an action alleging that the stripping 
of corporate assets was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
judgment creditor). 
Further, there was the issue of whether the term "creditor, should 
be restricted to persons to whom a debt is owing, or whether it should have an 
30 
31 
32 
34 
35 
(1987), 67 C.B.R (N.S) 296 (Alta Q.B) 
[1989] R.JQ. 2452 (C.S) 
(1990), 75 O.R (2d) 720 (Div. Ct) 
(1988), 40 B.L.R 28 (Alta Q.B), revd [1990] 2 W.W.R. 670 (Alta C.A) 
(unreported) (June 5, 1990), Doc. Toronto 18929/87, Van Camp J 
(Ont.H.C) 
(1991), 6 O.R (3d) 733 (Gen. Div) 
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extended meaning to include persons with unliquidated claims for damages. 36 This 
issue was resolved in G. T Campbell & Associates Ltd v Hugh Carson Co .. 37 where 
the Court of Appeal considered the provisions ,of the 1970 Ontario Act which 
provided for the commencement of actions against the corporation and its 
shareholders within two years of dissolution. In interpreting the meaning of 
"creditor" in the relevant section of the Ontario Act, a majority of court was of the 
view that to ascribe the common law meaning to the word, that is restricting claims 
to persons to whom liquidated amounts are owing, would lead to an unjust and 
unreasonable result, in that otherwise, persons with unliquidated claims against the 
corporation would be unable to satisfy their judgment as against the shareholders to 
whom the property of the corporation had been distributed. The court was of the 
opinion that it would be impossible to obtain judgment against the corporation, 
commence an action against the shareholders and obtain judgment within the two-
year period required by the Ontario Act. 38 Therefore, for the purpose of those 
provisions, 'creditor' included persons with unliquidated claims for damages. 
It is no doubt that the inclusion of the term 'creditor' would lead to a 
floodgate of legal suits against companies. Possibly to curtail such actions being 
brought, the Malaysian courts should be given a wide discretion as to whether the 
36 
37 
38 
Harry Sutherland,Q.C., David B.Horsley,QC. , Graham Turner, Chritopher 
O.Woodbury and Shona Bradley, Fraser & Stewart Company Law of 
Canada, 6th Ed. Carswell, 1993, p 715 
(1979), 24 O.R (2d) 758 (C.A) 
supra n 40 at p 715 
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creditors concerned have a cause of action under section 181 . Then again, this may 
lead to unnecessary and protracted legal actions which would not be in the best 
interest of the company. 
One important principle Of company law is that the Memorandum of 
Association and the Articles of Association are statutory contracts between the 
company and the shareholders or members. Companies must be governed by these 
constitutional documents and shareholders have the right to ensure that the board of 
directors manage and run the companies in accordance with the provisions of those 
documents. In a way these documents give shareholders and members a sense of 
importance that at least they have some control as to how companies are run and at 
the same time make those elected directors accountable to them. 
By allowing debenture holders a right to make use of section 181, 
the legislature has indirectly weakened the position of the shareholders and the 
significance of the statutory contracts between the shareholders and the company. 
This is obvious by the wide variety of orders that a court could make pursuant to 
section 181 (2) of the Act. The situation would be made worse if section 181 is 
amended to include the term "creditors". 
C. The Minister 
Finally the Minister, in the case of a declared company under Part IX of the Act, 
can commence an action under section 181 . In section 194 a declared company is 
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defined as meaning a company or foreign company to which Part IX applies, that is 
a company the affairs of which are being investigated under sections 195 and 196. 
However to date no application has been made in Malaysia by the Minister under 
section 181. 
II. Conditions applicants need to prove under section 181 
Finally, it should be noted that an applicant under section 181 must prove one of 
the following conditions to establish a case: 
(i) the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to 
one or more of the members, shareholders or debenture holders of the 
company; or 
(ii) the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to 
one or more members shareholders or debenture holders of the company; or 
(iii) the affairs of the company are being conducted in disregard of the interests 
of one or more of the members shareholders or debenture holders of the 
company; or 
(iv) the powers of the directors are being exercised in disregard of the interests 
of one or more of the members shareholders or debenture holders of the 
company; or 
(v) some act of the company have been done or is threatened to be done which 
unfairly discriminates against one or more of the members or debenture 
holders of the company; or 
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(vi) some resolution ofthe members (or any class of them) has been passed or 
is proposed which unfairly discriminates against one or more of the 
members or debenture holders of the company; or 
(vii) some act of the company has been done or is threatened which is otherwise 
prejudicial to one or more of the members or debenture holders of the 
company; or 
(viii) some resolution ofthe members (or any class of them) has been passed or is 
proposed which is otherwise prejudicial to one or more of the members or 
debenture holders ofthe company. 
In Chapter 5, the writer will examme some of the important 
elements of section 181(1) which the petitioner has to prove before the court can 
provide an appropriate remedy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE SECTION 181(1) OF THE COMPANIES 
ACT 1965 
I. Affairs of the company 
A Definition 
One ofthe requirements of section 181(a) of the Companies Act 1965 is the need by 
the applicant to prove that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a 
manner oppressive to one or more of the members or in disregard of his or their 
interests as members, shareholders or holders of debentures of the company. 
Section 181 Companies Act 1965 does not define what is meant by 'affairs of the 
company'. However, it is a fact that in the great majority of cases it would be clear 
that the conduct complained of is conduct of the company's affairs and any attempt 
to defme what constitutes conduct of the affairs of the company is bound to be 
largely tautologous' . 1 
"Affairs of the company" was broadly defmed by Bowen CJ in Re 
Cumberland Holdings:2 
The words 'affairs of the company' are as wide as one could well 
have. They are not limited to business or trade matters, but encompass 
capital structure, dividend policy, voting rights, consideration of take-
over offers and indeed all matters which may come before the board 
' ' for consideration. 
Robin Hollington: Minority Shareholders' Rights, 2nd ed London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994, p 58. 
[1976] ACLR 361 at p 374-375. 
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In section 53 of the Australian Corporations Law, this expression was 
defined in broad terms and in relation to a body corporate it included reference to:3 
i) the promotion, formation, membership, control, business, trading, transaction 
and dealings, property, liabilities, profits and the income, receipts, losses, 
outgoings and expenditure; 
ii) the internal management and proceedings; and 
iii) the power of persons to exercise, or to control the exercise of, the rights to 
vote attached to shares in the body corporate or to dispose of, o,r to exercise 
control over the disposal of, such shares. 
In Rea Company (No. 001761 of 1986)4 Harman J held:5 
Thus one must always analyse very carefully ... what is the conduct in 
the company itself or by the company itself (whether it be a single act 
or whether it be a course of conduct matters not) to see that there was 
conduct in the company's own affairs .. . (T)he conduct complained of 
must be in the affairs of the very company in respect of which the 
petition is presented. 
Rea Company (NO. 001761 of 1986) is important in the sense that it 
illustrates the distinction between conduct "in the company" and conduct "dehors 
3 
4 
5 
P.Lipton and A.Herzberg, Understanding Company Law, 4th ed, Sydney, The 
Law Book Company Limited, 1992, p 449. 
[1987] BCLC 141 
Ibid at p 144 f-g 
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the company".6 Conduct "in the company" is illustrated by the facts of the well-
known case of Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer. 7 Here the 
petitioners were minority shareholders in a subsidiary company formed by Scottish 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS). The subsidiary had five directors, three 
were nominees of SCWS and the petitioners were the other two directors. The 
subsidiary and SCWS carried on the same business. The subsidiary, however 
depended on SCWS for its supplies. Later, SCWS deliberately refused to supply the 
subsidiary with supplies with the intention of ruining the subsidiary. The three 
nominee directors did not intervene to prevent sews from ruining the subsidiary's 
business. It was held that the action of the Board of SCWS and the majority 
shareholders constituted conduct in the affairs of the company and therefore was 
oppressive. 
On the other hand conduct such as being 'rude, domineering, 
disruptive and aggressive towards ·[customers] and members of the staff of the 
company at the [company] premises'; trying 'to get more money for the company in a 
somewhat abrasive fashion'; asking 'the secretary to park the director's car; ... in her 
personal interest asking the others in a board meeting, in their personal and 
individual capacity, to transfer their shares to her and resign as directors, have been 
6 
7 
Ibid at p 148a 
(1959) AC 324 
103 
held not to be 'conduct of or in the company' .8 These acts are considered acts done 
by the ditectot in his or her personal capacity and are examples of conduct ' dehors 
the company' . 
B. Related companies and the position of nominee directors 
The concept of separate legal entity and the principle that directors only owe 
fiduciary duties to their own company, may give rise to difficulties in circumstances 
where directors are appointed as nominee directors. Nominee directors are generally 
appointed to represent the appointer in the board of another company. It is common 
for holding companies to appoint nominees as directors of its subsidiaries. Where the 
subsidiary is wholly-owned by the holding company, nominee directors will be 
required to act in the best interests of the group of companies, whereas, if it's a non-
wholly owned subsidiary, the nominee directors must balance the interests of the 
group with the interests of the shareholders generally including the minority 
shareholders. 9 However, the fact still remains that the nominee directors must act in 
the best interest of the company of which he or she is the director and not act in 
disregard of the interests of the company. The nominee director must give due 
regard to the interests of the members of the company he is appointed to. There is 
8 Supra at n 4 at 145-6. 
9 P.Lipton and A.Herzberg, Supra n 3 at p 301 
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also authority that in certain circumstances the interests of its creditors must be 
taken into account especially when the company is insolvent. 10 
It is to be noted that the above view expressed would be 
commercially unrealistic as most company's affairs are managed on a group basis 
and it would be impossible to clearly specify the affairs of each company in the 
group of companies as they would generally tend to overlap. It has been suggested 
that the 'economic reality of group activity should be recognised and the manner in 
which the affairs of one member of the group are conducted should, in most 
circumstances, be treated as part of the affairs of other group members' .11 
Therefore, in conducting the affairs of the company there is a high 
possibility that nominee directors may be in a position of conflict of duty in 
exercising their powers as directors. In such circumstances, they may be vulnerable 
to section 181 actions by minority shareholders. 
10 
11 
Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 at 6-7; Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) 
Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 453. 
S.H.Goo, Minority Shareholders ' Protection: A Study ofS 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1994, p26. 
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In Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd, 12 the petitioner, a minority 
shareholder in Soundcraft Magnetics Ltd (the company) brought an action under 
the equivalent of section 181 of the Companies Act 1965. The company had three 
shareholders. 75% of the shares were held by Soundcraft Electronics Ltd (the parent 
company) and the remainder was divided equally between the petitioner and 
another. The company had a board of four, the petitioner and another and two 
others who represented the parent company. The parent company was to support 
the company but owing to its own financial difficulties, it withheld sums due to the 
company. 
One of the issues before the Court of Appeal was whether the 
withholding of the sums constituted acts done in the conduct of the affairs of the 
company. It was held that the parent company exercised detailed control over the 
affairs of the company and when it withheld payments to the company it was doing 
so as part of the general control that it exercised over the affairs of the company. 
Therefore, the non-payments of the sums due to the company did relate to the 
manner in which the affairs of the company were conducted. However, it was 
further held on the facts that the parent company's conduct of the company's affairs 
did not constitute unfair prejudice. 
12 [1993] BCLC 360 
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In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer, the facts of 
which were stated earlier, Lord Keith in the House of Lords held: 13 
The only question is: was it oppressive in the affairs of the company? 
At a previous stage of this case when relevancy was under 
consideration the late Lord President Cooper said: "The truth is that , 
whenever a subsidiary is formed as in this case with an independent 
minority of shareholders, the parent company must, if it is engaged in 
the same class of business, accept as a result of having formed such a 
subsidiary an obligation so to conduct what are in a sense its own 
affairs as to deal fairly with its subsidiary." I would adopt this 
statement with this expansion, that conducting what are in a sense its 
own affairs may amount to misconducting the affairs of the subsidiary. 
It is difficult to say that misconduct in the affairs of the subsidiary is 
not conduct in the affairs of the subsidiary and that, I think, is what 
Lord Cooper had in mind. Misconduct in the affairs of the company 
may be passive conduct, neglect of its interests, concealment from the 
minority of knowledge that it is material tor the company to know. 
That, in my opinion, is what happened here. 
In Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd, 14 the plaintiff and the second 
defendant were brothers. They acquired shares in 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd which 
in turn held shares in Metal Recyclers fty Ltd The second defendant represented 
45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd in the board of Metal Recyclers Pty Ltd Later there was a 
dispute between the brothers and the plaintiff began to trade in competition with 
Metal Recyclers Pty Ltd. Metal Recyclers Pty Ltd resolved to pay large directors 
fees and bonuses to the second defendant at the expense of 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd 
The plaintiff, sought an order under the equivalent of section 181 for the 
13 Supra n 7 at p 362. 
14 (1986) 10 ACLR 692 
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compulsory purchase of his shares. The main allegation of the plaintiff was that in 
' 
exercising his votes as a member ot the board of Metal Recyclers Pty Ltd, the second 
defendant was acting in the affairs of the company which appointed him to that 
position. Young J held: 15 
In general where a person is serving on a board of directors, he is 
dealing with the affairs of the company that is being controlled by 
the board and whilst he is so acting he is not, and should not, be also 
involved in the affairs of some other entity. This principle seems to 
me also to underline the decision in Molomby v Whitehead ( 1985) 63 
ALR 282. A board member can look at all papers that he wants to see, 
even though he may be appointed to represent a special interest 
group because when acting for the board it is assumed unless the 
contrary is proved the director is acting in the affairs of the board and 
not in conflict with them. 
It is of course true that a person who is what might be called a 
nominee director, may legitimately exercise his votes on a board in the 
interests of the person who appointed him without being in breach of 
a fiduciary duty to the company on whose board he sits: see eg the 
judgements of Jacobs Jon Levin v Clark [1962] NSWR 686; 80 WN 
(NSW) 85 andRe Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1964-5] NSWR 
1648. However, I do not consider that this state of affairs is 
sufficient for one to conclude that when so taking part in a board 
meeting of a company one is acting in the affairs of the appointor 
company. 
In the instant case, on the facts Young J held that the second 
defendant was not acting in the affairs of the appointing company when voting at a 
meeting of the board of the company to which he had been appointed. 
15 Ibid at p 705 
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A similar situation arose in case of Re Norvabron Pty Ltd (No 2). 16 
Here the oppression complained occurred in Transfield (Qld) Pty Ltd, which was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Norvabron Pty Ltd. The petitioner sought an order 
requesting the respondents to purchase his shares. It was argued that the conduct 
complained of related to the affairs of the subsidiary and therefore, the applicant 
had no right to bring an action against . the parent company, Norvabron Pty Ltd. 
However, the court rejected the argument of the respondents that the applicant's 
case was on its facts limited to the subsidiary, whereas the application was made in 
respect of the parent company. The court held such an approach is artificial in the 
extreme. The court said that the directors of Norvabron Pty Ltd were aware of the 
happenings in the subsidiary because they were personally involved and they 
omitted to act in relation to those happenings even though it was their duty to do so. 
It was held that their omission to act was relevant under the equivalent of section 
181 proceedings. 
Therefore in situations as above, the important fact to take into 
consideration is whether one is dealing with a wholly or majority owned subsidiary 
of a company. In Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer and Re 
Norvabron Pty Ltd it was held that the parent company was in a position to control 
the affairs of the subsidiary whereas in Morgan v -15 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd, the 
company in question only controlled 50 per cent of the voting power and there were 
16 1986) ll ACLR 279 
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provisions in the articles of association requiring all directors to agree to certain 
matters. 17 Although the iaw is uncertain with respect to the position of such 
nominee directors but the following Australian authorities seem to provide 
protection to nominee directors from being sued under section 181. 
In Re Broadcasting Station 2 GB Ltd, 18 Jacobs J of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales thought that nominee directors who acted in the 
interests of their principals would not be in breach of duty unless it could be 
inferred that they would still have acted that way if they were of the view that their 
acts were not in the interests of the company. That approach was approved in Ber/ei 
Hestia (NZ) Ltd19 as being appropriate to a joint venture company.20 
21 d " . d h In Levin v Clark, two uectors were nommate to t e board to 
exercise their powers only if the terms of a security over the company's assets were 
17 
18 
19 
10 
21 
Peter G. Wilcocks, Shareholders' Rights and Remedies, The Federation Press, 
1991, p 30. 
[1964-5] NSWR 1648 
[1980] 2 NZLR 150 
HAl Ford, Principles of Company Law, 5th ed, Sydney, Butterworths, 1990, p 
425. 
[1962] NSWR 686 
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broken by the company. Jacobs J held that they were not in breach of their fiduciary 
duty to the company when they acted to enforce the security. He said:22 
It may be in the interest of the company thc;tt there be upon its board of 
directors one who will represent these other interests and who will be 
acting solely in the interests of such a third party and who may in that 
way be properly regarded as acting in the interests of the company as 
a whole. 
In Levin v Clark the articles allowed the creditor to nominate 
directors and thus the members could be taken to have waived any supposed right to 
have a board which considered only their interests (and, where appropriate, the 
interests of creditors generally) to the extent that the board could consider the 
particular secured creditor's special interest. But even if, in the absence of relevant 
articles, the creditor' s right to representation vested on only a board resolution, the 
issue would seem to be whether the board resolution was in the interests of the 
company.23 In Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd,24 the High Court of Australia 
held that the articles may determine the legi~imate parameters of directors ' 
behaviour. 25 Therefore, with properly drafted articles, nominee directors may act in 
the interests of their appointor without breaching their fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interest of the company. 26 
22 Ibid at p 700. 
23 Supra at n 20 at p 424-425. 
24 (1987) 5 ACLC 421 
25 Supra at n 3 at p 302. 
26 Ibid at p 302-303. 
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Therefore, it may be concluded that if the articles expressly authorise 
the appointment of directors by outsiders, then power to do so is undoubtedly valid 
and if the company refuses to accept the outsider's· nominees, the court wi1l compel 
it to do so by injunction unless the nominee is unfit to act. 
C. Continuing state of affairs 
The words "affairs of the company are being conducted" in section 181 (I)( a) of the 
Companies Act 1965 relates to a continuing state of affairs. Therefore, where a 
petition is presented on the ground of oppression or disregard of a member's 
interests, the acts complained of must be continuing at the time the action is brought. 
This implies that a member is not entitled to relief if the oppression has stopped. Jn 
Re Kong Thai Sawmills (Miri) Sdn Bhd,27 the Privy Council refused to provide relief 
in respect of acts of oppression or disregard that had ceased at the time of the action, 
therefore preventing a member complaining against an isolated act or completed 
transaction which has no enduring results; he must show a continuing state of affairs 
in order to justify relief 28 On the other hand, in the case of an act or resolution that 
unfairly discriminates against a member or is othervvise prejudicial to him, the 
27 
28 
(1978) 2 MU 227 
Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks, The Companies Act of Malaysia, An 
Annotation, Butterworths Asia, 1997 at VII (83). 
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wording of the section suggests that relief may be obtained even if the act has 
already been done or the resolution has been passed. 29 
However, what is important to note, is that, the oppression remedy is 
directed against the effects of the oppressive conduct and not just the oppressive 
conduct itself, otherwise it would render the effectiveness of the remedy in section 
18l(l)(a) meaningless.30 This point was made clear in the case of Owen Sim Liang 
Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd and Anor31 where the court rejected an argument that 
the act was not continuing because it was fiat accompli at the date of the hearing of 
the petition. 32 Gopal Sri Ram JCA held:33 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Now, it is inaccurate to state as a proposition of law that because of 
the present tense of the language appearing in s 181 (1 )(a) the 
oppression complained of must in every case continue up to the date 
of the presentation of the petition. Indeed, Lord Wilberforce [in Re 
Khong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd] himself recognised this when he 
referred to a last minute correction as not having the effect of avoiding 
an inference of a propensity to oppress. But the reference by his 
Lordship to a last minute correction is but a mere illustration of a 
much wider principle. It is this. 
Paragraph (a) to the first sub-section 181 is not, as observed by Lord 
Wilberforce [in Re Khong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd], directed at 
specific or particular acts or omissions. It is directed at the nature of 
the conduct complained of And where attention is called to particular 
Ibid 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers: Controls, Remedies and Decision 
Making, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p 149. 
[1996] 2 AMR 2477 
Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 30 at p 149. 
Supra n 31 at p 2500 
acts or omissions, it is the effect of these which has to be considered. 
It is not and has never been the law that the section does not bite 
where what is complamed of ts but a single act or omission on the part 
of wrongdoers. 
A single act or omission may, by its very na~re, have so devastating or 
far reaching a consequence upon the rights of a member that its effects 
may be permanently felt. For the purposes of sl81(1) it is sufficient 
that the effects of a single act or omission are such that they persist at 
· the date of the presentation of the petition. It is no answer, in those 
circumstances, for the perpetrators of the act or omission to allege that 
there was no continuous oppressive conduct up to the date of 
presentation of the petition. 
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In Australia, for instance, before 1983 it was a requirement that the 
affairs of the company must be conducted in a manner oppressive to some member 
or members at the time when the petition was presented. 34 The present Australian 
section 260 (l)(a)(i) contains a reference to "are being conducted" in relation to the 
affairs of the company and accordingly on the basis of past authority it would not be 
possible to allege that the "affairs of the company" are being conducted in an 
oppressive manner if such conduct has ceased and under those circumstances it 
would be necessary to rely on the provisions of section 260(l)(a)(ii) in relation to an 
act or omission. 35 This basically implies that no member can bring an action by 
relying on past conduct of the affairs of the company, where it is a combination of 
acts or omissions which creates the oppression and where each single act or 
34 Peter G. Wilcocks, Supra n 17 at p 27 
35 Ibid 
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omission taken alone is not oppressive. 36 The present position in Australia is stated 
in Norvabron Pty Ltd(No. 2) :37 
It should first be noted that one branch of the qualification for relief 
involves the continuing conduct of any affairs of the company that 
involve oppression, unfair prejudice or discrimination, while in respect 
of the second branch, a single past act of that description is sufficient. 
Obviously, in order to invoke the exercise of the court ' s discretion, the 
single past act would need to be so serious as to equate to a continuing 
present state of affairs, but a series of past acts may be cumulative and 
may be considered in respect of their present and future effect. A 
single act in the past may not be so serious as to support the remedy 
or having been corrected may not support it, but of course everything 
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. 
In an earlier Australian case, Anti-Corrosive Treatments Ltd & The 
Companies Act, 38 the court made it clear for the purposes of the equivalent of section 
181, that intention of the oppressor to carry through an act is paramount in 
establishing whether there was oppression or not. In that case, the majority 
shareholder who was also the governing director had called for a general meeting to 
alter the articles of association, so as to enable him to acquire the shares of the 
petitioner and get rid of the petitioner. It was held that as long as an act is oppressive 
and the oppressor shows an intention to carry through with the act, there is a 
36 Ibid 
37 Supra n 16 at 289 
38 (1980) ACLC, 34165 
continuing process of oppression.39 White J held:40 
The conclusion I have reached is that in the present case an attempt 
was made to commit a breach of the membership rights under the 
articles followed by a damaging course qf conduct set in motion to 
avoid a breach of the existing membership rights under the articles. 
That, in my view, must be regarded as a continuing process of 
oppression. 
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Referring to the Malaysian case of Owen Sim Liang Khui and the 
Australian cases of Re Norvabron Pty Ltd and Anti-Corrosive Treatments Ltd, the 
words ' affairs ofthe company are being conducted' and 'powers of the directors are 
being exercised' (only in the Malaysian section), does not mean the conduct or act 
must be of a continuing nature and persist at the date of hearing of the petition. It is 
generally a question of fact and as stated in Re Norvabron Pty Ltd, it would depend 
on the seriousness of the act and on the circumstances of each case. 
Therefore looking at section 181 ( 1 )(b) and also section 260(1 )(b)( ii) 
of the Australian s 260, whereby Parliament seems to have recognised past single 
acts or omissions, it is the writer' s opinion that it would not have been the intention 
of Parliament not to recognise past conduct of the affairs of the company for the 
purposes of section 181(l)(a) and under the circumstances the decisions of the 
Malaysian courts in relying on the effect of the conduct should be appreciated. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested by the writer, that the legislature should have included 
39 Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 30 at p 148. 
40 Supra n 38 at 34172 
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the words 'have been conducted' and 'have been exercised' in section 181(1)(a). In 
section 459 of the Engiish Act, the section reads ' ... company's affairs are being or 
have been conducted .. . ' . The inclusion of the above words would have solved the 
problems faced by the courts in interpreting the actual scope of section 181 (1 )(a). 
II. Oppression 
A. Definitions 
In United Kingdom, the introduction of section 210 Companies Act 1948 was the 
first step of the legislature to provide protection to minority interest in a company, 
however it is obvious that the section 210 remedy was defective especially in the 
way the courts interpreted the meaning of the word "oppression". The courts were 
very rigid and defined the word in a very restrictive manner. In Scottish Cooperative 
Whosale Society v Meyer, Lord Simonds defined the term "oppression" to mean 
"burdensome, harsh and wrongful". In fact how these words are to be further 
interpreted and applied in a particular fact situation will always be a major hurdle for 
the courts. It is obvious that the definition stated by Lord Simonds did not help 
minority litigants because there were only two successful actions brought under 
section 210 of the English Act.41 However, some courts, recognising the 
restrictiveness of the meaning of the word 'oppression' had endeavoured to provide 
broader definitions so as to protect minority shareholders. The definitions had 
received different interpretations and criticisms by different courts. 
41 Scottish Cooperative Whosale Society v Meyer ( 1959) AC 324 andRe HR 
Harmer [1959] 1 WLR 62 
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In the United Kingdom with the passing of the section 75 of the 
Companies Act 1980 the word "oppression" was replaced with that of unfairly 
prejudicial conduct. But then, some countries like Australia, Malaysia, India and 
Ghaha have still retained the word "oppression" in their statutes. However, as will be 
noted in a later part of this chapter, the courts in these countries have given a much 
more liberal interpretation to the word 'oppression' . Buckley LJ defined oppression 
· R 42 m e Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd: 
In our judgement, oppression occurs when shareholders, having a 
dominant power in a company, either (1) exercise that power to 
procure that something is done or not done in the conduct of the 
company' s affairs or (2) procure by an express or implicit threat of an 
exercise of that power that something is not done in the conduct of the 
company's affairs~ and when such conduct is unfair ... to the other 
members of the company or some of them, and lacks that degree of 
probity which they are entitled to expect in the conduct of the 
company's affairs. 
In Gidwitz v Lan::it Corrugated Box Co, Justice Hershey said:43 
The word does not necessarily savor of fraud, and the absence of 
'mismanagement, or misapplication of assets', does not prevent a 
finding that the conduct of the dominant directors or officers has been 
oppressive. It is not synonymous with 'illegal' and 'fraudulent' . 
In Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd,44 Lord Cooper gave a broader and 
42 [1971] 3 AllER 184 
43 170 NE 2d 131 at p 135 
44 [1952] sc 49 
more liberal definition:45 
The essence of the matter seems to be that the conduct complained of 
should at the lowest involve departure from the standards of fair 
dealing, and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every 
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely. 
118 
Lord Keith in Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd stated the test of 
oppression to be "lack of probity or fair dealing"; whereas Lush J in Re Dalley and 
Co Pty Ltcf6 took a broader view:47 
In my opinion want of probity is only one of the ways in which 
oppression can manifest itself, as indeed the use of the alternative 
'lack of probity or fair dealing' by Lord Keith [in Elder's case] 
indicates. One person may subject another to continual injustice by 
insisting, however honestly, on a proposition that is wrong or by using 
his strength to maintain, however honestly, a position unjustified in 
law. 
In Malaysia the court in the case of Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn 
Bhd had preferred the view as expressed in Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd and again 
recently in the case of Jaya Medical Consultants Sdn Bhd v Island and Peninsular 
Bhd and !3 Ors,48 Siti Norma J (as she then was) held:49 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
.. . oppression does not necessarily mean illegal or fraudulent nor does 
it require fraud. For there to be oppression, there must be visible 
departure from the standard of fair dealing or fair play and where the 
Ibid at p 55 
(1968) 1 ACLR 489 
Ibid at 492 
[1994] 1 MLJ 520 
Ibid at p 536 
oppressed is constrained to submit to some overbearing act or attitude 
on the part of the oppressor. 
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In India, the meaning of the term ~'oppression" as explained by Lord 
Cooper was cited with approval by Wanchoo J of the Supreme Court of India in 
Sh::Znti Prasad Jain v Kalinga Tubes. 50 
It is obvious from the various definitions postulated by the courts, that 
no single explicit definition can be given to the word 'oppression' . The most the 
courts could do is to define the word "oppression" as broadly as possible in order to 
protect minority shareholders in any given fact situation. In H.R Harmer Ltd,51 it 
was stated: 
The result of applications under [the equivalent of s 181] in different 
cases must depend on the particular facts of each case, the 
circumstances in which oppression may arise being so infinitely 
various that it is impossible to define them with precision. 
B. Lack of probity 
One of the important issues faced by the courts in establishing " . .,, oppressiOn was 
whether there was a necessity to prove lack of probity to establish oppressive 
50 (1965) 1 Comp LJ 193, 204 
51 [1959] 1 WLR 62 
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conduct. Here again the courts seem to defer in their views as is apparent from the 
following cases. In Re Chi Liung and Sons Ltd,52 Gill J seem to support the 
requirement of lack of probity:53 
Looking at the circumstances as a whole, I do not see how I can resist 
the conclusion that there has been a lack of probity and fair dealing in 
the affairs of the company to the prejudice of at least some of the 
members of the company. I have therefore come to the conclusion that 
the affairs of the ~ompany are being conducted in a manner oppressive 
to one or more of its members. 
In Re Jermyn Turkish Baths Ltd. Buckley LJ held that lack of probity must be 
shown: 54 
... is unfair or, to use the expression adopted by Viscount Simonds in 
Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer .. . 'burdensome, 
harsh and wrongful' ... and lacks that degree of probity which 
[complaining members] are entitled to expect in 'the conduct of the 
company's affairs ... 
However, comparatively, the Weight of authorities do not seem to 
support the above proposition of law postulated by Gill J and Buckley LJ. This is 
obvious from the following statements of law made by judges in other courts. In Re 
Dalley(M) and Co. Ltd, Lush J stated that lack of probity was not essential in proving 
. 55 
oppresswn: 
52 [1968] 1 MLJ 97 
53 Ibid at p 102 
54 Supra n 42 at p 199 
55 Supra n 46 at p 492 
... want of probity is only one of the ways in which oppression can 
manifest itself, as indeed the use of the alternative 'lack of probity or 
fair dealing' by Lord Keith indicates. 
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Recently, in the case of Residues Tr{!atment and Trading Co Ltd and 
Anor v Southern R~sources Ltd and Anor (No.2),56 Perry J held:57 
The fact that lack of probity is not an essential element in a breach of 
[the equivalent of s 181], does not mean that where it exists it is not 
relevant .. . In the absence of lack of probity, the application of ihe 
'internal management' rule is likely to provide a substantial hurdle .... 
It is also clear from the definitions stated earlier especially in Gidwitz 
v Lan::it Corrugated Box Co, Elder v Elder and Watson Ltd and which was accepted 
by the courts in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd and Jaya Medical 
Consultants, that the meaning of 'oppression ' does not in any way relate to the 
concept of 'illegality' or 'fraud' . Fraud and illegality are not essential or required to 
be proved in establishing whether there is oppression of minority shareholders. 
C. Motive and effect of conduct 
Further, the courts in deciding whether there was oppression or not in a particular 
situation are not concerned with the intentions, purpose or object of the oppressor 
but rather on the actions of the oppressor and the consequences and effects of the 
actions. Basically, the courts are not concerned with the motive of the oppressor, 
56 (1989) 7 ACLC 1130 
57 Ibid at p 1153 
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although it is an important factor when the court is considering an appropriate 
remedy in a proven case of oppression. In Re HR Harmer Ltd, Jenkins U said: 58 
Finally, counsel submitted that the father got no pecuniary benefit out 
of what he did. That is not literally true, but even if it were, I do not 
think that it is essential to a case of oppression that the alleged 
oppressor is oppressing in order to obtain pecuniary benefit. If there is 
oppression, it remains oppression even though the oppression is due 
simply to the controlling shareholder's overwhelming desire for power 
and control and not with a view to his own p\!cuniary advantage. The 
result rather than the motive is the material thing. 
In Re Dalley & Co Pty Ltd, the directors had insisted that the petitioner's shares 
were not ordinary shares but employee shares. This classification of the shares was 
important because employee shares could be expropriated by the company at the 
discretion of the board of directors, whereas the ordinary shares could not. The 
directors 'were fixed in their determination to classify the petitioner's shares as 
employee shares and so to remove her from the company at relatively small cost and 
to their own and for their children's advantage.' It was held by Lush J that the 
directors acted oppressively in expropriating the petitior.er's shares at an undervalue. 
Lush J held:59 
58 
59 
[The equivalent of section 181] is, upon the authorities a wide 
remedial section not to be narrowed .. . it speaks of oppression in terms 
of its impact on the oppressed, not in terms of the intention of the 
oppressor ... 
As far as applications under section 181 are concerned, the courts 
Supra n 51 at p 84 
Supra n 46 at p 492 
60 
61 
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position in Malaysia is clear, that is motive is not a material consideration. This 
aspect has been discussed by the writer earlier when dealing with 'affairs of the 
company' under the sub-heading 'continuing state of affairs' . 
D. Passive conduct 
It is well established in the case of Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v 
Meyer, that passive conduct by controllers of companies may give rise to oppression. 
Lord Keith referred to some of the statements made by Lord Russel and Lord Som in 
the Court of Session:60 
Lord Russel held that they "acted in the interests of the society and 
against the interests of the company by adopting a policy of masterly 
inactivity and allowing the company's trading activities to decline to 
vanishing point. Lord Som's view was that the society as majority 
shareholders controlling the company made use of its control to ensure 
that the company remained passive under the attack and did not have 
the opportunity to struggle for its existence; that they failed in their 
duty of raising the question of looking for another source of supply as 
an urgent question of policy and that, when the policy of liquidation 
had been expressly approved by the society's board, the nominee 
directors still did nothing and let the company drift towards the rocks. 
After stating the above, Lord Keith made the following statement:6 1 
My Lords, these views indicate that the conduct of the society on the 
company's affairs was negative conduct. That, in a sense, is true, for it 
is just the other side of the shield from that which displayed the 
society acting positively to destroy the company. But I cannot think 
that where directors, having power to do something to save a 
company, lie back and do nothing, they are not conducting the affairs 
Supra n 7 at p 362 - 363 
Ibid at p 363 
of the company, perhaps foolishly, perhaps negligently, perhaps with 
some ulterior object in view. They are certainly conducting the affairs 
of the company in breach of their duty as directors. 
Lord Denning held:62 
It is said that these three directors were at most only guilty of inaction 
· - of doing nothing to protect the Textile Company. But the affairs of 
the company can, in my opinion, be conducted oppressively by the 
directors doing nothing to defend its interests when they ought to do 
something- just as they can conduct its affairs oppressively by doing 
something injurious to its interests when they ought not to do it. 
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Similarly in Ng Chee Keong v Ng Teong Kiat Highlands Plantations 
Ltd,63 the board of directors left a tea estate to deteriorate and did not pay the quit 
rent, hence risking the estate lands being forfeited. There Mohd Azmi J (as he then 
was) held that the failure or omission on the part of the directors to exercise 
reasonable care and skill in conducting the business was oppressive in nature. 64 
E. Mismanagement 
A question usually asked is whether the word 'oppression' covers mismanagement in 
companies. Generally, courts are very reluctant to interfere in the management of the 
companies and given the strict and narrow definition to the word 'oppression' 
' 
minority shareholders were deprived in circumstances where there was 
62 Ibid at p 367 
63 [1980] 1 MLJ 45 
64 Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 30 at p 136- 137 
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mismanagement by the directors and those in control of companies. In Re Five 
Minute Car Wash Service Ltd/- 5 the petitioner applied to the court under the 
equivalent of section 1 81, alleging that Evison, a large shareholder, managing 
director of the company and chainnan of the board, had conducted the affairs of the 
CO!npany in a manner oppressive of the minority shareholders by disregarding the 
interests of those other than himself and his wife. Some of the alleged acts of 
oppression related to differences of opinion between the petitioner and Evison on 
matters of policy, some mere allegations of inefficiency by Evison, some related to 
projects of Evison's which never came to fruition and some others. It was held that 
the conduct of Evison did not amount to oppression on the grounds that the 
allegations did not suggest that Evison acted unfairly, harshly or with any lack of 
probity towards any member of the company and that the allegations that Evison was 
unwise, inefficient and careless in the performance of his duties as managing 
director did not amount to oppressive conduct under the equivalent of section 181. 
In the Indian case of Lalita Rajya Lakshmi v Indian Motor Co.,66 the 
petitioner alleged that the board of directors were guilty of certain acts detrimental to 
the minority shareholders. The allegations were that the income of the company was 
deliberately shown less by excessive expenditure; that passengers travelling without 
ticket on the company's buses were not checked; that petrol consumption was not 
65 (1966] 1 AllER 242 
66 AIR 1962 Ca1127: (1962) 32 Comp Cas 207 
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properly checked; that second hand buses of the company had been disposed of at 
low cost, that dividends were being declared at too low a figure. It was held that 
even if each of these allegations were proved to the satisfaction of the Court, there 
would have been no oppression. 
In Re Van-Tel T.V. Ltd,67 the company was owned by the petitioner 
and the respondent, each having one share each in the company. The petitioner 
brought an action under the equivalent of section 181 claiming that the affairs of the 
company were conducted in a manner oppressive to her. The petitioner alleged that 
there were no meetings of directors or shareholders of the company held since its 
incorporation, the petitioner's request for meetings were denied, her accountant was 
denied access to the company's financial records; financial statements were not 
prepared and there were no sales records at all, there was evidence of 
misappropriation of loans to the company by the respondent, tax on sales has been 
assessed wrongly and that dealings with the company's customers was 
unsatisfactory. MacDonald J of the British Columbia Supreme Court held on the 
facts that the respondent was conducting the affairs of the company in a manner 
oppressive to the petitioner. 
67 (1974) 44 DLR (3d) 146 
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The recent case of Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd,68 supports the stand taken 
in Re Van-Tel T. V Ltd and recognises the fact that courts are willing to rely on the 
equivalent of section 181 in circumstances where there is serious mismanagement on 
the part of controllers of the company. Here, a Mr Thompson was the sole director 
and -majority shareholder of two companies. The business ofthe companies was that 
of landlords of residential property and garages. The petitioners basically alleged 
mismanagement by Thompson and sought an order requiring Thompson to purchase 
their shares. The petitioners alleged that Thompson failed to attend to the 
companies' affairs while abroad, wasted money on building repairs, allowed 
employees to charge ' key money' for granting lettings of company properties, left 
property management to an inexperienced person, failed to inspect the properties 
regularly and charged excessive management fee. Arden J held that the conduct of 
the companies affairs by Mr Thompson was prejudicial and that since the conduct is 
prejudicial in a fmancial sense to the companies, it must also be prejudicial to the 
interests of the plaintiffs as holders of its shares. 69 Arden J further said: 70 
68 
69 
70 
To this I would add that the jurisdiction under [the equivalent of s 181] 
has an elastic quality which enables the courts to mould the concepts 
of unfair prejudice according to the circumstances of the case. 
With respect to alleged mismanagement, the court does not interfere in 
questions of commercial judgment, such as would arise here if (for 
example) it were alleged that the companies should invest in 
commercial properties rather than residential properties. However, in 
cases where what is shown is mismanagement, rather than a difference 
of opinion on the desirability of particular commercial decisions, and 
[1994] 2 BCLC 354 
Ibid at p 404 
Ibid at p 404 - 405 
the mismanagement is sufficiently serious to justify the intervention of 
the court , a remedy is available under [the equivalent of section 181]. 
128 
Arden J' s statement that only in situations where mismanagement is 
sufficiently serious will it justify the court to intervene was stated in the earlier case 
of Re Elgindata Ltd. 71 In this case the petitioner under the equivalent of section 181 
alleged unfair prejudice on the grounds that he had not been consulted with respect 
to policy decisions, that the affairs of Elgindata were managed incompetently and 
that there was misuse of the assets of the company. The court held that although on 
the facts there was evidence of mismanagement and a lack of managerial 
purposefulness this did not constitute conduct that was unfairly prejudicial. Warner J 
held that in an appropriate case it was open to the court to fmd that serious 
mismanagement could constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct but normally the court 
would be reluctant to find that mismanagement as such would amount to unfairly 
prejudicial conduct. 
In Malaysia, in the case of Chiew Sze Sun & Anor v Cast Iron 
Products Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors, 72 the petitioners brought an action under section 181 
complaining that the respondents have mismanaged the affairs of the first respondent 
and that the exercise of the powers of the respondents has been oppressive and in 
disregard of the interest of the petitioners under section 181 (1) of the Companies 
71 
72 
[1991] BCLC 959 
[1993] 2 AMR 3173 
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Act 1965. The complaints related mainly to lack of proper accounting, 
misappropriation of company funds by directors, unauthorised disposal of assets of 
the company by the directors, tax mismanagement, loss of assets and absence of 
declaration of dividends. It was held by Zakaria M Yatim J that there was 
mi~management of the financial affairs of the company and on the facts the 
respondents' actions had been in total disregard to the interest of the petitioners and 
was oppressive. 
In Re Coliseum Stand Car Service Ltd,73 the respondent was the 
majority shareholder in the company and the applicant a minority shareholder. The 
company was incorporated in 1939. The respondent ran the company as though he 
was the sole shareholder. The applicant was deprived of his directorship. No 
dividends were declared until 1965 although the company showed a credit balance in 
the years 1959 to 1963. The respondent was receiving a regular monthly salary for 
managing the company even during his three and a half year absence . The 
respondent appointed his own son as manager as if he was the only shareholder of 
the company. He made loans to himself and his son for purposes unconnected with 
the company's affairs. Rent from letting of premises was not accounted for. The 
High Court held that the respondent had conducted the affairs of the company 
without proper regard to the applicant's interest and the acts constituted an 
oppression on minority shareholders. 
73 [1972] 1 MLJ 109 
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In view of the above authorities, it is apparent that the courts would 
have to walk on a tight rope in deciding , what "degree of mismanagement is 
required to convince the court"74 to pr~vide a remedy under section 181. In t~ ·ing to 
decide the courts would have to keep in mind the fact that those managing 
companies are free to make managerial decisions, that those decisions may be 
incompetently made and that a shareholder acquiring shares should be aware that the 
share value depends to a certain extent on managerial competence. It is' obvious then, 
that unless the circumstances are extreme, the courts will be very reluctant to 
intervene in the internal affairs of a company whether [under section 181] or for that 
matter in any of the other minority provisions in the other jurisdictions. In Tri-Circ/e 
7 " M Investment Pte Ltd, ) Prakash JC held: 
The court, however, is not here to second guess management decisions 
of corporations. As long as such decisions are taken honestly and in 
good faith the fact that they are wrong decisions does not entitle 
disgruntled shareholders to apply for relief under [ the equivalent of 
section 181]. 
It is suggested that since directors owe a duty of care and skill to the 
company and that the members have a legitimate expectation that the directors will 
act with due care in running the company's business, therefore, the courts should be 
74 K.W.Wedderbum, Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 29 MLR 321, p325 
75 [1993] 2 SLR 523 
76 Ibid at p 534 
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able to hold that senous mismanagement causmg real economic harm to the 
company's business 77 should be actionable under s 181. 
ln concluding, it is obvious that there is no one clear meaning given 
to the expression "oppression". However, the courts have done their best to provide 
as broad a meaning as possible in the interests of justice and the Malaysian 
legislature has rightly introduced broader terms like prejudice, discrimination and 
disregard of interests of members in section 181 to protect the minority shareholders. 
The Malaysian legislature should have spelt out generally the requirements for the 
proving of oppression but then it is the writer's opinion that the existence or the 
retention by the legislature of the word "oppression" is superfluous given the other 
broad words in the provision which may allow any conduct or fact situation to fall 
within the minority provision. 
Ill. Disregard of interests 
A Legitimate Expectations 
One of the perplexities faced with regards to the minority protection provisions is the 
inclusion of the word "interests of members". The legislatures in the Commonwealth 
countries seem to have worded the expression in a slightly different manner and the 
question one would ask is whether they all mean the same. In England, section 
459(1) (as amended by the Companies Act 1989) reads: 
77 S.H. Goo, Supra nll at p 84 
A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an 
order. .. on the ground the company's affairs are being or have been 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
the members generally or of some part of its members(including 
himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission on the part of 
the company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would 
be prejudicial. 
In Australia, section 260 of the Corporations Law 1991 reads: 
A member who believes that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or 
unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members, or in a manner 
that is contrary to the interests of the members as a whole ... 
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Whereas in section 216 of the Singapore Companies Act and s 181 of 
the Malaysian Companies Act, the sections use the expression: 
" ... that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers 
of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive... or in 
disregard of his or their interests as members ... , 
Although the Malaysian section includes debentureholders, howe 1er 
for comparison purposes, the writer would confine the expression to members only. 
Even though the provisions are worded differently the expression "membership 
interests" is generally confined to the two main constitutional documents (the 
Memorandum of Association and the Article of Associations) and to the other rights 
provided in the respective companies legislation. Strictly speaking, the constitutional 
documents and the legislation provide certain rights to a11 the members so as to 
protect their interests in the company concerned. The documents act as statutory 
contracts between the members themselves and the members and the company. The 
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documents spell out c1early the rights and obligations of all the parties including 
those managing the company, that is the board of directors. However, there has been 
much controversy as to why the legislatures mentioned above have used the 
expression "interests of members" rather than "rights of members". It has been 
argued that the expression "interests of ·members" is wider than the expression 
"rights of members", in the sense that "interests of members" encompasses other 
equitable rights or legitimate expectations of members. 
Generally, the question of equitable rights or legitimate expectations 
usually arise in small private owned companies compared to public companies. In 
public companies a shareholder who is unhappy or discontented with the way the 
company is managed can realise his investment by selling his shares in the securities 
market. However this may not be the case in private companies because in most 
private companies the shareholders are sma11 in number and the company is more in 
the nature of a partnership. The famous case where the court recognised equitable 
considerations is the case of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 78 In this case , E 
and N had been business partners and later decided to form a private company with 
each holding equal shares and were also the company's directors. Later, E and N 
transferred some shares to N's son, G and made him a director. The company was 
very profitable and all profits were distributed as directors remuneration. However 
' 
after a disagreement, N and G removed E as a director and excluded him from 
78 [1973] AC 360 
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management. E petitioned on the 'just and equitable' ground to wind up the 
company. The House of Lords held that the company be wound up because when E 
and N formed the company it was clear that their personal business relationship 
would remain the same. In the circumstances, Nand G were not entitled, in equity, 
to use their statutory power to remove a director. 
However, Lord Wilberforce in the above case suggested that one or 
more of the following factors should be present before equitable considerations 
come into play: 
a) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, 
involving mutual confidence. 
b) That there be restrictions on the transfer of members interests in the company. 
c) That there was an agreement that some or all of the shareholders shall participate 
in the management of the business. 
79 The case Re a Company, seems to support that equitable 
considerations considered in the Ebrahimi case do apply in section 459 petitions in 
the United Kingdom. 80 In Re a Company, two competing take-over bids were made 
for the shares of a private company. The directors of the company in a circular 
79 
80 
(1986) BCLC 382 
D.D Prentice, 'The Theory of the Firm: Minority Shareholders Oppression: 
Sections 459 - 461 of the Companies Act 1985', 8 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 55 at p 73. 
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advised the shareholders to take up the lower bid, made by a company which was set 
up by the directors of the target company. The petitioners alleged that the directors 
' 
the respondents had breached their duty to the share~olders by preventing them from 
selling their shares to the highest bidder. The petitioners alleged that their interests 
as members had been unfairly prejudiced by the action of the directors. One of the 
arguments by the respondents was that the petitioners' interest as shareholders 
comprised a 'bundle of rights and obligations' and that unless they could show some 
infringement of rights (other than those conferred by section 459 itself), their 
interests as shareholders could not be said to have been prejudiced within the 
meaning of section 459. The respondents said that failure to take steps which would 
result in the petitioners being able to accept the better offer did not infringe any of 
the rights attached to their shares. Hoffinan I rejected this argument and said that 
this is too restrictive an interpretation of the section. Hoffman J held: 81 
The concept of fairness which was chosen by Parliament as the basis 
of the jurisdiction under s.459 in my judgement cuts across the 
distinction between acts which do or do not infringe the rights 
attached to the shares by the constitution of the company ... Unfairness 
is a familiar concept employed in ordinary speech, often by way of 
contrast to infringement of legal right. It was intended to confer a very 
wide jurisdiction upon the court and I think it would be wrong to 
restrict that jurisdiction by adding any gloss to the ordinary meaning 
of the words. 
It is to be noted from the above statement by Hoffman J, that the 
interests of a member would basically depend on each individual case. Other than 
ensuring the constitution is complied with, the shareholder may thus have an interest 
81 Supra n 79 at p 387£- 388b. 
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in the competent management of the company, its profitability and dividend policy, 
its policy of rewarding directors, and its policy in relation to trading or other dealing 
with any associated companies or persons all of which may have a direct effect on 
the shareholder's financial interests or value of his shares. 82 Nonetheless, it is 
generally accepted and presumed that all the rights of a member is fully and 
completely laid down in the art_icles and therefore a petitioner claiming any other 
rights other than those set out in the company's documents will have to prove to the 
court that there was some special arrangement or understanding between the parties 
outside those documents. 83 The courts are usually careful not to cross their 
boundaries and do recognise for a fact that where matters complained of are within 
the powers of the directors in the articles, there is no equitable obligations to the 
shareholders, that the directors must obtain the approval of the shareholders when 
exercising management powers84: Re Postgate and Denby (Agencies Ltd). 85 In Re 
Elgindata Ltd, Warner J said:86 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
It was common ground between counsel that, even in the absence of a 
quasi-partnership, the interests of a member that are relevant for the 
purposes of [the equivalent of s 181] are not necessarily confined to 
his legal rights. They extend to any legitimate expectations he may 
have. 
Where counsel differed was on the question whether in this case [the 
petitioner] had any legitimate expectation going beyond his legal 
Robin Hollington, Supra n1 at p 62 
D.D.Prentice, Supra n 80 at p 75 
Ibid at p 76 
[1987] BCLC 8 
Supra n 71 at p 985 
rights. [Counsel for the Respondent] referred me to Re Posgate & 
Denby (Agencies) Lid. [1987] B.C.L.C. 667 and Re A Company 
(No.005685 of 1988), ex p. Schwarcz (No.2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 427. 
From those authorities I derive the following propositions. In general 
members of a company have no legitimate e?(pectations going beyond 
the legal rights conferred on them by the constitution of the company, 
that is to say its memorandum apd articles of association. None the 
less, legitimate expectations superimposed on a member's legal rights 
· may arise from agreements or understandings between the members. 
Where, however, the acquisition of shares in a company is one of the 
results of a complex set of formal written agreements it is a question 
of construction of those agreements whether any such superimposed 
legitimate expectations can arise. 
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Further, given the broad meaning of the "interests of the members", it 
must be borne in mind that a membership interest although variable in nature should 
be strictly confined to the interests in the affairs of the company depending upon the 
shareholders position, involvement and financial stake in the company. The above 
propositions of law on the meaning of 'interests of members' has been judicially 
recognised by the Malaysian courts. In the case of George Ting Yew Tong and Ors v 
Leong Hup Holdings Bhd,87 the Court of Appeal endorsed that legitimate 
expectations are within section 181.88 In Jaya Medical Consultants Sdn Bhd v Island 
and Peninsula Bhd and Ors, Siti Norma J (now JCA) in interpreting section 18l(b) 
clearly recognised the importance of equitable considerations:89 
87 
88 
89 
... [the] concept of unfair discrimination or prejudice ... enables the 
court to take into consideration not only the rights of the members 
under the company's constitution but also their legitimate 
expectations arising from the agreements and understanding of the 
members among themselves. 
unreported judgement dated 23 November 1995. 
Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 30 at p 153 
Supra n 48 at pp 536- 537 
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B. Interests of members 
The courts have also struggled with the tenns "interests of the members generally or 
some of its members"(U.K), "the interests of the members as a whole"( Australia) 
and ."his or their interests as members'~ (Malaysia). In U.K., the use of the word 
"generally" in s 459 has been commented as being an imprecise concept because if it 
was the intention of the legislature to cover the whole membership, then why was 
the word "whole" not used as in Australia. 90 The basis of this argument rest on the 
fact that the phrase "members generally" may be construed as involving the whole or 
entire membership or it could be contended that the conduct affects a majority of 
interests, therefore in a way implying only a part of the membership is affected. 91 In 
Australia, the wording of s 260 "contrary to the interests of the members as a whole" 
has given rise to many judicial interpretations as to what it really means or as to its 
scope. The words seem to be very wide covering all conducts which are prejudicial 
or discriminatory. This would mean that negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty 
by directors are indirectly covered by the words. Such a view would conflict with the 
general principle of company law that directors only owe a duty to the company and 
90 
91 
Stephen Griffm, 'The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders: s 459 of 
Companies Act 1985', The Company Lawyer Vol13 No.5, p 87. 
Ibid at p 86 
92 
93 
94 
95 
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not the shareholders. 92 In Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd,93 the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal (later confirmed by the High Court of Australia) 
interpreted the meaning of "contrary to the interests of members as a whole" as 
corresponding in meaning ~o "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole" 
as expounded by Lord Lindley in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa. 94 Street CJ, 
Kirby P and Hope JA stated:95 
The Australian provision contains an additional statutory basis for 
curial intervention to those in New Zealand legislation. [The 
equivalent of section 181] also permits the court to intervene where 
the act or omission 'was or would be contrary to the interests of the 
members as a whole'. This reflects recognition of a long established 
principle of company law. In the present case, for example, as his 
Honour pointed out, the object in cl 3(b) of the memorandum of 
association to foster and control the game of rugby league football 
throughout the State does not override the basic requirement that 
pervades all aspects of company law, namely that the corporate 
decisions whether at director or at shareholder level must be made 
'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole': Allen v Gold 
Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 ch 656 at 671 per Lord Lindley. The 
phrase used in [the equivalent of s 181] is 'the interests of the 
members as a whole'. This phrase in the statute has not, so far as we 
are aware, been the subject of reported judicial consideration since its 
insertion in 1983, but as present advised, it seems difficult to place 
any meaning on 'the interests of the members as a whole' that differs 
from 'the benefit of the company as a whole'. The only legitimate 
interests of the members would be their interests as corporators. As 
corporators, considered as a whole, their legitimate interests must be 
circumscribed by, and found within, the constituting documents of the 
company. The legitimate benefit of the company to which Lord 
J.F Corkery, "Oppression or unfairness by Controllers - What can a 
shareholder do about it? An analysis ofS 320 of the Companies Code" 
(1983- 1985) 9 Adelaide Law Review 437, p 447. 
(1985) 3 ACLC 177 at p 186 
[1900] 1 Ch 656 
Supra n 93 
Lindley referred must likewise be circumscribed by, and found within, 
the constituting documents of the company. It follows that the 
principles that ·have been evolved in development of Lord Lindley's 
basic requirement of 'the benefit of the company as a whole' are 
equally applicable to the statutory element in [the equivalent of 
section 181] of'the interests ofthe members.as a whole' ." 
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The problem here is what is the meaning of the phrases 'bona fide for 
the benefit of the company as a whole' or 'bona fide in the best interests of the 
company'. To date the courts have failed to clearly define what the concepts or 
phrases actually mean. Lord Evershed MR, in Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas Ltd 
stated:96 
It is now plain that 'bona fide for the company as a whole' means not 
two things but one thing. It means that the shareholder must proceed 
on what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a 
whole. Secondly, the phrase, 'the company as a whole' does not (at 
any rate in such a case as the present) mean the company as a 
commercial entity as distinct from the corporators: it means the 
corporators as a general body. That is to say, the case may be taken of 
an individual hypothetical member and it may be asked whether what 
is proposed is, in the honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, 
for that person's benefit. 
However, Lord Evershed's attempt to distinguish the above phrases in 
the quotation did not clear the doubts because where the interests of the majority 
were in conflict it was difficult to see what common 'benefit' they shared as 
96 (1951] Ch 286 at 291 
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'corporators' other than that they share in the company as a 'commercial entity'. 97 
This is apparent in situations where for example there is evidence to prove malice or 
discrimination in the alteration of articles, therefor~ making the act far from being 
bona fide. 98 Ultimately, the only possible solution in a dilemma like this is to rely on 
a reasonableman test, that is the benefit accruing to the company must be sufficiently 
real to satisfy the test. 99 This is important because the phrase 'members .as a whole' 
may operate restrictively if it was interpreted to mean that the behaviour must 
detrimentally affect all the members. 1 
With regards to the Malaysian s 181 , the setbacks faced by other 
jurisdictions by using words like "generally" or "contrary to the interests of members 
as a whole" does not arise because of the use of the words "his or their interests as 
members". This provides that any one member or if necessary all the members 
whose interests are disregarded can rely on the section for a remedy. 
C. Disregard of interests 
In the Singapore and Malaysian provisions the expression "disregard of interests" is 
97 
98 
99 
S.H Goo, Supra n 11 at p 74 
Ibid at pp 74- 75 
Ibid at p 75 
J.F Corkery, "Oppression or unfairness by Controllers - What can a 
shareholder do about it? An analysis ofS 320 of the Companies Code" 
(1983-1985) 9 Adelaide Law Review437, p 447. 
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used. There is no statutory concept of conduct in 'disregard of interests' in Eng] and, 
Australia or New Zealand. 2 In Re Kong Thai Sawmills (Miri) Sdn Bhd, Lord 
Wilberforce in the Privy Council in interpreting section 181, said that conduct in 
disregard of interests:3 
· .. . involves something more than a failure to take account of the 
minority's interest: there must be awareness of that interest and an 
evident intention to override it or brush it aside or set at naught the 
proper company procedure ... 
The only limitation in section 181 is the way the word "disregard of 
interest" has been interpreted by the Privy Council in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) 
Ltd. The court said that there must be awareness and an evident intention to override 
it or brush it aside. The court did not go further and explain what "awareness of that 
interest" means. Since the constitutional documents of the company are considered a 
statutory contract between the members inter se, it could be argued that all members 
should therefore be aware of each others interests. But then the existence of other 
equitable rights which are not embodied in the constitutional documents may give 
rise to problems. The problem would be apparent especially in companies having 
large number of members with different expectations. In a section 181 action the 
court would have to decide the question of whether the defendant was aware of the 
interests of the plaintiff. Even if it is proven that the defendant was aware, the next 
problem that would be faced by the plaintiff is the question of proving intention. The 
2 
3 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers. Controls, Remedies and Decision 
Making, Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p 149. 
( 1978) 2 MLJ 227 at p 229 
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words "evident intention" used by the court in Re Kong Thai Sawmills (Min) Ltd 
indicate clearly the requirement of proof that the defendant 'intended' to disregard 
the interests of the plaintiff. Such requirement seem~ to also indirectly cast a some 
sort of fiduciary duty on members when exercising their interests or rights. In the 
\vriter'"s opinion, even though the requirement of awareness and intention would 
severely restrict the effectiveness of section 18l(l)(a) as a remedy for disgruntled 
members, nevertheless it is obvious that the existence of the element 'disregard of 
his or their interests as members' in section 181(1)(a) and the interpretation given to 
the word 'interests of members' would capture many fact situations, which under the 
old English section 210 would not have been possible. It is well recognised now that 
members have a legitimate expectation that the company would be managed in the 
best interest of all members and not for any specific person. 4 Depending on the facts 
and circumstances, generally in a family company or an incorporated partnership, the 
minority shareholder would have a legitimate expectation that he would be allowed 
to participate in the management of the company to protect his interests. 5 Members 
would expect that directors will act responsibly and be accountable to the company 
by ensuring annual general meetings and annual accounts are held and submitted 
respectively each year. 6 In a joint venture, a member of the joint venture company 
4 Re Harmer Ltd [1958] 3 AllER 689; Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd 
[1966] 1 Al1 ER 242; Re Coliseum Car Stand Service Ltd [1 972] 1 MLJ 109 
5 
6 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360; Tay Bok Choon v 
Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1 985] 1 MLJ 58; [1 987] 1 MLJ 433. 
Guan Seng Co Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Hock Chuan & Ors (1990) 1 MSCLC 
90,551. 
7 
8 
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would expect that the jojnt venture will be conducted on mutual trust and respect 
without disregarding the interest of the other mem hers. 7 
IV. Unfairly Discriminatory and Unfairly Prejudicial 
A Concept of fairness 
Under section 181(1)(b) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965, where any act of the 
company has been done or is threatened or that some resolution of the members, 
holders of debentures or any class has been passed or is proposed which unfairly 
discriminates against or is otherwise prejudicial to one or more of the members or 
holders of debentures (including himself), then an application can be made to the 
court for a remedy under section 181(2). Unlike the English and Australian 
provisions wherein the expression "unfairly prejudicial" is used, in the Malaysian 
provision, the word 'unfair' is excluded. But then it is submitted that only an 
unjustifiable detriment caused to a member will entitle him to r~lief. The term 
"prejudice" in the English provision has been defined to mean "causing prejudice, 
detrimental to rights or interests". 8 
Kumagai Gumi Co Ltdv Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 2 MLJ 
789. 
Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks, The Companies Act of Malaysia, An 
Annotation, Malaysia, Butterworths Asia 1997, at p VII 50 - 80. 
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The importance of the concept of "unfairness" in section 181 (I )(b) 
was succinctly stated by Siti Norma J (now JCA) in Jaya Medical Consultants Sdn 
Bhd v Peninsular Bhd & 13 Ors:9 
The essence of the \Wong done to the minority member under s 
181(l)(b) is the 'unfairness' ·of the discrimination or prejudice 
suffered by the member resulting from some act of the company in the 
advancement of its objectives. Mere discrimination against or 
prejudice to such a member is insufficieut to attract the · court's 
jurisdiction to intervene. 
In fact, in the case of Wayde & Anor v New South Wales Rugby 
League Ltd, Brennan J dealt with the essentiality of 'unfairness' under [the 
equivalent of section 181] ofthe Australian Companies Act. His Honour stated: 10 
Where the directors of a company are empowered to discriminate 
among its members and to prejudice the interests of one of them, the 
adoption of a resolution which has the effect and which is made in 
good faith and for a purpose within the power is not, without more 
'oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
against, a member'. [The equivalent of section 181] requires proof of 
oppression or proof of unfairness: proof of mere prejudice to or 
discrimination against a member is insufficient to attract the court's 
jurisdiction to intervene. In the case of some discretionary powers, any 
prejudice to a member or any discrimination against him may be a 
badge of unfairness in the exercise of the power but not when the 
discretionary power contemplates the effecting of prejudice or 
discrimination. 
However, what is fair or unfair will usually depend on the facts of 
each situation and therefore not in every situation can a member rely on the section 
9 (1994] 1 MLJ 520 at p 536. 
10 (1985) 3 ACLC 799 at p 806. 
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[section 181(1)(b)] because the courts would have to do a balancing exercise 
between the petitioner who is affected and the interest of the company as a whole. In 
Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd, 11 Richardson J dealing with [ the equivalent of section 
181] of the New Zealand Act said: 12 
Fairness cannot be assessed in a vacuum or simply from one member's 
point of view. It wi11 often depend on weighing conflicting interests of 
different groups within the company. It is matter of balancing a11 the 
interests involved in terms of the policies underlying the companies 
legislation in general and [the equivalent of section 181] in particular: 
thus to have regard to the principles governing the duties of a director 
in the conduct of the affairs of the company and the rights and duties 
of a majority shareholder in relation to the minority; but to recognise 
that [the equivalent of section 181] is a remedial provision designed to 
a11ow the court to intervene where there is a visible departure from the 
standar~s of fair dealing; and in the light of the history and structure of 
the particular company and the reasonable expectations of the 
members to determine whether the detriment occasioned to the 
complaining member's interests arising from the acts or conduct in 
that way is justifiable. 
When we analyse the case law of the various jurisdictions and the 
statements made by the judges it is ob\<ious that underlying the concept:; of 
'oppression', 'unfairly prejudicial' and 'unfairly discriminatory' is the question of 
fairness and the courts have found it difficult to identify each concept separately in 
any given circumstance. In Re Thomas v H~V Thomas Ltd, Richardson J stated: 13 
II (1984) 2 ACLC 610 
12 Ibid at p 618 
13 Ibid at p 617 
I do not read the subsection as referring to three distinct alternatives 
which are to be considered separately in watertight compartments. The 
three expressions overlap, each in a sense helps to explain the other, 
and read together they reflect the underlying concern of the subsection 
that conduct of the company which is unjustly detrimental to any 
member of the company whatever form · it takes and whether it 
adversely affects al1 members alike or discriminates against some only 
is a legitimate foundation for a ·complaint under [the equivalent of s 
181]. The statutory concern is .directed to instances or courses of 
conduct amounting to unjust detriment to the interests of a member or 
members of the company. It follows that it is not necessary for a 
complainant to point to any actual irregularity or to an invasion of his 
legal rights or to a lack of probity or want of good faith toward him on 
the part of those in control of the company. 
In Morgan v 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty Ltd, Young J held: 14 
In my view a court now looks at [the equivalent of s 181] as a 
composite whole and the individual elements mentioned in that 
section should be considered merely as different aspects of the 
essential criterion, namely, commercial unfairness. 
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With reference to the above statements and section 181, it cannot be 
denied that the genus of the concept of oppression, disregard of interests and unfairly 
discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial conduct is unfair conduct. 15 
B. Discrimination 
It is to be noted that the English section 459 does not include the word "unfairly 
discriminatory" compared to the Malaysian and Australian provisions. 
14 (1986) 10 ACLR 692 at p 704 
15 Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 2 at p 127. 
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Discrimination occurs when "one group of members do not have or where one group 
of members is subject to some detriment or liability to which others are not 
subject."16 In section 181(1 )(b) and also in section 260(1)(a)(i) of the Australian 
provision , the use of the expression "unfairly discriminates" denotes the fact that in 
certain situations discrimination may be fair. For instance in the case of Wayde v 
New South Wales Rugby League Ltd, the League decided at a meeting to reduce the 
number of clubs participating in the premiership competition from 13 to ] 2. The 
Leaque's Article of Association conferred power on the Leaque to detennine which 
clubs should and which clubs should not be entitled to participate in the premiership 
competition. In this regard, a club, Wests was excluded from the competition. Wests 
brought an action under the equivalent of section 181 to restrain the Leaque from 
implementing its decisions, on the grounds that the decisions were oppressive. It was 
held by the High Court of Australia that given the special expertise and experience 
of the Leaque and the bona fide and proper exercise of the power conferredd upon it 
to foster the game of rugby, the decision reached by the Leaque was one a reasonable 
Leaque could have made. Wests could not proof that the actions of the Leaque were 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory. 
In fact there are numerous cases decided in England under their 
section 459 and it is obvious from those cases that the expression 'unfairly 
prejudicial' includes conduct which is 'unfairly discriminatory'. This can be seen in 
16 Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks, Supra n 8 at p VII 50- 80. 
17 
18 
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the case of Re a Company (No. 002612). 17 Here, S and A and two others set up a joint 
venture company. The shares were held equaJJy between them. There was an 
alteration in the shareholdings of the company with the result that A became the 
majority shareholder. Relations between A and S deteriorated and eventually S 
resigned as a director. Later, the com~y proposed to make a rights issue, and the 
sha:.-es not taken up according to the offer were to be offered to other shareholders. s 
claimed that he had neither the resources nor the desire to take up his allocation of 
the shares and that if it is taken up by the other shareholders his interest would be 
reduced from 25% to 0.125%. S petitioned for relief under the equivalent of section 
181. One of his grounds is that the proposed rights issue constituted unfairly 
prejudicial treatment. It was held on the facts that the rights issue was motivated by a 
bona fide desire to raise needed capital and was not aimed at prejudicing the 
petitioner. The petition was dismissed. Hoffman J said: 18 
Nevertheless, I do not think that the bona fides of the decision or the 
fact that the petitioner was offered shares on the same terms as other 
shareholders necessarily means that the rights issue could not have 
been unfairly prejudicial to his interests. If the majority know that the 
petitioner does not have the money to take up his rights and the offer 
is made at par when the shares are plainly worth a great deal more 
than par as part of a majority holding (but very little as minority 
shareholding), it seems to me arguable that carrying the transaction in 
that form could, viewed objectively, constitute unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. In this case, however, it seems to me that the petitioner, if he 
lacks the resources or inclination to contribute pari passu to the 
company, could protect his interests by offering to sell his existing 
holding to the majority. Indeed, if the company needs funds and he 
does not want to pay his share, it seems to me only fair that he should 
offer to sell out 
[1986] BCLC 362 
Ibid at p 367 
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It is obvious from the above statement that the courts do recognise 
that any act of the company and its controllers which affects all the shareholders 
equally, may at times be unfair to some others or unfairly discriminatory them. 
The{efore, even though the English provision does not include the w:Jrd 'u:)fairly 
discriminatory', it is understood that the word 'unfairly prejudicial' would cover 
circumstances where there is unfair discrimination. 
C. Principles and factors for interpreting 'fairness' 
Given that not many cases have been litigated or reported in Malaysia under section 
181, one has to glean from the other jurisdictions certain principles or factors that 
the courts have taken into consideration in interpreting 'fairness'. In assessing 
fairness the courts have generally applied an objective test. In Re Bovey Hotels 
19 
20 
19 "d 20 Ventures Ltd, Slade J sa1 : 
The test of unfairness must, I think, be an objective , not a subjective , 
one. In other words it is not necessary for the petitioner to show that 
the persons who have had de facto control of the company have acted 
as they did in the conscious knowledge that this was unfair to the 
petitioner or that they were acting in bad faith; the test, I think, is 
whether a reasonable person bystander observing the consequences of 
their conduct, would regard it as having unfairly prejudiced the 
petitioner's interests. 
unreported judgement of Slade J dated 31 July 1981 
Ibid at p 50 
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In Jaya Medical Consultants Sdn Bhd v Island & Peninsular Bhd & 
13 Ors, Siti Norma J (as she then was) adopted the objective test laid down in Wayde 
& Anor v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd: 21 
The test of unfairness is objective and it is necessary, though difficult, 
to postulate a standard of reasonable directors possessed of any special 
skill, knowledge or acumen possessed by the directors. The test 
assumes (whether it be the fact or not) that reasonable directors weigh 
the furthering of the corporate object against the disadvantage, 
disability or burden which their decision will impose, and address 
their minds to the question whether a proposed decision is unfair. 
In England , the courts have well defined the concept of 'unfairly 
prejudicial' in section 459 and the requirements to prove it. In Rea Company (No. 
005134 of 1986), ex P Harris,22 Peter Gibson J said:23 
(1) The test of unfair prejudice is objective. 
(2) It is not necessary for the petitioner to show bad faith. 
(3) It is not necessary for the petitioner to show a conscious intention to 
prejudice the petitioner. 
( 4) The test is one of unfairness, not unlawfulness. 
Again in Re Ringtower Holdings Plc,24 Peter Gibson J referring to 
section 459 of the English provision stated the following four points:25 
21 Supra at p 806 
22 (1989) BCLC 383 
23 Ibid at p 389 - 390 
24 (1989) 5 BCC 82 
25 Ibid at p 90 
(1) 
(2) 
. (~) 
(4) 
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the relevant conduct (of commission or omission) must relate to the 
affairs of the company of which the petitioners are members; 
the conduct must be both prejudicial (in the sense of causing 
prejudice or harm) to the relevant interests and also unfairly so: 
conduct may be unfair without ~eing prejudicial or prejudicial 
without being unfair and in neither case would the section be 
satisfied; 
~he test is of unfair prejudice, not of unlawfulness, and conduct may 
be lawful but unfairly prejudicial; 
the relevant interests are interests of members (including the 
petitioners) as members, but such interests are not necessarily limited 
to strict legal rights under the company's constitution, and the court 
may take into account wider equitable considerations such as any 
legitimate expectation which a member has which go beyond his legal 
rights. 
D. Conclusion 
Although the English cases seem to assist m expounding the words 'unfairly 
prejudicial' and 'fairness' but then in the context of the Malaysian section 181 
problems may arise because section 18l(l)(a) only deals with affairs of company or 
powers of directors being exercised in a manner oppressive or in disregard of 
interests ofmember(s), shareholder(s) or holder(s) of debentures of the company and 
section 181 (1 )(b) only deals with unfairly prejudicial and unfairly discriminatory 
conduct with regards to acts and resolutions of the company which affects members 
or debenture holders. This division of section 181(1) into two parts means that we 
have to be careful in applying the interpretations given by the courts in other 
jurisdictions. This is obvious by the fact that under section 459(1 )[U.K.], affairs of 
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the company and any actual act or proposed act or omission of the company are 
based on the only criteria of 'unfairly prejudicial'. The same is true for section 
260(1)(a)[Australia] wherein the affairs of the company or any act or omission or a 
proposed act or omission or a resolution or a proposed resolution is based on the 
criteria of 'unfairly prejudicial', 'unfairly discriminatory', or 'oppressive'. 
Whatever it is , the core of section 181 is 'unfairness' and as stated 
earlier the courts are more concerned with the effect of the conduct on the 
petitioners rather than the motive. In the circumstances the specific division of the 
elements in section 181 (1 )(a) and (b) may not be desirable. For instance, in section 
181(1)(b), the 'acts or resolutions' mentioned would easily fall under 'affairs ofthe 
company' in section 18l(l)(a). Further, it would be difficult for the courts to attempt 
to formulate a clear and comprehensive definition of the elements so that any fact 
situation could be categorised under that specific element and in the specific 
provision concerned. In categorising the conduct the courts would also have to take 
into consideration any conflicts that may arise between the memorandum and 
articles as agreements and strictly rely on the principle of non-interference in the 
internal management of the company. In the writer's opinion, it would have been 
much better if a similar approach as in England or Australia had been taken as that 
would allow the Malaysian courts a wider discretion to deal easily with any fact 
situation. 
CHAPTER6 
REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 181 COMPANIES ACT 1965 
I. Introduction 
The main significance of the statutory remedy under section 181(2) is the wide variety 
of remedies that the court is able to grant. Section 181 (2) reads as follows: 
S 181 (2) If on such application the Court is of the opinion 
that either of those grounds is established the Court may, with the 
view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained 
of, make such order as it thinks fit and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing the order may-
(a) direct or prohibit any act or cancel any transaction 
or resolution; 
(b) regulate the conduct of the affairs of the company 
in future; 
(c) provide for the purchase of the shares or debentures 
of the company by other members or holders of 
debentures of the company or by the company 
itself; 
(d) in the case of a purchase of shares by the company 
provide for a reduction accordingly of the 
company's capital; or 
(e) provide for the company be wound up. 
The remedies granted in section 181(2) are very similar to the 
remedies granted in section 260(2) and section 461 (2) of the Australian and UK 
provisions respectively. They read as follows: 
Australia 
S260(2) : . .. . the Court may, subject to subsection (4), make such 
order or orders as it thinks fit, including, but not limited to, one or 
more of the following: 
(c) an order that the company be wound up; 
(d) an order for the regulating the conduct of the affairs of the 
company in the future; 
(e) an order for the purchase of the shares of any member by 
other members; 
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(e) an order for the purchase of the shares of any member by 
other members; 
(f) an order for the purchase of the shares of any member by 
the company and for the reduction accordingly of the 
company's capital; . 
(g) an order directing the company to institute, prosecute, 
defend or discontinue specified proceedings, or authorising 
a member or members · of the company to institute, 
prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings in 
the name and on behalf of the company; in the name and 
on behalf of the company; 
(h) an order appointing a receiver or a receiver and manager of 
property of the company; 
(j) an order restraining a person from engaging in spec;;ified 
conduct or from doing a specified act or thing. 
(k) an order requiring a person to do a specified act or thing. 
United Kingdom 
S 461. Provisions as to petitions and orders under this Part 
( 1) If the court is satisfied that a petition under this Part is well 
founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief 
in respect of the matters complained of. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1 ), the 
court's order may-
(a) regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the 
future, 
(b) enquire the company to restrain from doing or 
continuing an act complained of by the petitioner or 
to do an act complained of by the petitioner or to do 
an act which the petitioner has complained it has 
omitted to do, 
(c) authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the 
name and on behalf of the company by such person 
or persons and on such terms as the court may 
ilire~ · 
(d) provide for the purchase of the shares of any 
members of the company by other members or by 
the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by 
the company itself, the reduction of the company's 
capital accordingly. 
1)5 
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It is to be noted that all the provisions do state that the remedies are 
not exhaustive by the use of the words "without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing/subsection" 1 or "but not limited to". 2 F~her the provisions empower the 
court with a wide discretion to make whatever "orders it thinks fif'3 to remedy the 
matters complained of 
However there are some differences in the above provisions. Section 
181(2) does not have similar provisions as provided for in section 260(2)(g),(h),(j) 
and (k), although it is suggested that section 260(2)(j) and (k) would presumably fall 
under section 181 (2)( a) of the Malaysian section. Another difference between section 
181(2) and the other two provisions is that section 181(2) does not provide for civil 
proceedings to be brought in the name or on behalf of the company. Section 260(2)(g) 
and section 461 (2)( c) of the Australian and UK sections respectively recognise the 
concept of derivative actions. 4 One may argue that section 181 (2)(b) which allows a 
court to make an order to 'regulate the conduct of the affairs of the company in 
future' covers this situation. 
2 
3 
4 
The Malaysian and UK sections 
The Australian section 
The Australian and UK sections 
In Singapore, s 216 of the Companies Act does not provide for civil 
proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company. 
However, s 216A of the Companies Act provides for a derivative action. This 
special provision does not apply to listed public companies since shareholders 
in such companies can always sell their shares in the open market if they are 
not happy with the company. 
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It is apparent that under section 461 of the UK section, there is no 
provision made expressly allowing the court to make a winding up order, whereas in 
section 181(2)(e) and section 260(2)(c), winding up,is provided for expressly. On the 
other hand, in the Australian section 260.( 4 ), there is a provision prohibiting the court 
from ·making a winding up order if it is of the opinion that the winding up of the 
company would unfairly prejudice the oppressed member or members. This implies 
that under section 260(4) the court must tak~ due care in granting winding up orders 
and possibly treat it as a last resort remedy. There is no similar provision to section 
260( 4) in section 181 of the Malaysian Act.. This aspect of winding up will be 
discussed in greater detail when the writer deals with the remedy of winding up later. 
One feature of the remedies in all the jurisdictions stated above is that 
' 
there is no requirement or expectation that the remedies must rank in a certain order. s 
Very often, based on the facts, the remedies overlap. 
II. Remedies under section 181(2) Companies Act 1965 
The remedies under the Malaysian section 181 (2) are discussed in detail below. 
A. Section 181(2)(a): an order directing or prohibiting any act or to cancel 
or vary a transaction or resolution. 
Under this heading the court would be able to require the company, the directors or 
any other person managing the company to carry out specific work or prevent from 
5 In Kuah Kok Kim v Chong Lee Leong Seng Co (Pte) Ltd [1991] 2 MLJ 129 at 
p 131 the court reiterated the statement made by Lord Wilberforce in Re 
Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 rvfLJ 220 and said ' All these 
reliefs rank equally and it is not correct to say that the primary remedy under 
this section is winding up' . 
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canying out that work. Indirectly the provision seems to imply that the court can 
impose some sort of mandatory or prohibitory injunctions or impose specific 
performance of any contracts or transactions. The following cases do highlight the 
circumstances where the court had or had.Possibly relied on section 181(2)(a). 
In the Singapore case of Re S.Q Wong Holdings (Pte) Ltd, 6 the 
petitioners were successful in an action brought under the Malaysian equivalent of 
section 181(1)(a) and (b). The facts were as follows: 
The company in this case was incorporated by Dato S.Q. Wong, a wealthy man, on 
May 18, 1973. The nominal capital was $100,000 divided into 100,000 shares of 
$1.00 each. On March 31, 1976, Dato Wong owned all the issued preference shares 
(90,002) and the children and grand children together owned all the issued ordinary 
shares (48) of the company. On July 1, 1978, Dato Wong made his last will and 
testament whereby he appointed Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Singapore) Trustee 
Ltd, as the sole executor and trustee and he bequeathed his residuary estate to Mabel 
Hudson (which included the 90,002 preference shares). On July 8, 1978, Dato Wong 
in exercise of his powers as Governing Director removed Alan Wong and Joyce 
Liu as directors and appointed Wong Peng Tuck (WPT), Mabel Hudson and Benjamin 
Wong as directors with WPT as his deputy. Dato Wong died on October 11, 1980, and 
WPT succeeded to the position of Governing Director of the Company. On October 
20, 1980, WPT ceased to be the Governing Director when he resigned as a director. 
On February 4, 1983, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Singapore) Trustee Ltd, was 
granted probate of the will ofDato Wong. The Grant of Probate was not extracted and 
6 [1987] 2 MLJ 298 
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the 90,002 preference shares remained registered in the name of Dato Wong until 
September 14, 1985. On July 31, 1985, the petitioners requisitioned the extraordinary 
general meeting of the company with a view to removing Mabel Hudson and 
Benjamin Wong as directors and appointil)g Joyce Liu and Wong Hong Ching in their 
place . . The petitioners contended that (a) the 90,002 preference shares could not be 
voted as they were not registered in the name of Mabel Hudson; (b) as directors, 
Mabel Hudson and Benjamin Wong ought to '"'ave paid the accumulated dividend on 
those preference shares; (c) they deliberately withheld doing so in breach of the 
Articles of Association with the collateral purpose of ensuring that the preference 
shares had voting rights and using such rights to defeat the voting rights of the 
majority of the ordinary shares held by the petitioners; and (d) the~efore the affairs of 
the company or the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner 
oppressive to the petitioners as members or in disregard of their interests as 
shareholders. The respondents denied aJiegations of oppression and said that they had 
managed the company well and had paid dividends on the ordinary shares. 
Although Chan Sek Keong I. C when delivering the judgement did not 
specifY under which paragraph of the Singapore equivalent of section 181(2) he was 
relying on, it appears that the orders granted by the court fell under section 181(2)(a). 
The orders were as follows: 
(a) the company must forthwith pay all unpaid dividends payable on the cumulative 
preference shares of the company. 
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(b) the directors must convene within 7 days from the date of judgement an 
Extraordinary General Meeting of the company to be held not later than 21 days 
therefrom for the election of new directors. 
(c) the respondents were to continue as .directors until the date of the Extraordinary 
General Meeting of the company. 
Other than the above mentioned Singapore case, it is suggested that 
many Australian and English cases decided under the equivalent of section 181 , 
would have attracted the remedy as provided for in section 181(l)(a) if they had been 
decided in Malaysia. 
In McGuinness & Anor, Petitioners, 7 the court directed the directors of 
a public company to convene an extraordinary general meeting on a certain date and 
to appoint a firm of accountants as independent scrutineers. In Hannes v MJH Ltd, 8 
where a governing director breached his fiduciary duty to act for a proper purpose, the 
court gave an order setting aside a service contract and an allotment of shares to the 
director concerned. ln Whyte, Petitioner, 9 a court order restrained a company from 
holding a meeting and from passing a resolution removing a director and replacing 
him with another, and restrained two shareholders from moving or voting in favour of 
such resolutions. 
7 [1988] BCLC 673 
(1992) 10 ACLC 400 
1984 S.L. T. 330 
8 
9 
In fact many of the following common law cases, although not decided 
under the minority provisions would, it is suggested, be actionable under the present 
equivalent of section 181 and would attract the remedy under section 181(2)(a). The 
cases generally involve circumstances where the majority shareholders use their 
voting power to pass resolutions which are oppressive in nature or in disregard of the 
interests of the minorities. 
In Ngurli v McCann 10 the court said that the majority of shareholders 
in exercising their voting power in general meeting must not commit a fraud by 
exercising their vote to appropriate to themselves or to some of themselves property, 
advantages or rights which belong to the company. In Winthrop Investments Ltd v 
Winns Ltd, 11 the court held that a resolution of a general meeting approving a 
transaction which the directors had entered into with an improper object in mind 
would be ineffective. In Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd, 12 Foster J set aside resolutions 
of general meeting to approve the setting up of a trust for employees, to increase the 
capital and to provide for new allotment of shares. The main purpose of the 
allotments in this case was to reduce the plaintiff's share holdings so that the plaintiff 
could not block a special resolution. This was clear case of abuse of power. In Brown 
10 
II 
12 
(1953) 90 CLR 425 at p 439 
[1975] 2 NSWLR 666 
[1976] 2 AllER 268 
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v British Abrasive Wheel Co13 and Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co, 14 it was 
held that an attempted expropriation of a member's property by an unjustified 
alteration of the articles was not for the benefit of the company but merely for the 
benefit of the majority shareholders. In both the cases, the resolutions were set aside 
by the courts. 
Given the vague concepts and the imprecise tests formulated by the 
common law courts that the majority shareholders must exercise their powers in the 
best interest of the company and that any alteration of the articles must be 'bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole', it is suggested that the wide ambit of 
section 181 and the remedies provided therein would solve much of the problems 
encountered by the courts previously. 
B. Section181(2)(b): regulate the conduct of tbe affairs of tbe company in 
future 
This remedy in section 181(2)(b) has a contrary effect to the general principle of 
judicial non-interference in management decisions established in Foss v Harbottle. 15 
But then under section 181(2)(b), Parliament has given the courts every right and 
liberty to intervene in the management of the companies provided the elements under 
section 181(1) are proven. The major drawback here, is that Parliament has failed to 
13 
14 
15 
[1 919] 1 Ch. 290 
[1920] 2 Ch. 124 
(1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 
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provide any specific or general guidelines as to the manner or to the limits of the 
courts powers to regulate the affairs of a company, other than to bring to an end or 
remedy the matters complained ofunder section 181(1). 
The well known case of Re HR Harmer Ltd, 16 decided under section 
210 Companies Act (UK), and the remedies provided in that case for 'oppression', 
would clearly fall under section 181(2)(b). In Re HR Harmer Ltd, a company was 
founded by Mr Harmer. He was 88 years old at the time the court action was 
commenced. Mr Harmer controlled the company as a life director and majority 
shareholder. Mr Harmer' s two sons were also life directo.rs and members of the 
company. The affairs of the company were conducted in a very dictatorial manner. He 
ignored board resolutions, did not consult the other directors (his sons) and exercised 
powers which he did not have. 
The court found that the father's conduct was oppressive and ordered 
that he be removed from office and restrained from interfering in the company's 
affairs unless invited by the board to do so. The court ordered that the father should 
enter into a contract with the company as a consultant with a fixed salary. 
A similar situation arose in the Malaysian case of Re Coliseum Stand 
16 [1958] 3 AllER 689 
Car Service Ltd 17 The applicant petitioner relying under section 181(1) averred that 
the company was solely run by the first respondent, that he was not given proper 
notices of meetings and that many of the affairs of the company were conducted in an 
oppressive manner because of the majority voting power of the respondent. 18 In this 
case ihe applicant was seeking relief from the court to order the first respondent to 
transfer to him and another the whole of the shares held by the iirst respondent. But 
the court held that it was not justified to order that the whole of the shares held by the 
respondent be purchased by the minority shareholders. The court said that the 
applicant was entitled to relief but that relief should be aimed at bringing to an end or 
remedying the matters complained of :9 The court ordered that some shares to be 
transferred to the applicant and some of the other respondents so as to effect a joint 
management of the affairs of the company. 
In Re Spargos Mining NL, 20 a member brought an action against the 
board of directors with regards to transactions benefiting other members in a group of 
companies. The action was brought under section 320, the predecessor of section 260 
of the Australian Corporations Act. The Supreme Court of Western Australia ordered 
the existing board of the company be replaced by a board of the court's choosing, 
comprising of people who were independent of the controlling shareholders. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
[1972] 1 MLJ 109 
Ibid at p 112B 
Ibid at p 112C 
(1990) 8 ACLC 1218 
21 
22 
23 
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Further, even though there is no provision in section 181(2) giving 
powers to the court to appoint a receiver or a receiv.er and manager,21 given the wide 
and general ambit of section 181(2)(b) and the discretion of the court to provide a 
remedy, in an appropriate ~ircumstance, the court may do so. The Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia in Jenkins v Enterprise Gold Mines NL. 22 in 
interpreting section 320, the equivalent of the Malaysian section 181, rejected the 
argument that the courts should not interfere with the internal administration of the 
company and held that there was nothing in the legislation to prevent it from 
interfering in the internal administration. In the joint judgement of Malcolm CJ 
Rowland and Franklyn JJ, it was held:23 
There is nothing in any of the authorities, however, which would 
tend to place a limit on the grant by the court of an appropriate 
remedy once it is found that the conduct complained of is 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory. 
The powers given to the court are extremely wide. They include 
the powers to make orders regulating the conduct of the affairs of 
the company in the future. This necessarily involves the court 
making orders which may interfere with the internal administration 
of the company. There is nothing in the language of s 320 which 
suggests that the court should be reluctant to interfere where that is 
necessary or desirable to give effective relief. .. 
The court there appointed a receiver and manager to investigate certain 
Under s 260(2)(h) of the present Australian provision, a receiver or a receiver 
and manager can be appointed. 
(1992) 10 ACLC 136 
Ibid at p 155 
' 
transactions involving a breach of fiduciaries duties and to take the appropriate legal 
proceedings against them. In the recent Australian case of ReBack 2 Pay 6 Pty Ltcf4, 
where a petition for oppression was filed under s 260 of the Corporations Act 1989, 
the court appointed a provisional liquidator to cany out independent supervision of 
the company's affairs to protect the petitioner's interest. 
Although in section 181(2), the remedies are listed out, it is apparent 
that when the remedies in section 181(2)(a) or (b) or both are given, the courts do not 
specifically mention whether they are dealing with section 181(2)(a) or (b) or both 
together. This is owing to the nature of the facts before the courts which in most 
instances cover many issues. Therefore most remedies under section 181(2)(a) or (b) · 
tend to overlap. This is quite obvious when one looks at the facts and remedies given 
in the cases of Re Chi Liung Ltcf-5 andRe Kong Thai Sawmill(Miri) Sdn Bhd.26 In Re 
Chi Liung & Sons Ltd, the court cancelled offending resolutions appointing the 
respondents as managing directl)f and assistant director, granted an injunction 
restraining the managing director and assistant managing director as such, cancelled 
the offending registration of share transfers and restored the former managers, 
confined all developments until the settlement of a probate action, restricted the 
duties of managers to collecting the income of company and paying all salaries of the 
24 
25 
26 
(1994) 12 ACLC 253 
[1968] 1 MLJ 97 
[1978] 2 MLJ 227 
employees and directed the directors not to embark on any major policy with regard 
to management of the company. 
Similarly, in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd, the Federal Court 
made "orders appointing a watch dog director, imposed conditions on the operation of 
the company's bank accounts, fixed the ceiling for directors bonuses, cancelled the 
powers of the managing director to make donations and investments without full 
board approval and required the managing director to purchase the yacht from the 
company and restore to the company the political donations. 
It is therefore difficult for the courts in cases i.1volving complex fact 
situations to specifY whether a remedy falls under section 181(2)(a) or (b). This is 
made worst by the fact that before a remedy is given, the elements in section 181 ( 1 ), 
"oppression" or "in disregard of interest" of members need to be proven by the 
applicant or petitioner. Mr Pillai in an article27 has pointed out the difficulties that a 
court would face in remedying breaches of duties of directors. In referring to Re Kong 
Thai Sawmill(Miri) Sdn Bhd, he was of the opinion that the Federal Court was wrong 
in making the two orders with respect to: 
(i) one Beng Siew, the managing director to purchase the yacht (Betjaya Malaysia); 
and 
(ii) that Beng Siew would pay the company the amount of donations paid to the 
27 Enforcement of directors' duties and oppression: In Re Kong Thai Sawmill 
(Miri) Sdn Bhd [1976] I MLJ lxxii 
political parties. 
Mr Pillai argues that the Federal Court was wrong in granting the 
above remedies because the remedies in section 181(2) is contingent upon whether 
'oppression' 28 or acts were done in ' disregard of interest' of members were proven 
under section 181(1). Under the circumstances, he felt that it was wrong to genera1ly 
equate any breaches of directors duties as oppression falling under section 181. In 
such cases, involving breach of directors duties, he stated that there could be some 
other remedy available to the company shareholder. 29 
Therefore on a strict interpretation of section 181, one has to be careful 
not to confuse the elements in section 181(1) with those of the duties of directors 
because most cases under section 181 involve small private companies where the 
28 
29 
Buckley J in Re Five Minutes Car Wash Service Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 745 at 
page 751: The mere fact that a member of a company has lost confidence in 
the manner in which the company's affairs are conducted does not lead to the 
conclusion that he is oppressed. Nor can resentment at being outvoted; or 
mere dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the conduct of the company's 
affairs, whether on grounds relating to policy or to efficiency, however well 
founded. Those who are alleged to have acted oppressively must be shown to 
have acted at least unfairly towards those who claim to have been oppressed. 
Buckley LJ in Re Jermyn Streets Turkish Bath Ltd [1971] 3 All ER 184 at 
page 199: If a director of a company were to draw remuneration to which he 
was not legalJy entitled in excess of the remuneration he was legaJJy entitled, 
this might not doubt found misfeasance proceedings or proceedings for some 
other kind of relief, but it would not, in our judgement, of itself amount to 
oppression. Nor would the fact that the director was a majority shareholder in 
the company make any difference, unless he had used his majority voting 
powers to retain the remuneration or to stifle proceedings by the company or 
other shareholders in relation to it. 
majority shareholders are also the directors. The courts may unwittingly remedy all 
breaches of duties that may incidentally come to light. 30 
This confusion could be further exacerbated if the courts do not take 
the effort or trouble to scrutinize the facts of a particular case before them so as to 
ensure that the minority action falls under section 181(1)(a) or (b) or both. This is 
apparent in Re Chi Liung & Son Ltd, where Gill J did not differentiate section 
"d 31 181(1)(a) and (b) when he sa1 : 
The question which I had to consider in the determination of these 
proceedings is whether there is, has been or is threatened the sort 
of oppression which is contemplated by section 181(1) of the 
Companies Act 1965. 
It cannot be denied that he failed to realise that in section 18l(l)(a) the 
words 'are being conducted' and 'are being exercised' imply that something had been 
done in the past. On the other hand in section 181(1)(b) the words 'is threatened' or 
'is proposed' connotes some future conduct. The courts would have to be careful 
because the appropriate remedy to be granted in a particular fact situation would 
depend on their right interpretation of section 181(1 ). 
30 Supra n 22 at lxxvi 
31 Supra n 24 at p 100-10 1 
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C. Section 181(2)(c): purchase of the shares or debentures of the company by 
other members or holders of debentures of the company or by the 
company itself 
Generally in large public companies , the only remedy for a disgruntled 
shareholder would be for him or her to ?ell the shares and leave the company. It is 
difficult in public companies for shareholders to exercise their rights because of the 
wide spread of shareholdings and the easy availability of markets for their shares. It is 
only in the small private companies that the application of the section 181 minority 
provision would become useful and effective. The reason being that in private 
companies shares are usually closely held and members have the expectation to 
participate in the management of the company. This is provided that there are no clear 
restrictive provisions in the Articles of Association preventing members from being 
involved in management decisions. 
It is common in most applications under section 181 for the courts to 
order for the aggrieved party's shares to be bought by other members of the company 
or the company itself. This is so where the court is unable to make any other order 
under section 181(2)," other than to make an order that the petitioner's shares be 
bought over. This would thus prevent the petitioner being •tocked in' as a minority in 
the company. 32 It is interesting to note that in the English case of Re Little Olympian 
Each-Ways Ltd, 33 the court relying on the equivalent of section 181(2Xc), made an 
order against a constructive trustee to purchase the shares of a petitioner in the 
32 Re Elgindata Ltd [ 1991] BCLC 959 at 1005 
33 [1995] 1 BCLC 636 
company from which assets were transferred at a gross undervalue to the constructive 
trustee. 34 
Even though the order to purchase the shares seems to be the best and 
. 
con-.:enient remedy but a look at the volume of case law in the area of valuation of 
shares, suggests that aggrieved shareholders may not obtain what they were hoping 
for. They have to put their faith on the courts for a fair monetary compensation for 
their shares. 
The main problem encountered by the local courts in valuing shares of 
a company is due to the lack of any guidelines in the Companies Act 1965 as to the 
proper and fair method for the valuation of shares. Owing to the lack of &.uthorities, 
the Malaysian courts will have to rely on principles established by the courts, 
especially in UK and Australia, on their equivalents of section 181. 
In granting an order to purchase the shares, the courts generally have a 
very wide discretion in determining the value of the shares. The main questions that 
would confront a court is how the shares are to be valued and on what date? The 
factors that a court might consider in valuing the shares are the company's net asset 
value and profits, the nature of the business and the period of its operation. 35 The 
34 
35 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers: Controls, Remedies and Decision 
Making, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Law Journal, 1996 at p 168 
S.H.Goo, Minority Shareholders' Protection: A study of Section 459 0j the 
Companies Act 1985, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1994 
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value of the shares are basically determined by attributing to them the proportion of 
the total asset value of the company ("net tangible assets" or NTA) that they 
represent, with no discount for a minority stake,36 _based on the price/earnings ratio 
(PIE ratio), with a discount for a minority shareholding, the unsaleability of a private 
company's shares37 and many other factors. Further, the court would also have to 
consider the basis of the valuation of the shares, that is whether on a pro rata38 or 
discount basis39 or by taking a pragmatic approach. 40 However, the biggest obstacle 
for the court is the date the shares are to be valued. Earlier authorities suggest that the 
date of commencement of the proceedings is the proper date,41 some prior to the 
36 
37 
38 
Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] BCLC 195,201-202 
ReA Company [1986] BCLC 362, 368 
This approach is relevant in a quasi partnership type of relationship between 
members where each would have to participate in the management of the 
company. Therefore when a member is forced out of the company, it would be 
unfair to have the member's shares disposed at a discounted price: Re Bird 
Precision Bellows Ltd [1984) BCLC 195 
39 This approach is common where shares are acquired for investment purposes 
and as in a quasi-partnership type of situation It is therefore fair to have the 
shares discounted to reflect the minority shareholding: Elgindata Ltd [1991] 
BCLC 959 
40 
41 
In this approach the courts do not rely specifically on any particular basis of 
valuation but rather rely on the circumstances or facts of each case to ascertain 
a fair value: ReA Company (no. 007623 of 1984) [1986] BCLC 362 
Per Lord Som in Meyer v Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society (1957) SC 
] 1 0; Re Golden Bread Pty Ltd [1977] Qd R 44; Guan Seng Co Sdn Bhd v Tan 
Hock Chuan [1990] 2 CLJ 761 
1/.) 
petition,42 others the date the order was made43 or some other date which the court 
"d . 44 cons1 ers appropnate. 
It is obvious that the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph are 
very technical in nature and the court would have to depend on experts especially 
accountants to assist them in valuing the shares of the company. Ultimately it is up to 
the court to make the final decision as to the fairness of the valuation under any given 
fact situation. The court is generally not bound by any accounting rules or business 
rules as long as the value attributed to the share is fair and proper in the 
circumstances before the court. 45 
Whatever may be the factors that the court would have to consider 
, 
what is most important is for the court to arrive at a value which is fair in all the 
circumstances and to disregard the effect of any oppressive conduct which may have 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430. The Court of Appeal at p 436 stated that a 
prior date before the petition would arise in situations where the majority 
shareholders deliberately took steps to depreciate the value of shares in 
anticipation of a petitio'l being presented. 
ReA Company (No 005134 of 1986), ex p Harries [1989] BCLC 383399; Re 
Novabron Pty Ltd (No 2) (1986) 11 ACLR 279,296; Re Da/keith Investments 
Pty Ltd (1984) ACLR 247,255; Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1006-7; 
Re London Schoof of Electronics Ltd [1985] 3 WLR 474,484 
ReA Company (No 003843 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 562,572 
Scottish Cooperative Vlholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324 at p 369 
occurred.46 This view was held by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Planeta Tullio v 
Andrea G Maoro47 where the court held that the value at which the shares ought to be 
repurchased must be fair and reasonable based on the circumstances of each case. For 
instance to ensure fairness the court In The Matter of Asahi Metal Pte Ltd, 48 in 
granting an order to purchase the shares , appointed an independent auditor to be 
agreed between the parties to assess their value. 
The importance of this remedy under section 181 can be seen in the 
case ofln The Matter ofCastlron Products, "'9 where an application under section 181 
was made by shareholders. In this case there was serious mismanagement of the 
company's affairs. There was no proper accounting for the company, funds were 
misappropriated by the directors, the directors disposed of property without 
authorisation and there was loss of assets and tax mismanagement.. The audited 
accounts ofthe company for the year 1981 was only provided to the shareholders in 
1987 and the company failed to submit accounts for the years 1981 to 1986. The 
company also failed to take legal action against a director for unauthorised disposal of 
the company's car to a third party. The company also failed to pay dividends from 
1971 to the date of petition. The High Court held that the affairs of the company were 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Waddell CJ in Sanford v Sanford Courier Service Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 
549,562 and Mcpherson J in Re Dalkeith Investments Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 
247,255 
(1994) 4 MSCLC 96093 
( 1995) 4 MSCLC 96317 
(1993) 3 MSCLC 9103Q 
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being conducted and the powers of the directors were being exercised in a manner 
oppressive and in disregard of the interests of the shareholders. Although there was 
serious mismanagement and the facts would justi-fy a winding up order, the court 
nevertheless declined to make the drasti~ order of winding up as the company was a 
going concern and instead made an order for the shares of the petitioners to be bought 
by the respondents (excluding the respondent company). 
D. Section 181{2)(d): in the case of a purchase of shares by the company 
provide for a reduction accordingly of the company's capital. ' 
In the writer's opinion section 181(2)(d) is not actually a specific remedy but rather a 
superfluous provision. Section 181(2)(d) merely shows the effect of the company 
purchasing the shares of the member. It is obvious that under such a circumstance the 
company has to reduce its capital accordingly. Under section 181(2)(c) the remedy 
allowing the company to purchase its shares has already been mentioned and it is not 
necessary for Parliament to repeat it in section 181 (2)( d). Parliament should have 
actually split section 181(2)(c) and worded it as provided for in section 260(2)(e) and 
(f) of the Australian provision. Section 260(2)(f) provides for an order for the 
purchase of the shares of any member by the company and for the reduction 
, . I so 
accordingly of the company s capita. 
It is important to note that it is a long established rule at common law 
that companies may not purchase their own shares. This rule was established in 
50 S 461 (2)( d) of the UK provision is similarly worded. 
1/0 
Trevor v Whitworth. 51 The main purpose of this rule is to protect the creditors of the 
company who would have given loans to the company based on the issued share 
capital of the company. Therefore, in the case of the court contemplating to make an 
order to acquire its shares, it must give dqe consideration to creditors. 52 This rule is 
now entrenched in section 67(1) of the Companies Act 1965. However, following the 
introduction of section 67A by Companies (Amendment) Act 1997, which came into 
effect on the 1 September 1997, a public company is now allowed to purchase its own 
shares as well as provide financial assistance for the purchase of shares in the 
company. The purchase or the giving of financial assistance must be from 
distributable reserves which would otherwise be available for dividends. In the case 
of purchase of its own shares, the company's issued capital shall be diminished by 
the cancellation of the shares so purchased and the amount must be transferred to a 
capital redemption reserve. The cancellation of shares so purchased shall not be 
deemed to be a reduction of capital within the meaning of the Companies Act 1965 
Under the Companies Act 1965, the only normal manner by which a 
company can reduce its capital is by following the procedures as stated ins 64. Under 
section 64, the articles must provide for the reduction of capital, a special resolution 
must be passed by the members and the court need to confirm such reduction. 
Therefore under the Act, it is not easy for a company to reduce its capital because 
75% of the majority of shareholders having voting rights must agree to such reduction 
51 (1887) 12 App Cas 409 
52 Quinlan v Fiboze Fty Ltd (1988) 14 ACLR 312 
and the court must be satisfied that the reduction is fair and does not prejudice 
unfairly any party, especially Yle creditors. Generally the application of the section 64 
involves a time consuming and a cumbersome procedure. 
Given the difficulties of an application under section 64, it would seem 
that shareholders who are aggrieved and disappointed with the manner the affairs of 
the company are managed, could rely on section 181 (2)( c) to have their shares bought 
over by the other members or the company itself. This is subject to the shareholders 
concerned being able to bring an action within section 181(1). Whether they would 
succeed or not is another question but the very existence of the section 181 remedy is 
a tool for any member for relief There is no necessity for a ·special resolution. 
Since in most cases, the courts approach is to have the petitioner's 
shares bought by the other members or the company itself (rather than take the drastic 
step of winding up) it would be crucial for the court to take cognisance of the 
existence of other class shares. The court must ensure that the rights of other classes 
of shareholders are not affected. It would be rather unfair in an application under 
section 181 if the view of different class shareholders are not taken into 
consideration. Table A Article 4 provides that the rights of particular class 
shareholders cannot be altered unless they themselves do so: So Article 4 requires the 
holders of three quarters of the issued shares of a class of shares, to consent in writing 
to or pass a special resolution at a separate meeting of holders of the shares of the 
class, approving a variation of their rights. It would be a difficult task for the courts 
'IV 
to provide an appropriate remedy under section 181(2)(c) when there are class rights 
involved. 
E. Section 181(2)(e): provide that the company be wound up. 
Other than winding up a company by the court under section 181(2)(e), a company 
can also be wound up by the court under the various grounds as provided for in 
section 218(1) Companies Act 1965. For the purposes of the present discussion, 
section 218(1)(f) and (i) would be relevant and for convenience they are stated herein 
below: 
S 218( 1 )- The Court may order the winding up if-
(f) the directors have acted in the affairs of the company in 
their own interests rather than in the interests of the 
members as a whole, or in any other manner whatsoever 
which appears to be unfair or unjust to other members. 
(i) the Court is of the opinjon that it is just and equitable that 
the company be wound up. 
Courts are generally very reluctant to take a drastic step and wind up a 
company because it may adversely affect the members, the creditors and employees 
ofthe company. Therefore it is arguable whether section 218(1)(f) and (i) would be of 
any significance given that section 181 would be a better provision for members and 
debenture holders to rely on for an effective remedy.53 Section 181(2) gives the court 
53 In Australia, s 461 of the Australian Corporation Law is similar to the 
Malaysian s 218. S 461 (e),( f) and (g) of the Australian provision is very 
similar to the Malaysian s 181(1). S 461(k) is similar to the Malaysian s 
218(1)(i). In Austra1ia s 461 would be important because it is only through 
that provision that creditors can obtain a winding up order. However in the 
Malaysian s 181, debenture holders can apply for any of the remeilies. It 
cannot be derued that if s 181 elements cannot be proven, then s 2 us(l)(i) 
I I ':1 
wide discretion in granting a suitable remedy which in its opinion would bring to an 
end or remedy any matters complained of. There are a vast number of case authorities 
to show the courts reluctance in winding up a compa:py if there is some other suitable 
alternative remedy. 
In Re Dalkeith Investments Pty Ltd, 54 a divorce between two major 
shareholders resulted in a breakdovm in the mutual trust and confidence between the 
members. Although the applicant shareholder was entitled to wind up the company 
under the equivalent Australian section 218(l)(i), the court was of the opinion that 
winding up will only be granted if there is no other less drastic form of relief 
available. Therefore a remedy under the equivalent section 181 was granted for the 
purchase of the minority member's shares by the majority. 
In Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd, 55 the court said that it will not 
make an order under the equivalent section 218(1)(f) or (i), if it is of the opinion that 
the applicants have some other remedy or that they are acting unreasonably in seeking 
the winding up order instead of pursuing some other less drastic remedies possibly 
under section 181 or other common law remedies. 
54 
55 
would be very important to creditors because the words 'just and equitable' 
are very wide and do not limit the jurisdiction of the court to any particular 
case. It is a question of fact, and each case depends on its own circumstances: 
Re Bleriot Manufacturing Aircraft Company Ltd (1916) 32 TLR 253 
(1985) 3 ACLC 74 
(1987) 5 ACLC 222 
In Re SG White Pty Ltd, 56 the court refused to order that the company 
be wound up even though there were grounds under the Australian Unifonn 
Companies Act's equivalent ofboth section 181 and section 218(1)(f) and (i) because 
the company had l'l good and profitable business. The court ordered the company to 
purchase the shares of the member concerned. As mentioned earlier, a similar 
position was taken by the High Court of Malaya in In The Matter of Cast Iron 
Products. 
However, it is interesting to compare the Australian cases with some 
local cases. In Singapore, in the case of Kuah Kok Kim v Chong Lee Leong Seng 
Co(Pte) Ltd, 57 the court in construing section 216(2) of the Singapore Companies Act 
said that it was not right to say that winding up would only be granted only if all the 
other reliefs specified in section 216(2) were inadequate or ineffective for the 
purposes of remedying the matters complained of 58 The courts reasoning was based 
on the fact that section 216 confers on the court an unfettered discretion and therefore 
it would be wrong to lay down any general rule which would operate to limit or 
restrict the exercise of the court's discretion. 
Although the court acknowledged that winding up was a drastic 
remedy as stated by Lord Wilberforce in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhc/9 at p 
56 
57 
58 
59 
(1982) 1 ACLC 254 
[1991] 2 MLJ 129 
Ibidatp 131E 
[1978] 2 MLJ 229 
us l 
23360 it nevertheless went on to say that winding up would be a more appropriate 
remedy in certain circumstances even though relief other than winding up would put 
an end to the oppression. The above statement made by Lord Wilberforce was 
reiterated in Gee Hoe Chan Trading Co P_te Ltd.61 Here the majority shareholders of a 
( ompimy petitioned under section 216 Singapore Companies Act claiming that the 
majority shareholders had conducted the affairs of the company in a manner 
oppressive to the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders were seeking 
relief for proportional representation on the company's board of directors, the 
purchase of their shares by the majority shareholders or the winding up of the 
company. 
Chao Hick Tin J after being satisfied that the petitioners had made 
their case under section 216(l)(a) said at p 95576: 
I was inclined to give the respondents the option of purchasing 
the shares of the petitioners at a price to be determined by the 
auditors based on the accounts; and if the respondents should fail 
to exercise the option \\-ithin a reasonable time, I would then 
order the company be wound up. I did not think it was practical, 
having regard to the fact that the parties were at logger heads and 
mutual trust and confidence were no longer there, to order that 
60 Winding up is specifically mentioned in s 181 (2)( e) of the Companies Act [the 
equivalent of s 216(2)(f) of the Singapore Companies Act] as a head of relief 
which the court may grant. No limiting conditions are imposed, so that the 
granting of it is in the discretion of the court. In exercising this discretion the 
court will have in mind the drastic character, of this remedy, if sought to be 
applied to a company which is a going concern; it will take into account (a 
statement which is not exhaustive) the gravity of the case made out under s 
181 ( 1 ); the possibility of remedying the complaints proved in other ways than 
by winding the company up; the interests of other members of the company 
not involved in the proceedings 
61 (1991) 1 MSCLC 95576 
the company should continue with proper representation on the 
board for the petitioners. This would only cause further 
deadlocks. However, on my indication to the parties at the 
conclusion of the hearing that the petitioners had made out a case 
for reliefs, the respondents' counsel, after consulting the 
respondents who were present in Court, told this court that the 
respondents would not be able to purchase the shares and that in 
the circumstances , the company be wound up. I accordingly 
-ordered that the company be wound up. 
lOL 
Further, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Kuah Kok Kim v Chong Lee 
Leong Seng Co(Pte) Ltd, compared section 216 with section 186 of the, Australian 
Companies Act. Section 186(2) reads as follows: 
S186(2) If the Court is of the opinion that the company's affairs 
are being so conducted the Court may, with a view to bringing to 
an end the matters complained of-
(a) except where paragraph (b) of this subsection applies, 
make an order hat the company be wound up; or 
(b) where the Court is of opinion that to wind up the company 
would unfairly prejudice the member or the members 
referred to in subsection (1) of this section, but othenvise 
the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on 
the grounds that it is just and equitable that the company be 
wound up, or that, for any reason it is just and equitable to 
make an order (other than a winding up order) under this 
section, make such order as it thinks fit whether for 
regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future or 
for the purchase of the shares of any members by other 
members or by the company and, in the case of a purchase 
by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the 
company's capital, or otherwise. 
It is obvious that looking at section 186(2), the legislature intended 
that the remedy of winding up is to be granted only as a remedy of last resort. Section 
186(2) is reflected under the present section 260 of the Australian Corporations Act: 
S260(2) : ... the Court may, subject to subsection(4), make 
such order or orders as it thinks fit, .... 
S260(4) : The Court shall not make an order under subsection 
(2) for the winding up of a company if it is of the 
opinion that the winding up of the company would 
unfairly prejudice the oppressed member or 
members 
Since there is no equivalent Australian provision in the Malaysian and 
Singapore Acts, therefore the Courts in Malaysia and Singapore do not have to rely on 
the Australian court decisions which are based on a differently worded provision. 
In Malaysia in the recent case of Tien lk Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors v 
Woodsville Sdn Bhd, 62 the then Supreme Court by comparing the various UK and 
Australian provisions63 came to the conclusion that under the Malaysian Act there 
was no obligation for the Malaysian courts to consider the availability of alternative 
remedies before making a winding up order under section 218(1)(i) of the Companies 
Act.64 In Tien lk Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Woodsville Sdn Bhd, the Supreme Court 
referred to the Singapore case of Tang Choon Keng Realty (Pte) Ltd v Tang Wee 
Chenl5 where Chan Sek Keong J said:66 
62 
63 
64 
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[1995] 1 MLJ 769 
S 225(2)(b) English Companies Act 1948 and s 367(3) Australian Companies 
Act 1981 
Supra n 64 at p 779C 
[1992] 2 SLR 1114 
Ibid at p 1137B 
Having considered the authorities ... it was no answer to say that 
relief might also have been obtained in a minority shareholders' 
action. 
A similar position was taken by the Singapore Court of Appeal in 
Chong_ Choon Chai & Anor v Tan Gee Cheng & A nor. 67 In this case the appellants 
were both shareholders and directors of Kim Heng Glass(Pte) Ltd ('the company') 
each holding 39300 shares. The other directors were the respondents, who were the 
majority shareholders owning 81300 shares each. On 3 August 1992, the appellants 
' 
filed a petition for the winding up of the company under section 254 of the Singapore 
Companies Act on the following grounds: 
a) that they were denied equal participation in the management of the companies 
although they joined the company on the basis that they would be involved in 
the management. 
b) there were malpractices by the respondents and there was discrimination 
against the appellants. 
c) the respondents under declared the company's stocks and therefore the 
appellants were not able to sell their shares to the respondents. 
The High Court by relying on the case of Kuah Kim Kok v Chong Lee 
Leong Seng Co (Pte) Ltd, amended the heading of the winding up proceedings to that 
of originating petition on the premise that the appellants were actually seeking a 
remedy under section 216 ofthe Singapore Companies Act. However, the Singapore 
67 [1993) 3 SLR 1 
Court of Appeal in Chong Choon Chai & Anor v Tan Gee Cheng & Anor 
distinguished Kuah Kim Kok v Chong Lee Leong Seng Co (Pte) Ltd on the grounds 
that in Kuah Kim Kok, the actual relief sought was under section 216 but the 
proceedings were brought mistakenly by :vay of a winding up petition. 
In Chong Choon Chai & Anor, the intention of the appellants was all 
along to seek a winding up order against the company under section 254 and not 
section 216. Therefore the court was of the opinion that there was no cause of any 
d . 68 amendment to the form of procee mgs. 
The Chong Choon Chai case also shows that the position taken by the 
Singapore courts are different from the Australian courts. The Singa.Pore Court of 
Appeal recognised that a litigant is completely free to pursue his claim under either 
section 254 or section 216 and the court does not have a right to compel a person to 
consider alternative remedies. This is obvious from the fact that the Court of Appeal 
refused to strike out the winding up petition which was based on valid grounds. 69 
With due regard to the above propositions of law as to granting of 
winding up orders the court in Tang Choon Keng Realty (Pte) Ltd v Tang Wee Cheng 
recognised that such an order would not however be made if it can be shown that the 
68 
69 
Ibid at p 5. The confusion that arose here which most probably misled the 
High Court was the choice of the words. The petitioner by the use of the word 
'oppression' instead off 'unfair or unjust' as provided for ins 254(f) had given 
the impression that he was seeking a remedy under s 216. However, the Court 
of Appeal stated that both the expressions were not terms of art and were also 
not statutorily defined but in the ordinary sense capable of a broad definition. 
Ibid at p 7 
member does not really seek the remedy but is using the process of the court for a 
collateral object. The courts will not grant any remedy if the petitioner is trying to 
abuse the process of the court so as to force the other party to adhere to the demands 
of the petitioner. 
Til General conclusions 
Finally the impact of the section 181 remedies can be seen in section 
181 ( 4 ), where the court is allowed to make an order to alter or make additions to the 
company's memorandum or articles and such alterations or additions shall have the 
same effect as if duly made by a resolution of the company. Under the Act the 
Memorandum and the ArticJes constitute a statutory contract between the company 
and the members and between the members themselves. The Act also provides that 
the Memorandum and the ArticJes can only be altered by following the procedures as 
stated in the Act. However the alteration of the two important constitutional 
documents is further subject to the alteration being made bona fide and in the best 
interest of the members as a whole. Of course what is in the best interest of the 
members as a whole has been a moot point. It seems that by relying on section 181, 
less than the requisite majority may be able to convince the court to have the above 
documents altered. 
In this writer's opinion whether such a remedy should be permitted is 
questionable because Parliament has not only allowed the courts to interfere with the 
internal management of the companies but also had interfered with the concept of 
majority rule. Now even a single member may exercise his or her's authority in an 
appropriate case. 
The ability of the courts to interfere in the internal mattagement of the 
company is weli reflected in Kumagai GZfmi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & 
Ors70 where the court said that once a case has been made out under either paragraph 
(a) or (b) of subsection (1) of section 181, it is clear that the court can make an order 
altering the memorandum or the articles of the company. The power to alter the 
constitutional documents by the courts means that the courts could impose their own 
opinion as to how the company should be run or managed. In fact debenture holders 
themselves through the courts would be able indirectly to interfere in the internal 
management of the company. 
It is surprising to note that section 181(2) does not mention specifically 
the authority to commence civil proceedings as provided in the equivalent provisions 
in UK and Australia. It is a known fact in law that it is better to specify certain 
matters expressly so as to avoid any element of doubt. Could it be implied then that 
Parliament did not have the intention to provide such powers to the courts? But then 
this argument would seem to be rather academic because section 181(2) provides that 
the court may make any order as it thinks fit without in any way limiting the scope of 
the remedies that it can provide. Therefore, it is the writer's opinion that under 
section 181(2), the courts would have the authority to compel the company to 
commence, institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings. 
70 [1995] 2 SLR 297 
It may be concluded that by providing such wide remedies under 
section 181 (2) which allows the courts to interfere in the internal management of the 
companies, most of the powers of members in companies are now indirectly subject 
to the ·opinion of the courts. It could be argued that whatever powers or rights, 
Parliament had given to members of the company under the Companies Act it has 
indirectly removed them. It is made worst by the fact that even debenture holders can 
possibly use the courts to have the companies managed in a certain manner. 
Given the wide ambit of section 181 and the vast number of cases 
decided under similar provisions in other jurisdictions, it is only a matter of time that 
the Malaysian courts will be inundated with many section 181 applications. As more 
and more companies are being formed and more shareholders being aware of their 
rights and powers as shareholders, there would be an increase of litigation in this area 
of the law. It is therefore important for the courts and also Parliament to set clear 
precedents in this area. There should also be some restrictions on how the courts 
exercise their discretions in granting remedies. This is important because appellate 
courts are very reluctant to interfere with how the lower courts had exercised their 
discretion unless there is clear abuse of the discretionary power. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The avowed principle of comp~ny law is majority rule. The minority must submit to the 
. . 
wishes. of the majority. The majority have risked their money and have invested it in a 
business venture and it would be unfair to put restraints in their way. 
The principle of majority rule is enshrined in the Foss v Harbottle1 rule. 
The rule is very severe on the minority and the minority would completely be in the 
hands of the majority if there are no exceptions to the rule. Over the years a cautious 
judiciary has developed a number of exceptions to the rule. The most important of these 
is the exception commonly called the 'fraud on the minority exception'. This exception 
became one ofthe major vehicles of minority protection. The minority could assert their 
right as well as seek remedies for an alleged wrong to the company by way of an action 
which came to be known as the derivative action. 
I. Limitations of the fraud on the minority exception 
In theory the derivative action appeared attractive but in practice it proved to be complex, 
hazardous and frustrating. To bring an action under the fraud on the minority exception, 
the minority had to prove that the acts of the wrongdoers amounted to fraud and that the 
wrongdoers were in control. The main obstacle faced by the courts was in trying to 
provide a clear and precise definition to the meaning of ' fraud' . The concept of fraud on 
(1843) 2 Hare 461 
189 
190 
the minority was a very vague concept and different courts gave different interpretations 
as to what it actually meant. In Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong industrial Park 
(Me/aka) Sdn Bhd and Ors, 2 it was held that the expression 'fraud on the minority' was a 
term of art and was not concerned with the actual fraud or deception at common law but 
rather o-n the abuse of power by those in control of companies. 
The proper plaintiff rule and the internal management rule underlying the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle gave rise to abuse of corporate powers by those in, control of the 
companies. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to prove wrongdoer 
control under the fraud on the minority exception. There is no clear authority as to what 
wrongdoer control means. There is also the unsettled question as to whether control 
means ' de facto' or 'de jure'. 
Knox J in the case of Smith v Croft (No.2/ added to the confusion by 
introducing an exception to the exception. By virtue of Smith v Croft (No.2), 
notwithstanding '" fraud" and '"wrongdoer control", a derivative action will be stayed if an 
'"independent organ" of the company is able to prove that it does not wish to continue 
with the legal suit. In such a situation, the plaintiff minority shareholder could not 
proceed with the suit. However, this noble idea postulated by Knox J is full of 
ambiguities in the sense that it is difficult to establish who the '"independent organ" is 
2 
3 
[1995] 3 MLJ 417 
[1988] Ch 114 
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going to be and what test is to be applied to detennine shareholder independence. The 
minority shareholders, to overcome the new obstacle, must satisfy the burden of proof 
that the votes of the "independent organ" is cast to support the wrongdoers. The obstacle 
created by Smith v Croft (No.2) would deter minority shareholders from considering any 
legal action on behalf of the company. 
In fact given the present corporate culture and the complexities and 
sophistication of modem shareholding, it will be extremely difficult to prove 
manipulation or that the new shareholders are nominees of the wrongdoers or that they 
are not truly independent. It is to be noted that even though the above decision of Knox J 
has its attractions, it does not seem to enhance the proper governance of companies as it 
provides a license to the majority of the independent shareholders to decide whether it is 
legitimate for a company to be deprived of its title to property in cases of fraudulent 
breaches of duties. 4 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle being based on the principle of majority rule 
has also given rise to problems when dealing with the issue of ratification of directors 
acts in relation to the company. There is the problem of identifying the category of 
shareholders who are entitled to vote on a ratification exercise and the circumstances 
under which a derivative action may be precluded in respect of a non-ratifiable 
transaction. 5 This a major problem in situations where the wrongdoers are shareholders 
4 
5 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers: Controls, Remedies and Decision Making, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Law Journal, 1996, p 601 
Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 4 p 610 
192 
and are also the directors of the company. It generally gives rise to conflicts of mterest in 
addressing ratification issues. The 'independent organ' formula mentioned earlier may 
not be of any assistance in the ratification proce~s owing to the many unresolved 
ambiguities surrounding it. 
Then there is the issue of whether the member has locus standi to bring a 
derivative action. Here again the courts do not seem to be in one accord as to the exact 
position of the law. There is likelihood that any litigation involving ·a derivative action 
may lead to a lengthy and costly battle between the parties concerned, especially if the 
issue of locus standi is decided as a preliminary point. It cannot be denied that in any 
legal action involving companies, there will always be numerous parties, witnesses and 
documents that would need to be brought and tendered before the court and in such a 
situation it will be an impossible task for the courts on a cursory examination of the 
witnesses or documents to conclude whether a particular member has a locus standi to 
bring a derivative action. Much has been said on this issues in the many cases reported6 
but it is the writer's opinion that none of the cases provide a clear solution concerning the 
issue of locus standi. 
The inconsistency of the courts in applying the fraud on the minority 
exception in certain cases shows the uncertainty and the ambiguity surrounding the rule 
6 Prudential Assurance Co Ltdv Newman Industries Ltd & Ors [1981] 1 Ch 257~ 
Smith v Croft (No.2) [1987] BCLC 206; Hurley & Anor v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd 
& Drs (1982) 6 ACLR 791; Biala Pty Ltd v Mal/ina Holdings Ltd & Drs (1993) 
11 ACSR 785; A lor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Drs [1 995] 1 MLJ 
241; Tan Guan Eng & Anor v Ng Kweng Hee & Drs [1992] 1 MU 487 
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in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions. One of the major problems facing the minority 
shareholder is that the rule in Foss v Harbottle prevents him from suing the company's 
officers where it is alleged that they were negligent in conducting the company's affairs.7 
This is unfortunate as negligence may sometimes cause enormous loss to a company. 
Although there is dicta that the suit may be possible where gross negligence by the 
company' s officers is alleged8 and although self serving negligence may give rise to a 
derivative action as in Daniels v Daniels,9 the position of the minority shareholder is still 
weak where he alleges negligence. 
In the writer's opinion these problems could have been addressed if the 
courts had given due recognition to a fifth exception, namely the ' in the interest of 
justice' exception. However, as discussed by the writer earlier in the dissertation, the 
courts in the various jurisdictions seem to differ in their views as to the application of the 
fifth exception. Although the Court of Appeal in Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong 
Industrial Park (Me/aka) Sdn Bhd & Ors and the Federal Court in Owen Sim Liang Khui 
v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd & Ano/0 expressed the view that the existence of the fifth 
exception as recognised in Australia is to be preferred but then there is no decision in 
Malaysia which has decided whether the fifth exception does or does not exist. 11 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Pavlides v Jensen[1956] 1 Ch 565 
Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v Multinational Gas & Petrochemical 
Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258 
[1978] 2 AllER 89 
[1996] 2 AMR 24 77 
Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 4 p 601 
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It was also established in Nurcombe v Nurcombe12 that a member 
bringing a derivative action must come to court with clean hands or where he has been 
guilty of an unreasonable delay, he would be precluded from brin~ng such an action. In 
this case, a wife obtained maintenance in a divorce I:roceedings against the husband. 
Thereafter, she proceeded as a member of a company of\vhich she and her husband were 
the only shareholders, to bring a derivative action against him to recover company 
moneys which she alleged that he had misappropriated from the company and which she 
knew about at the time of divorce. The court held that it would be inequitable to allow a 
plaintiff minority shareholder to continue an action where the plaintiff minority 
shareholder had been aware of the defendant's wrongful conduct. In the recent case of 
Barrett v Duckett, again involving a family dispute, the minority shareholder, the widow 
of the founder of the company, brought a derivative action on the grounds that the 
management and control of the company had passed to her son-in-law and his second 
wife, to the exclusion ofthe founder's family and in particular his daughter (the ex-wife 
of the son-in-law). The court held that the widow did not have standing to sue in a 
derivative action because her main motive was to secure something of the family 
inheritance for her daughter rather than correct wrongs done to the company. It was also 
held in this case, that a plaintiff would only be allowed to bring a derivative action, if he 
or she has no other alternative remedy available. Yet, another hurdle for a minority 
shareholder to contend with. 
12 [1985] 1 AllER 65 
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Then there is also the issue of cost. In Wallersteiner v Moir, 13 the English 
Court of Appeal held that in appropriate cases the court may order the company to 
indemnify against the costs incurred in an action. However, in Smith v Croft, 14 Walton J 
held that this would impose an unfair burden on the company and that only a percentage 
of the costs should be paid. Other than the differing vi~ws of the courts on this issue, 
there are further problems as to establishing a proper system or procedure for 
indemnifying the minority shareholder and how the costs are to be imputed by the courts. 
These are matters which cannot be easily resolved by the courts themselves. 
It is to be noted that there is no specific procedure in Malaysia for 
commencement and prosecution of derivative actions. In England, there is Order 15 Ruie 
12A of the Rules of the Supreme Court. There is no equivalent to Order 15 Rule 12A in 
the Malaysian High Court Rules. In Malaysia, therefore the action has to be in the form 
of a representative action under Order 15, rule 12 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. 
The plaintiff is the shareholder and the company is added to the action as a nominal 
defendant, so that any decision made by the court would be binding on the company. 15 
Order 15, rule 12A which has been included in the English Supreme Court Rules 
introduces a special interlocutory procedure for derivative actions. It basically reinforces 
the ruling in the Prudential case, that is the question of the plaintiffs standing to bring an 
action should be settled before the substantive issues are heard. Order 15, rule 12A 
13 
14 
15 
[1975] 2 WLR 389 
[1986] 1 WLR 580 
pokes v Grosvenor & West End Rly Terminus Hotel Co Ltd [1897] 2 QB 14, 128 
per Chitty LJ 
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provides that where a defendant (it appears any defendant- either the company or an 
alleged wrongdoer) has given notice of intention to defend, the plaintiff must apply to the 
court for leave to continue the action and will not be allowed to take any further steps in 
the case unless such leave is given. However, this new rule has been criticised on the 
grounds that it does not provide any guidance as to the criteria which must be adhered to 
by the courts when granting or withholding such leave. 16 It is hoped that the Malaysian 
High Court Rules will be amended to provide a suitable efficient and speedy procedure 
for derivative actions. It may not be wise to blindly copy the English rules in view of the 
many short comings. 
It is therefore apparent that the common law bas failed to develop. a 
positive doctrine of minority shareholders. The range of wrongs for which· a shareholder 
could sue under the rule in Foss v Harbottle is severely restricted. Fortunately for the 
minority shareholder, the legislature has provided another vehicle for the minority 
shareholder to seek relief in the form of section 181 Companies Act 1965. Section 181 
overcomes many of the problems of derivative action, in that it is not restricted to fraud, 
illegality and ultra vires. Where section 181 applies, it is not necessary: 
a) to join the company as co-defendant. 
b) for preliminary issue for locus standi to be tried. 
c) for wrongdoer control to be proved. 
16 LS Sealy, Cases & Materials in Company Law, 6th ed.London,Butterworths,l996, 
p 534 
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Also the "exception to the exception" principle illustrated in Smith v Croft 
(No.2) is irrelevant. Furthermore, the requirement of clean hands as stated in Nurcombe v 
Nurcombe and the new obstacle created by Barrett v Duckett & Ors, namely that the 
derivative action is not possible if an alternative remedy is available are irrelevant in a 
. 
petition based on _section 181. Therefore section 1~1 is a great boon to minority 
shareholders because of its wider scope and the unlimited relief that can be provided by 
the courts at their discretion to the minority shareholders. Section 181 comes into play 
when one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
1) the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to one or 
more of the members, shareholders or debenture holders of the company; or 
2) the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressiv~ to one or 
more members shareholders or debenture holders of the company;· or 
3) the affairs of the company are being conducted in disregard of the interests of one 
or more of the members shareholders or debenture holders of the company; or 
4) the powers of the directors are being exercised in disregard of the interests of one 
or more of the members sharehoiders or debenture holders of the company; or 
5) some act of the company have been done or is threatened to be done which 
unfairly discriminates against one or more of the members or debenture holders of 
the company; or 
6) some resolution of the members (or any class of them) has been passed or is 
proposed which unfairly discriminates against one or more of the members or 
debenture holders off the company; or 
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7) some act of the company has been done or is threatened which is otherwise 
prejudicial to one or more of the members or debenture holders of the company; 
or 
8) some resolution of the members ( or any class of them) has been passed or is 
· proposed which is othenvise prejudicial to one or more of the members or 
debenture holders of the company. 
II. Advantages of applications under Section 181 Companies Act 1965 
Section 181 is more flexible and allows the courts to play an important role in the 
protection of minority shareholders and debenture holders. Such a role bestowed upon the 
courts indirectly enhances the proper management of companies, lead to better 
accountability of those managing companies and prevent abuse of powers by directors 
and those in control of companies. This in tum leads to proper and effective use of the 
resources of the company, especially the capital raised from shareholders and debenture 
holders. 
The remedies provided in section 181(2) are non exhaustive and it is to be 
noted that the remedies provided in section 181 (2 )(a) and (b) show the wide extent of the 
power of the courts to interfere in the management of the companies. The courts are not 
only able to direct or prohibit any act or cancel any transaction or resolution but most 
importantly are able to regulate the conduct of the affairs of the company in the future. 
This remedies basically allow the courts to cast aside the internal management rule 
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entrenched under the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The wide discretionary powers given and 
exercised by the courts can be seen in the cases. 17 
One significant achievement of section 181(1)' is that it allows for 
managerial misconduct or mismanagement to be actionable by the minority .. Therefore in 
situations involving continuous breach of duties by directors, even though the breaches 
are based namely on negligence, a petition under section 181 would be appropriate. In the 
Australian cases of Re Spargos Mining NL18 andRe Enterprise Gold Mines NL, 19 which 
' 
were based on the equivalent of the Malaysian section 181, corporate reliefs were 
granted where the petitioners complained of breaches of fiduciary duties and managerial 
misconduct. Further, the significance of section 181 in comparison to the common law 
can be seen in the context of exclusion of a member from management.of a company in 
breach of an express or implied understanding that the member would be allowed to 
participate in the management of the company. In common law, such a member could 
apply to wind the company on the 'just and equitable' ground?0 In fact in Re Tivoli 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Re Coliseum Stand Car Service Ltd [1972] 1 MLJ 109; Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v 
Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors [1994] 2 MLJ 789; Chiew S:=e Sun & Anor v 
Cast Iron Products Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 AMR 3173; Re SQ Wong Hong 
Holdings Pte Ltd [1987] 1 MLJ 298 
(1990) 3 ACSR 1 
(1991) 9 ACLC 168 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Ors [1973] AC 360; Tay Bok Choon v 
Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 433 
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Freeholds Lttf1 and Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd/2 winding up was ordered 
even though oppression was not proved. It is obvious that under section 181, the court in 
exercising its discretion, would be able to provide an appropriate remedy rather than take 
the drastic step of winding up the company, especially if it is a well established and a 
profitable going concern. Generally, winding up would have too far an implication , not 
only on the shareholders but also on the creditors and the employees of the 'tompany. 
Therefore, the availability of wide remedies under section 181(2) provides a proper 
avenue for shareholders and debenture holders to obtain a suitable remedy rather rely on 
the drastic remedy of winding up under the present section 218 Companies Act 1965. 
It cannot be doubted that the wide ambit of discretion granted to the· courts 
under section 181(2) would possibly allow the courts to provide remedies that are not 
clearly specified or mentioned in the section. An order similar to that made in the English 
case of Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltrf3 could possibly be made in Malaysia. In that 
case, the court relying on the equivalent of section 181 (2X c), made an order against a 
constructive trustee to purchase the shares of a petitioner in the company from which 
assets were transferred at a gross undervalue to the constructive trustee?4 Also m 
appropriate situations, a receiver and manager or a provisional liquidator could be 
21 
22 
23 
24 
[1972] V.R. 488 
[1973] AC 360 
[1995] 1 BCLC 636 
Loh Siew Cheang, Supra n 4 at 168 
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appointed by the courts. In Jenkins v Enterprise Gold Mines NL andRe Back 2 Pay 6 Pty 
Ltd,25 the courts made such appointments respectively when dealing with the equivalent 
of section 181. 
III. Limitations of applications under Section 181 Companies Act 1965 
s 
One of the major limitations of section 181, is that the legislatur~ has failed to provide 
any definitions or guidelines as to the meaning of the words 'oppression', 
'discrimination', 'prejudice' and 'disregard of interests' . It was completely left in, the 
hands of the judiciary and this led to various interpretations being given by the courts. 
Owing to the lack of clear and precise definitions or guidelines, the courts have faced and 
will continue to face a great burden in trying to balance the competing ·interests of both 
the majority and the minority and to ensure that the parties are treated fairly. But then the 
concept of fairness, which is the underlying factor in the above elements is itself a vague 
term. What is fairness in a particular case may vary between the judges sitting in the 
same court or between a judge sitting in the High Court and a judge sitting in a Supreme 
Court. The minority would have to rely on the wisdom and the ability of the judges to 
apply the facts in relation to the above vague elements. What is important is that a judge 
must consider the spirit of the legislation rather than the individual elements as such. In 
the writer's opinion it is essential for a judge to be more concerned in addressing the facts 
and the substantial issues rather than to be tied down with what the 'elements' actually 
mean. In a way the vagueness of the elements do provide the courts room to apply the 
elements in a wide range of circumstances. Nevertheless the courts must be careful, so as 
25 (1994) 12 ACLC 253 
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not to treat applicants under section 181 too favourably as it may hinder the companies' 
businesses and trade and may give rise to unnecessary litigation costs to the companies. 
In the long run the whole general body of shareholders are the ones who will suffer. The 
' 
courts must therefore ensure that section 181 is not blatantly abused by those who are 
~ntitled to rely on it. 
It is to be noted that the minority provlSlon still lacks protection to 
shareholders in public companies. In this type of companies, shareholders · are merely 
investors and hardly play an important role in the management and running of the 
company. As individuals they do not have the voting power to decide issues because of 
the wide spread of the shareholdings in this type of companies. Members are not locked 
into the company and the free transferability of the shares would allow the shareholders 
to exit the company. On the other hand, in private companies the importance of the 
minority protection cannot be undermined. In private companies the interests of members 
are paramount and the courts take into account equitable considerations in ensuring that 
the minority rights are protected. 
An important reform that could be introduced in the Companies Act 1965, 
is the 'Appraisal Remedy' which is available in the Canadian jurisdiction. This remedy is 
especially important in public companies, where minority shareholders may not be happy 
with the running of the company. Since it is rather difficult for them to invoke section 
181 , it is suggested that in such circumstances they be given the option to sell their shares 
to the corporation or other members at a fair value. In Canada, section 190, Canada 
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Business Corporation Act, RSC 1985, cc-44 provides that a shareholder may apply to the 
court to fix a fair value for the shares of any dissenting shareholder. A similar provision 
should be incorporated in the Malaysian legislation. 
In ·section 181 (2), the legislature did not specifically provide for a 
statutory derivative action as is provided in section 216( c) of the Singapore Companies 
Act 1967. Thus, it is arguable that where directors or members have committed a wrong 
against the company and refuse to bring an action against themselves, members may not 
have a remedy under section 181. This argument is based on the fact that section 181 is 
concerned with personal rights and not corporate actions. In Foo Ban Nyen v Foo Yet 
Kai,26 it was held that the section did not allow a derivative action and fi~her in Re Tong 
Eng Sdn Bhd,27 the petition was dismissed on the grounds that the petitioner was not 
personally oppressed or unfairly treated. However, in Peugeout SA v Asia Automobile 
Industries Sdn Bhd,28 Siti Norma Yaakob J suggested that section 181 could be used by 
members to bring an action on behalf of the company. In view ofthe above controversies, 
it is suggested that the legislature should include in section 181 (2) a remedy authorising a 
member to bring civil proceedings on behalf of the company as is provided in the other 
jurisdictions like Singapore, United Kingdom and Australia. 
Further, what probably needs to done is the inclusion of directors, officers 
and other persons as persons entitled to petition in section 181 . This is irr.portant because 
26 
27 
28 
[1991] 2 CLJ 1364 
[1994] 1 MLJ 451 
[1988] 3 MLJ 209 
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directors and officers of a company are usually well informed on the management and 
operation of the companies and are therefore in a better position to institute and 
commence legal proceedings against those managing or conducting the affairs of the 
company in a wrongful manner. Discretion can be given to the courts in allowing any 
' 
other person to pur~ue an action under section 181 . In, fact, the remedies under section 
181(2)(a) and (b) seem to provide wide powers to the courts to remedy breaches of 
' . 
directors fiduciary duties. 
It is suggested by the writer that a provision similar to the Australian 
section 260( 4) be included in section 181. Section 260( 4) prohibits the court from making 
a winding up order if it is of the opinion that the winding up of the company would 
unfairly prejudice the oppressed member or members. Although there is no similar 
Australian provision in the United Kingdom but it is to be noted that section 461, 
Companies Act 1985 (U.K) does not specifically mention winding up as a remedy. 
However, it is arguable that the court may do so owing to the fact that the provision states 
that the remedies are not exhaustive. Nevertheless, it is the writer's opinion that the 
inclusion of a similar Australian section would clearly highlight to the courts and the 
applicants under section 181 that it is the legislature's intention that the remedy of 
winding up should only be resorted to ifthere is ·no other suitable remedy available under 
the circumstances. If the applicant's primary intention is to wind up the company, then 
the applicant should pursue an action under section 218(f) of the Companies Act 1965, 
which is almost similar to section 181 ( 1 )(a). 
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With respect to section 181(2)(d) it is suggested by the writer that the 
section does not reflect a specific remedy and it would be advisable to have the section 
removed. However, in doing so, section 181(2)(c) has to be amended accordingly. It is 
suggested that section 181(c) and (d) be replaced with a similar provision as provided for 
in section 260(2)(e) and (f) of the Australian provi~ion. Moreover in dealing with the 
remedy on the purchase of shares, it is suggested that a prop~r mechanism for the 
valuation of shares be put into place. Possibly a body of professionals who are experts in 
the area of valuation of shares can be referred to by the courts in circumstances involving 
' 
the purchase of shares by other members or the company itself This is important rather 
than to solely rely on the ability of judges to do so. With the increasing number of cases 
under section 181 , it would be important in the long run to have such a body set up,' so as 
to handle remedies involving valuation of shares. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has used the words 'otherwise 
prejudicial' in section 181 ( 1 )(b) and the accepted fact that only an unjustifiable detriment 
caused to a member will entitle him to relief, it is suggested by the writer that for the 
purposes of clarity of law, the words 'unfairly prejudicial' be included in section 181 
instead of the words 'otherwise prejudicial' . Moreover, such an inclusion would be 
consistent with the words ' unfairly discriminatory' in the section. 
With regards to persons seeking relief under section 181, it is the opinion 
of the writer that the section is very restrictive in the sense that only members , debenture 
holders or the Minister may make an application . It has been seen that the narrow and 
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strict categorisation of persons being able to seek relief may deprive certain groups of 
people from obtaining a relief under section 181. In this respect, one possible reform to 
section 181, that would be necessary for the sake of clarity of law is the inclusion of a 
provision similar to the Australian sections 260(5)(b) and (c): Such a provision would 
clearly allow a member to bring an action if the member is affected in some other 
capacity than as a member. Even though the case authorities in Malaysia29 and the United 
' . 
Kingdom30 seem to support that a member would be entitled to bring such an action but 
there is no authoritative statement of law endorsing as such. 
It is also suggested further that a provision similar to section 459(2) of the 
English Act or section 260(1)(aXi) and section 260(5Xa) of the Australian Act, 
recognising and giving a right to a legal personal representative and tQ a person to whom 
a share in the company has been transmitted by will or operation of law, be included in 
the Malaysian section. The non existence of such a provision may give rise to injustice in 
certain circumstances and it is only fair that this persons be allowed to rely on section 181 
to protect their rights. Although the Court of Appeal in Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau 
Jaya Sdn Bhd had stated that the strict interpretation of section 181, allowing only 
registered members to seek a remedy under section 181 is too simplistic an approach and 
would be inequitable in certain circumstances, it is suggested that the legislature should 
have a wider provision to at least protect the legal personal representative and to those to 
whom the shares are transmitted by operation of law. 
29 
30 
Re Chi Liung & Sons Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 97 
Re A Company (No. 002567 of 1982) [1983] 1 WLR 927; Virdi v Abbey Leisure 
Ltd [1990] BCLC 342 
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Lastly, it is suggested that section 181 should also include ' creditors' 
rather than just ' debenture holders' as persons entitled to petition. The term debenture 
being not clearly defined would only lead to confusion and · lead to an increase in 
litigation costs. This is due to the fact that the courts- would have to establish whether a 
particular person is a debenture holder for the purposes of the section. It is the opinion of 
the writer that all creditors of a company, should be fairly treated and protected. In this 
respect the legislature can provide the courts discretionary powers to decide in any 
application, whether a particular creditor is entitled to a remedy under section 181. it is 
also essential for the legislature to clearly specify and define the category of creditors 
who are entitled to bring an action under section 181 . Is it creditors to whom a debt is 
owing or does it include persons to whom unliquidated claims for damages are due? With 
regards to the position of creditors, it is suggested by the writer that the Malaysian 
legislature could obtain much assistance by referring to the respective Canadian 
provisions and case authorities which had been briefly highlighted in this dissertation. 
BffiLIOGRAPHY 
Articles: 
Bastin NA, 'Minority Protection in Company Law' (1968) JBL)20 
Bastin NA, ' Minority Shareholders Suits' (1 S 80 ) l Co Law 3 
Baxt R, 'The Conduct of the Affairs of Companies in an Alleged Oppressive Manner' 
. (1985) 59 AU 347 
Baxt R, 'The New Remedy in Oppression - A Reworded Provision or a New Remedy?' 
(1985) 3 C and SU 21 
Baxt R, 'Oppression -Allotment of Control to Shareholder Advancing Loan- Lack of 
Equal Opportunity to other Major Shareholders' 46 ALJ 139 
Baxt R, 'Companies - OpprP-ssion - What constituties - Laches by affected Members' 
(1971-1972) 45 AU 103 
Baxt R, 'Reform of Company Law' ( 1983) 1 C and SU 204 
Baxter C, 'The Role of the Judge in Enforcing Shareholder Rights' ( 1983 ) 42 CLJ 96 
Black BS, 'Shareholder Passivity Examined' ( 1990) 89 Michigan L Rev 520 
Beck SM, 'J11e Shareholders Derivative Action' ( 1974) 52 Canadian Bar Review 159 
Block, Radin and Rosenzweig, 'The Role of the Business Judgement Rule in Shareholder 
Litigation at the turn of the Decade' ( 1990) 45 Bus Law 469 
Boyle, 'Indemnifying the Minority Shareholder' (1976) JBL 18 
Boyle, 'Statutory Protection of Minorities' (1991 ) BLR 87 
Boyle, 'The Derivative Action in Company Law' (1969) JBL 120 
Boyle, 'The Derivative Action in Company Law' ( 1969) JBL 120 
Boyle, ' The Minority Shareholder in the Nineteenth Century: A study in Anglo-American 
Legal History'( 1965) 28 MLR 317 
Bottomley S, 'Shareholder Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits : Two Versions 
of the same story' (1992) 15 U.N.S.W.L.J. 127 
208 
209 
Cameron, 'Rugby League Footballers and "Oppression or Injustice"' ( 1995 ) 8 
U.N. S.L.J 236 
Cheffins BR, 'The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law : The Canadian 
Experience'(l988 ) 10 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Business Law 305 
Cheffins BRand Dine 1M, 'Shareholder Remedies: Lessons from Canada' (1992 ) 13 
CoLaw89 
Cheffin BR and Dine JM, 'The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders: Section 
459 of the Companies Act 1985' (1992) 13 Co Law 83 
Coffee JC and Schwartz DE, 'The Survival of The Derivative Suit : An Evaluation a.nd a 
proposal for Legislative Reform' ( 1981) 81 Columbia L Rev 261 
Corkery JF, 'Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers - What Can a Shareholder Do 
About It? An analysis ofs320 ofthe Companies Code' (1983- 1985) 9 Adelaide 
Law Review 437 
Crabb, 'Minority Protection' ( 1981 ) 2 Co Law 2 
Demott DA, 'Shareholder Litigation in Australia and the United States Common 
Problems, Uncommon Solutions' ( 1987 ) Syd L Rev 259 
Digby Q, 'Eliminating Minority Shareholdings' ( 1992) 10 C and SLJ 105 
Fletcher KL, 'Section 209 of the Companies Act 1955: A Step Towards Shareholder 
Protection' (1970) 5 V.U.W Law Review 479 
Fox, 'Conduct Unfairly Prejudicial to some Members or to Members Generally' ( 1990) 
11 Co Law Dig 153 
Fox, 'Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct in Companies' ( 1988 ) 7 Sol Jo 78 
Friedman S, 'Ratification of Directors Breaches' (1992) 10 C and SU 252 
Gower, 'Oppression of Minorities' ( 1958) 21 MLR 653 
Gregory R, 'What is the Rule in Foss v Harbottle?' ( 1986) 45 MLR 584 
210 
Griffin, 'The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders - s459 of the Companies Act 
1985' ( 1992) 13 Co Law 83 
Griffin, 'Holding Companies Conducting Affairs of Subsidiaries 
Nicholas'(1994) 110 LQR 28 
ex parte 
Heerey PC, 'The Shareholders petition in cases if Oppression' ( 1962) 36 ALJ 187 
Herzberg A, ' Unfair prejudice to members interests~ Meaning of 'Unfairly Prejudicial -
Refusal by Company to Purchase Shares - Company proposing to enter new 
Business unrelated to existing business- Companies Act 1980 (England) s75 (I)' 
(1984) 2 C and SU 206 
Heng, Soh Koon, 'Protection of Minority Shareholders Rights in Malaysia' .( Project 
paper- Faculty of Law Universiti Malaya - 1982/83) ' 
Hill J, 'Protection of Minority Shareholders and Reasonable Expectations' ( 1992) 10 C 
and SLJ 86 
Kluver J, 'Derivative Actions and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle: Do w,e need a Statutory 
Remedy?' ( 1993 ) C and SLJ 7 
Lowry JP, ' The Scope of Unfairly Prejudicial Conducts' ( 1994) JBL 160 - 165 
Macintosh JG, 'Bad Faith and The Oppression Remedy: Uneasy Marrriage, Or Amicable 
Divorce' (1990) 69 Can B Rev 276 
Macintosh JG, 'Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860 - 1987' 
[1989] 27 Osgoode Hall L.J 561 
Macintosh JG, 'The Oppresive Remedy: Personal or Derivative?' ( 1991) 70 Can B Dev 
29 
Macintosh JG, 'The Shareholder's Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical Reappraisal' 
(1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J 201 
Mason HH, 'Fraud on the Minority. The problem of a single formulation of the principle' 
(1972) 46 AU 67 
Mason HH, 'Misappropriation of Company's Property and Gifts by a Company :An 
Anglo- Australian Comparison' ( 1979) 53 ALJ 271 
211 
McPherson BH, 'Duties of Directors and the Powers of the Shareholders' (1977) 51 ALJ 
460 
McPherson, 'Winding up on the 'Just and Equitable' Ground' ( 1964) 27 MLR 282 
McPherson BH, 'Oppression of the Minority Shareholders: Part r ( 1963) 36 ALJ 404 
McPherson BH, 'Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Part IF (11963) 36 ALJ 427 
Mooney P, 'S 18I Companies Act 1965' (1977) 2 MLJ xxii 
Neylan MJ, 'The Rule in Foss v Harbottle and the Statutory Derivative Action' ( 1992) 6 
Commercial Law Quarterly 11 
0' Donovan J and 0' Grady G.W, 'Company Deadlocks: Prevention and Cure' ( 1982) 
1 C and SLJ 67 
O'Neal, 'Oppression of Minority Shareholders : Protecting Minority Rights' ( J986 -
1987) 35 Cleveland State L. Rev 12.1 
Partridge RJC, 'Ratification and the Release of Directors from Personal Liability' (1987) 
46 Co Law 122 
Pillai P, 'Enforcement of Directors Dutzes and Oppression: In Re Kong Thai Sawmill 
(Miri) Sdn Bhd' ( 1976 ) 1 MLJ 1 xxii 
Pillai P, 'Minority Shareholders - Oppression' 21 Malaya Law Review 241 
Pillai P, 'Oppression of Minority Shareholders : The Singapore and Malaysian 
Experience' ( 1979 ) Mal L R 241 
Pollack K, 'Statutory Relief from Oppression: Re Chi Liung and Son Ltd' (1969) 11 Mal 
LR345 
Prentice DD, 'Winding up on the just and equitable ground : The Partnership Analogy' 
(1973) 89 LQR 107 
Prentice DD, 'The Theory of the Firm: Minority Shareholder Oppression: s459- 461 of 
the Companies Act 1985' ( 1988) 8 Ox. JLS 55 
Prentice DD, 'Minority shareholder oppression : Valuation of shares' (1986 ) 102 LQR 
179 
212 
Prentice DD, 'Protection of Minority Shareholders: Section 210 of the Companies Act 
1948' (1972) Current Legal Problems 124 
Prentice DD, 'Shareholder Actions: The rule in Foss v Harbottle' ( 1988) 104 LQR 341 
Rajak H, 'The Oppression of Minority Shareholdus' '( 1972 ) 35 MLR 156 
Ramsay I, 'Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and The Prospects for a 
· Statutory Derivative Action' ( 1992) 15 U.N.S.W.L.J 149 . 
Rees S, 'Directors' Unfair Conduct as a Ground for Remedy under the Companies Act 
(1985) 3 C and SLJ 63 
Rider AK, 'Amiable Lunatics and the rule in Foss v Harbottle' ( 1978) CLJ 270 
Riley, 'Contracting Out of Company Law: S459' ( 1992) 55 MLR 782 
Russel M, 'The Companies Amendment Act 1980' (1981) NZU 71 
Sealy LS, 'More Bleak News for the Minority Shareholder' [ 1987] CU 398 
Sealy LS, 'The Rule in Foss v Harbottle: The Australian Experience' (1989) 10 Co Law 
52 
Shapira G, 'Minority Shareholders Protection - Recent Developments' (1982) 10 
N.Z. U.L.R 134 
Shapira, 'Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders: Towards the "squeeze out"' in 
Farrar (ed), Contemporary Issues in Company Law (1987) 
Smith, 'Minority shareholders and Corporate J"egularities' ( 1987) 41 MLR 147 
Speakman M, 'Directors Duties and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle: Prudential Assurance 
Co v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2)' (1983) 10 Syd LR 156 
Stamp M, 'Minority Shareholders: another nail in the coffin' (1988) 9 Co Law 134 
Stapleton GP, 'Use of the Oppression provision in Listed Companies in Australia and 
United Kingdom' ( 1993 ) 67 ALJ 575 
Stapeldon, 'Mismanagement and the Unfair Prejudice Provision' ( 1993 ) 14 Co Law 94 
213 
Stephanie Rees, 'Directors Unfair Conduct as a ground for a remedy under the 
Companies Act' ( 1985 ) 3 C and SLJ 63 
Sullivan GR, 'Restating the Scope of the Derivative Action' (1985) 44 CU 236 
Telfer J.H and Mitchell R.J, 'Reduction of capital and the rights of the minority classes 
of shareholders: A New Approach to s 64' (.1981) 55 AlJ 249 
Thompson CJH, 'Share issues and the rule in Foss v Harbottle' (1975) 49 ALJ 134 
Tuffnell KD, 'Restrictions on Shareholders' Voting Rights' (1993) 14 Co Law 90 
Vann RJ, 'Share allotments, ultra vires and the rule in Foss v Harbottle' (1978) 52 ALJ 
490 . 
Wedderburn KW, 'Oppression of Minority Shareholders' (1966) 29 MLR 320 
Wedderburn KW, 'Shareholder rights and the rule in Foss v Harbottle' (1957) CU 194 
and (1958) 93 
Wedderburn KW, 'Shareholders Control of Director' Powers: A Judicial Innovation?' 
(1967) 30 MLR 77 
Weiss G, 'Shareholders Protection- The meaning of Unfairly Prejudicial and Unfairly 
Discriminatory Conduct' ( 1984) 2 C and SU 138 
Wishart D, 'A Fresh Approach to Section 320' ( 1987) 17 U.W.A.L.Rev 94 
WK Wong, 'Minority Shareholders Action: A commentary on Federal Transport Service 
Co Ltd v Abdul Malik and Ors' ( 1974 ) 2 MlJ xxxiv 
Xuerub PG, 'The Limitation on the Exercise of Majority Power' (1990) 6 Co Law 199 
Xuerub PG, 'Remedies for Abuse of Majority Power' ( 1986) 7 Co Law 53 
Yeung K, 'Disentangling the Tangled Skein 
Actions'(1992) 66 ALJ 343 
The Ratification of Directors 
214 
Afterman and Baxt' s, Cases and Materials on Corporations and Associations, 6th ed. 
Sydney, Butterwoths, 1992. 
Andrew Hicks and SH Goo, Cases and Materials on Company Law, London, Blackstone 
Press Limited, 1994. 
A.J. Boyle and J.Birds, Boyle & Bird's Company Law, 3rd ed. Bristol, Jordans, 1995. 
CCH, Guidebook to New Zealand Company Law Highlighting The 1980 Amendments, 
Auckland, Commerce Clearing House (New Zealand), 1981. 
CCH Company Law Editors, Guide to Company Law in Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd ed., 
CCH Asia Limited, 1993. ' 
CCH Company Law Editors, Malaysia and Singapore Company Law and Practice, 
Singapore, CCH Asia Limited, 1990. 
th . Charlesworth and Morse, Company Law, 15 ed. London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995. 
Chris Shepherd, Company Law Textbook, 7th ed. London, HLT Publications, 1995. 
Dr. Avtar Singh, Company Law, 9th ed. Lucknow, Eastern Book Company, 1989. 
HAJ Ford, Principles of Company Law, 2nd ed. Sydney, Butterworths, 1978. 
HAJ Ford and RP Austin, Ford & Austin's Principles of Corporation Law, 7th ed. 
Sydney, Butterworths, 1995. 
Harry Sutherlandd,Q.c., David B.Horsley,Q.C., Graham Turner, Christopher 
D.Woodbury and Shona Bradley, Fraser & Stewart's Company Law of Canada, 
6ed. Ontario, Canada, Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, 1993. 
IJ Dawson and IS Stephenson, The Protection of Minority Shareholders, Croydon, 
Surrey, Tolley Publishing Company Limited, 1993. 
J.H Farrar, N.Furey and B.Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law, 2nd ed. London, 
Butterworths, 1988. 
215 
J.H Farrar, N.Furey and B.Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law, 3rd ed. London, 
Butterworths, 1991 . 
Krishnan Arjunan and Low Chee Keong, Lipton & Herzberg's Understanding Company 
Law in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, LBC Information Services, 1995. 
Loh Siew Cheang, Corporate Powers: Control, Remedies and Decision Making, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malayan Law Journal, 1996. 
LS Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law, 5 ed. London, Butterworths, 1992. 
L.C.B Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 5th ed. London, Swee_t & Maxwell, 
1992. 
Paul Redmond, Companies and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, 2ed. 
Sydney, The Law Book Company Limited, 1992. 
Peter G Willcocks, Shareholders' Rights and Remedies, Sydney The Federation Press, 
1991 . 
Peter G. Xuereb, The Rights of Shareholders, Oxford, London, BSP Professional Books, 
1989. 
P.Lipton & A.Herzberg, Understanding Company Law, 5th ed. Sydney, The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1993. 
Philip Pillai, Sourcebook of Singapore and l'vfalaysian Company Law, 2 ed. Singapore, 
Butterworths 1986. 
Robert R Pennington, Company Law, 6th ed. London Butterworths, 1990. 
Robin Hollington, Minority Shareholders' Rights, 2nd ed. London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1994. 
SH Goo, Minority Shareholders' Protection: A Study of Section 459 of the Companies 
Act 1985, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1994. 
S.W Mayson, D.French and C.Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law, 9th ed. 
London, Blackstone Press, 1992. 
216 
Walter CM Woon, Company Law, Singapore, Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) Ltd, 
1988. 
Walter Woon and Andrew Hicks, The Companies Act of Malaysia: An Annotation, 
Malaysia, Butterworths Asia 1997. 
